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Abstract
The TLS protocol is one of the most important protocols today.
This thesis is a study of TLS 1.3 and its use in composite protocols.
The TLS protocol is intended to enable secure end-to-end communica-
tion over insecure networks, including the Internet. Unfortunately, this
goal has been thwarted a number of times throughout the protocol’s
tumultuous lifetime, resulting in the need for a new version of the pro-
tocol, namely TLS 1.3. Over the past four years, in an unprecedented
joint design effort with the academic community, the TLS Working
Group has been working tirelessly to enhance the security of TLS.
We provide a comprehensive, faithful, and modular symbolic model
of TLS 1.3, and use the Tamarin prover to verify the claimed TLS 1.3
requirements. Our analysis reveals a previously unreported unexpected
behaviour, which inhibits strong authentication guarantees in some
circumstances. In particular, participants cannot always derive their
authentication status. We also provide a symbolic model of Exported
Authenticators (EAs), a protocol that is layered on top of TLS to create
a composite protocol, using the Tamarin prover to verify the claimed
requirements. Our analysis requires us to define new authentication
properties that allow us to capture the guarantees claimed by EAs. The
results of our analysis show the same issue appears in EAs. We thus
propose Layered EAs, an extension to EAs that allows participants
to derive their authentication status. We provide a symbolic model of
LEAs, and use the Tamarin prover to provide a partial proof of the
claimed requirements.
We also propose a protocol composition that layers TLS 1.3 on top
of a multi-party authentication protocol. This allows us to construct a
TLS channel where the key is agreed between multiple parties, whilst
preserving authentication and integrity. We compare and contrast this
composition with three controversial proposals designed to achieve sim-
ilar confidentiality guarantees.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Security protocols have become ubiquitous in modern day life, with au-
thenticated end-to-end encryption becoming the norm. Whilst the design of
protocols has changed dramatically over the last few decades we can trace
the use of security protocols back to antiquity. From the use of seals in early
Imperial China [Lan12] to prove authenticity[1] to the use of obscure hiero-
glyphs to encipher proper names in ancient Egypt [Kah74], people have been
attempting to secure the written word for thousands of years. With the ad-
vent of mechanised, and later digitised cryptology the guarantees required
of security protocols began to be formalised and studied with rigour.
Modern security protocols are constructed from a relatively small number
of widely studied and well understood security primitives, such as symmetric
encryption and hashing. By constructing a protocol from these primitives it
is possible to achieve a wide variety of complex security properties.
1.1 Thesis overview
Over the course of this thesis we will discuss and develop three major themes.
1. The use of formal analysis in designing and securing protocols,
2. the construction of composite protocols, and
3. the interaction between the formal analysis community and the stan-
dards bodies that deploy protocols.
[1]A practice still common in East Asia today. For example in Japan and Korea legal
documents will often require a stamp from a seal registered with the government.
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1.2. Motivation
Formal analysis is a set of techniques for analysing security protocols and
the properties they achieve. We use these techniques to analyse a protocol
called TLS 1.3 and a number of protocols based on it. We extend these tech-
niques and push the boundaries of what it is currently possible to analyse.
We extend a number of definitions of authentication properties that allow
us to reason about a wider array of protocols, and develop new techniques
for constructing new protocols from old protocols.
Of particular focus is the study of composite protocols. Composite pro-
tocols are those formed of a number of constituent protocols. We design and
analyse a number of composite protocols based around TLS to achieve var-
ious complex effects. We make use of a technique called channel binding to
bind the constituent protocols together, achieving new security properties.
In particular we study compound authentication, an authentication property
that describes the authentication relationship between the different layers
of a composite protocol and extend the definitions to allow us to analyse a
wider range of protocols and properties.
Over the course of this research we collaborated closely with the IETF,
the premier internet standards body. The IETF produces and maintains
widely followed standards for internet protocols. IETF standards are there-
fore of great interest to the academic community. Working with the IETF
on draft standards allows the academic community to contribute their ex-
pertise to protocols that may see wide deployment, finding flaws before they
become a problem in the real world.
1.2 Motivation
The Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol is one of the most widely
deployed protocols in the world, used hundreds of billions of times each
day.[2] TLS provides a secure channel between a client and a server, and is
used to protect everything from financial transactions to cat gifs. The TLS
protocol has been refined over the years, with several versions currently
deployed. TLS 1.2 is by far the most common version.[3] In 2014 the IETF
[2]https://www.cloudflare.com/ssl/
[3]https://blog.cloudflare.com/why-tls-1-3-isnt-in-browsers-yet/
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1.3. Contributions
began drafting TLS 1.3, the latest version of TLS. Because of TLS’s ubiquity,
importance, and complexity the IETF commissioned a number of formal
analyses [Cre+16] [Bha+16b] [BBK17] [Cre+17a].
Formal analysis is the process of constructing a model of the protocol in
a form that can be reasoned about logically, and analysing its properties.
Using model checking software we construct proofs that the model has, or
does not have, certain properties. By careful construction of the model it is
possible to thereby obtain assurances of the security of the protocol design.
The IETF used the results of these analyses to inform the construction of
the protocol, undergoing multiple rounds of analysis and redesign.
1.3 Contributions
Our major contributions in this work are as follows.
• We prove that TLS 1.3 meets most of its security goals.
• We develop the literature on compound authentication to prove that
EAs meet their security goals.
• We develop layered exported authenticators (LEAs), an extension to
EAs with even stronger security goals.
• We provide a partial proof of the security of LEAs.
• We develop MLS with TLS, a composite protocol with complex confi-
dentiality and authentication guarantees.
1.4 The structure of the thesis
In this thesis we first introduce some background material on formal analysis
and the IETF’s processes in Chapter 2, and proceed on to one of these
analyses, namely [Cre+17a], in Chapter 3.
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In Chapter 3 we begin by describing TLS 1.3 and how we modelled it.
We then describe our analysis and results. Because TLS is used in so many
places and for so many different things TLS 1.3 is a very complex protocol.
In the course of our analysis we highlight a problem with post-handshake
authentication, which extends to the main handshake. We show that a client
never knows its authentication status, and thus cannot distinguish between
a bilaterally authenticated connection and a unilaterally authenticated con-
nection.
This leads us into Chapter 4, where we analyse draft-sullivan. draft-
sullivan defines a protocol that runs over the top of TLS that is intended
to supersede post-handshake authentication. draft-sullivan allows either
party to add arbitrarily many identities to a TLS channel, as opposed to
standard TLS that allows the client and server at most one identity each.
This is useful in the case of Content Distribution Networks (CDNs), which
represent many websites, each with a different identity. Layering this authen-
tication on top of TLS means that rather than construct a new protocol, it
is possible to run one protocol inside another. This leads us to the study of
layered authentication protocols.
Layered authentication protocols are a type of composite protocol formed
by nesting a number of authentication protocols one inside the other. Com-
posite protocols can have different security properties to those of their con-
stituent protocols. In Chapter 4 we develop the tools for analysing composite
authentication protocols, extending the definitions of compound authentica-
tion to describe a larger array of protocols. We then use these new definitions
to analyse draft-sullivan, and prove it has the desired security properties.
draft-sullivan however has the same issue as we discovered in TLS
1.3, and further, extends the ambiguity to the server. Because either party
may silently reject an authentication attempt, neither party can know if its
authentication attempt was successful. To address this issue, and to allow for
more complex authentication properties, we propose draft-hoyland, which
extends draft-sullivan to link runs of draft-sullivan together.
This linkage has a number of applications, from certificate pinning to
session resumption. In Chapter 5 we discuss the design of this binding, and
16
1.4. The structure of the thesis
the reasoning behind it. We then analyse the properties of the proposal,
finding that whilst we can prove a partial result about draft-hoyland, pro-
ducing a complete proof is elusive. Given its scope of potential applications
and the strength of the partial results, we demonstrate that draft-hoyland
is worthy of further study, which we leave for future work.
Both Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 examine composite protocols that layer
protocols on top of TLS. In Chapter 6 we invert this pattern and study
protocols which run TLS on top of a different base layer. This lets us produce
very different guarantees.
We were motivated in this work by a contentious discussion around the
use of TLS in enterprise environments. A number of enterprises decrypt TLS
traffic as it passes over their network to detect attacks and to diagnose issues.
In TLS 1.2 this could be achieved by using any of a set of modes that didn’t
provide a feature called forward secrecy. If a mode provides forward secrecy
then a passive observer cannot decrypt the traffic, even if provisioned with
the servers long-term keys (LTKs). TLS 1.3 deprecates all modes that do
not provide forward secrecy.
The removal of these modes was highly contentious, leading to a num-
ber of proposals for achieving visibility into TLS 1.3 connections within a
corporate network. Each of these proposals was flawed in a number of ways.
In Chapter 6 we describe each of these proposals, and discuss their mer-
its and drawbacks, before proposing a different option. By constructing a
composite protocol that uses TLS as an inner layer and a protocol called
MLS as its base layer we can construct a protocol that has a complex set
guarantees that we claim resolves or militates against all the objectionable
parts of earlier drafts. We describe these guarantees formally, and then work
through each objection raised in the debates surrounding this issue. Finally,
in Chapter 7 we provide some conclusions and final remarks.
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Chapter 2
Background
In this chapter we will provide a history of TLS, its goals, and its develop-
ment. In particular we focus on the design process at the IETF and attacks
on the different iterations of the protocol. We discuss the changes in the
development process for TLS 1.3, the latest version at the time of writing.
We use this as motivation to introduce formal analysis, a key factor in TLS
1.3’s development. We then proceed to introduce the various security primi-
tives we work with throughout the thesis. Finally we introduce the Tamarin
prover, a tool for carrying out formal analysis of protocols.
2.1 TLS
TLS is a protocol that allows two parties “to communicate over the Internet
in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and message
forgery.” [RFC8446, p. 1]. In short TLS is designed to provide a secure chan-
nel between a client and server over the internet. This achieved by means
of a handshake protocol that negotiates a set of authenticated secret keys
that are used to build a secure channel. The Transport Layer Security (TLS)
protocol is the de facto means for securing communications on the World
Wide Web, securing upwards of 70% of connections.[1] Initially released as
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) by Netscape Communications in 1995, the pro-
tocol has been subject to a number of version upgrades over the course of
its more than 20-year lifespan. Rebranded as TLS when it fell under the
[1]https://letsencrypt.org/stats/
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auspices of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) in the mid-nineties,
the protocol has been incrementally modified and extended.
In the case of TLS 1.2 and below, these modifications have taken place in
a largely retroactive fashion; following the announcement of an attack [Ble98]
[Vau02] [Moe04] [KPR03] [Can+03] [Bar04] [Bar06], the TLS working group
(WG) would either respond by releasing a protocol extension (A Request
for Comments (RFC) intended to provide increased functionality and/or
security enhancements) or by applying the appropriate “patch” to the next
version of the protocol.
One particularly notable attack was the renegotiation attack [SR09].
Discovered by Marsh Ray and Steve Dispensa in 2009, and rediscovered by
Martin Rex the renegotiation vulnerability was a major flaw in TLS 1.2
and earlier. The renegotiation flow allowed an attacker to prepend data to
a TLS connection. The renegotiation attack was a protocol design flaw. An
attacker could cause both parties to complete seemingly secure runs of the
protocol. Other attacks mostly relied on side-channels, causing thousands
of failed connections, or forcing downgrade of the protocol to older versions
with previously known security vulnerabilities. The renegotiation flaw, on
the other hand, looked like a secure connection to both the client and the
server, they just had different views of the history of the connection.
Attacks of this type are the most challenging to patch, because they
are very hard to detect, and require changes to the core of the protocol.
Downgrade and side channel attacks can be mitigated against by individual
implementations of TLS without affecting the core functionality of the pro-
tocol. Downgrade attacks can be mitigated against by removing support for
old versions of TLS, at the cost of reduced backwards compatibility. Side
channel attacks can be mitigated against by limiting the cipher suites of-
fered, or by implementing fixed time cipher suite mitigations. Core protocol
changes need to be agreed at the IETF, a much slower process.
Prior to the announcement of the BEAST [DR11] and CRIME [DR12]
attacks of 2011 and 2012, respectively, a reactive strategy was effective, given
the frequency with which versions were updated, and the limited number of
practical attacks against the protocol.
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Post-2011, however, the heightened interest in the protocol, and the
resulting flood of increasingly practical attacks against it [AP12] [AP13]
[Bha+14] [JSS15a] [DR11] [DR12] [Mav+12] [Avi+16] [MDK14] [Beu+15]
[Adr+15] [Man15] [GPV15] [BL16b] [BL16a] made this approach increas-
ingly untenable. As Figure 2.1[2] shows, the rate of attacks dramatically
increased after 2011.
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Figure 2.1: A timeline of the development of and attacks on TLS [PM16]
This increase in attacks and pressure to improve the efficiency of the
protocol pushed the IETF to begin development of TLS 1.3. In an effort to
reduce the likelyhood of serious attacks on the increasing important TLS
protocol the IETF decided to take an analysis-before-deployment approach
and actively solicited contributions from academia. This approach was suc-
cessful in finding a number of problems in early versions of the specification
draft [BBK17] [Cre+16]. The analyses that were performed were also able
to show that the discovered flaws were fixed in later versions.
2.2 The IETF
The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) is a standards body that pub-
lish internet standards. It is formed of an open group of people who work
together to come up with standards that “make the internet work better”
[RFC3935]. The IETF publishes some of the most fundamental protocols on
the internet, including the hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP), TLS, and
the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP). The IETF have an open stan-
dards process, which means that anyone can contribute to the development
of a standard. The work of the IETF is also transparent, happening on public
mailing lists and at open meetings.
[2]Figure 2.1 is replicated from the talk associated with [PM16]. The talk was before
TLS 1.3 was completed.
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A key factor of the IETF’s process is the principle of “rough consensus”.
Draft standards are brought to working groups at the IETF and, if they
choose to accept the work, the drafts are discussed on the mailing list. When
a draft standard has achieved so called “rough consensus” in the relevant
working group the IETF moves the proposed standard to an RFC. “Rough
consensus” means that all technical objections to a proposed standard have
been addressed, and the working group is happy to move forward with the
publication process. Addressing all technical objections does not mean that
all the objections have been resolved, simply that they have been given a
fair hearing. This process helps standards advance without becoming bogged
down in endless minor objections, but also helps prevent serious issues from
being overlooked.
In recent years there has been an increasing trend of looking to academia
to assist with the development of high importance protocols, particularly se-
curity focussed ones. This trend of analysis-before-deployment has helped
develop standards that are hopefully more secure than would have been de-
veloped otherwise. TLS 1.3 was heavily analysed in academia before the stan-
dard was completed. The IETF also requested a formal analysis of draft-
sullivan before they advanced the draft through the publication process.
2.3 Formal analysis
Formal analysis is a group of techniques for analysing security protocols.
The purpose of formal analyses of security protocols is to give mathemati-
cal proofs of their security. This gives a higher level of assurance than, for
example extensive testing or fuzzing, because some attacks only appear in
the presence of a malicious attacker.
A formal analysis encodes a security protocol into an algebraic form that
can be reasoned about in a mathematically rigorous way. There are two main
approaches to formal analysis, computational analysis and symbolic analysis.
A computational analysis, which expresses the security properties required
as an adversarial game, with the attacker as the adversary. A computational
analysis proves that an attacker obtains a negligible advantage in winning
the game. A symbolic analysis expresses a protocol as a formal grammar in
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a process algebra and the security properties as decision problems over the
grammar. The symbolic analysis gives a binary answer, saying the gram-
mar satisfies the decision problem or it doesn’t. A symbolic analysis is thus
coarser, but for that reason is often more tractable.
Historically formal analysis and the requisite tools have not been expres-
sive or powerful enough to analyse protocols as complex as TLS. However
as the available computing power has increased and the tool support has
improved the range of protocols that can be analysed has increased, making
formal analysis a more and more feasible option.
2.3.1 Symbolic analysis
Symbolic analyses of security protocols encode a protocol into a process
algebra, and encode the security requirements of the protocol into logical
formulae that can be rigorously be shown to be true for a given process
algebra.
A process algebra is simply a way of representing a concurrent computa-
tional process symbolically, with some fixed rules for manipulating algebraic
expressions. These fixed rules represent primitive actions, such as communi-
cation or a computational step. Often this representation is a formal gram-
mar that generates a record of protocol actions taken, called a trace. The
security requirements are then encoded as decision problems over the gram-
mar.
Symbolic analysis of security protocols was popularised by Burrows et al.
[BAN90] through their work on the BAN logic. The BAN logic is described
as a logic of authentication. The logic allows formal reasoning about the
beliefs of protocol participants, and thus about authentication, although not
about secrecy. The BAN logic is decidable [Mon99b], however it has limited
expressiveness [Nes90] [GNY90] [BM94]. It has been shown that proving
secrecy properties of protocols is undecidable except for in very restricted
cases [Mit+99]. However many tools are effective in practice, in particular
we use the Tamarin Prover tool to prove results about TLS.
To capture a wider range of protocols the protocols are simplified into
a protocol model. In symbolic analysis this modelling process makes certain
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assumptions, the major one being that cryptographic primitives are per-
fect, also called the perfect cryptography assumption. This is related to the
Dolev-Yao attacker. Unlike in computational analysis, symbolic models give
the attacker a fixed set of abilities it can use to attack the protocol. The
Dolev-Yao attacker [DY83] is an attacker that can intercept, drop, modify,
and send messages. This is also expressed as “the attacker controls the net-
work”. The attacker is not, however, given the ability to break cryptographic
primitives. This means that if an attacker does not know a cryptographic
key, for example, then it cannot derive any information about information
encrypted with that key. In practice it is often possible to derive some in-
formation about an encrypted message without being able to decrypt it, for
example through side-channel analysis. Symbolic analysis however, treats
this type of attack as out of scope.
To improve the tractability of the decision problems other simplifica-
tions can be made by the modeller, such as limiting the number of nonces
[BAN90] [Low96] [GL97], the depth of messages [Mea96] [Son99] [PS00]
[BMV05], or the number of sessions or participants [Mil95] [Low96] [MSM97]
[CJM98] [Mit98] [Mon99a] [BLR00] [RS03] . These techniques, however will
sometimes fail to detect attacks, and as such are avoided. Some techniques,
rather than restricting the protocol, over-approximate the protocol [Mea96]
[Mon99b] [Gou00] [GK00] [HL01]. For example the fault-preserving simplifi-
cations proposed by Hui and Lowe [HL01] provide a number of transforma-
tions that simplify a protocol. These simplifications are designed such that
if there is a fault in the original protocol, then the same fault exists in the
simplified protocol, although the inverse is not true. This makes the results
of such an analysis one-sided, i.e. if a flaw exists in the simplified model,
it is not necessarily the case that it exists in the original. If, however, it is
possible to prove a simplified protocol secure, then it proves that the original
protocol is also secure.[3]
[3]If a flaw is found in the abstract model that doesn’t exist in the full model, then we
can increase the model’s fidelity to remove the flaw and repeat our analysis. We can repeat
this process until we find either a flaw in the protocol, or our model is proven to be secure.
This is called a counter-example guided abstraction-refinement (CEGAR) cycle.
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By using this type of approach a modeller can prove highly complex
properties of sophisticated models. Furthermore, as compute power and tool
support improves the fidelity of models goes up, as does the complexity of
the properties that can be proven.
Tamarin, the protocol verification tool used throughout this thesis, takes
a symbolic approach. A protocol is expressed as a multi-set rewriting system,
and the security properties are expressed using a fragment of first order logic.
The Tamarin prover then evaluates the logical formulae over the multi-set
rewriting system, and if no attacks are found we achieve a high level of
assurance that the protocol meets its security objectives.
2.3.2 Computational analysis
Computational analysis takes a finer grained, probabilistic approach. Com-
putational analysis was introduced in the 1980’s [SM84], and considers mes-
sages as bitstrings, rather than as symbols, which gives the model a much
higher level of fidelity.
The protocol is expressed as an adversarial game in which the goal is to
break one of the security guarantees, the computational approach calculates
the attacker’s advantage in winning the game. The game is expressed as a
task that the adversary must complete, such as distinguishing between an
encrypted message and a random value of the same length. Advantage, in
this case, would be defined as the chance that it correctly selects the message
less the chance that it incorrectly selects the random value. If the attackers
advantage can be shown to be negligible, then the protocol is considered
secure. A more complete description of computational analysis can be found
in Katz et al. [KL07].
The advantage of computational analysis over symbolic analysis is that
the adversary is defined as a probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine,
i.e. the adversary can perform any attack that can be performed efficiently,
including making a limited number of guesses at things like keys. This differs
from symbolic analyses where the attacker is given a fixed set of actions
it may perform. The computational approach has a more powerful threat
model.
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To compute the attackers advantage the protocol game undergoes a series
of transformations, until the game can be solved by appealing to standard
cryptography assumptions. For example, the decisional Diffie–Hellman (DH)
problem is considered hard. By assuming that the attacker can only obtain
negligible advantage in solving the decisional DH problem, and that the
game can soundly be transformed into a game which solves the decisional
DH problem in a number of steps, we can compute the attackers advantage
as the sum of the advantage accrued at each step, plus its advantage in
solving the decisional DH problem. If the number of steps is small, and the
advantage accrued at each step negligible, the attackers total advantage is
also negligible.
Computational analyses are good at proving confidentiality properties,
but proving authentication properties is more complex. Computational anal-
yses define authentication in terms of matching conversations[4][BR93] or
session identifiers[5][AFP05], which require that both parties saw the same
set of exchanged messages, bar some negligible probability. The tool support
for computational analysis is also much more limited, and thus proofs are
often performed by hand, an error prone process.
2.3.3 Symbolic vs computational analysis
Symbolic analysis gives a coarser analysis than computational analysis, how-
ever the tool support for symbolic analysis is better, and analysis of complex
authentication properties, a major part of this thesis, are easier under the
symbolic model, and thus we use the symbolic model throughout this thesis.
2.4 Security primitives
In this section we will discuss the security primitives we use. Because through-
out this thesis we take a symbolic approach to security primitives we do not
address how these primitives are implemented, but merely describe the se-
curity properties we define them to have.
[4]Also called matching sessions or matching histories.
[5]Also called partnering.
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2.4.1 Nonces
A nonce, or number used once, is a value chosen by a protocol participant
at the start of a protocol. The value is included in messages sent by the
protocol participant. If the participant sees the value in the response it can
be sure that the response is fresh, i.e. that an old session has not been
replayed. Depending on the context in which the nonce is used the nonce
has different requirements. We assume that a nonce is fresh, i.e. that it has
never been used before by any party. In practice nonces are selected from a
large space, usually at least 64 bits. This makes collisions very unlikely, but
not impossible. In most cases a nonce is also assumed to be unpredictable.
Where this is not the case we will note this in the text.
2.4.2 Symmetric encryption
Symmetric encryption defines a function from messages to ciphertexts. Mes-
sages are also sometimes referred to as plaintexts. In practice this is a map-
ping a string of bits on to a string of bits. Symmetric encryption defines two
functions, an encrypt function, E, and a decrypt function, D.
E :: K → (M → C), takes two parameters, a key and a message, and
outputs a ciphertext. D :: K → (C → M), also takes two parameters, a
key and a ciphertext, and outputs a plaintext. Every key defines a different
relation between plaintexts and ciphertexts. We write Ek and Dk to notate
E and D parametrised by k respectively. We define the relationship between
E and D as follows.
Dk(Ek(m)) = m
A key used for symmetric encryption is called a symmetric key.
In practice symmetric encryption is defined by breaking a message into
fixed length blocks and applying a blockwise cipher such as AES to each
block, with some relationship between the blocks defined by a mode, such as
Galois/Counter Mode (GCM). We assume the security of this construction
as part of perfect cryptography, however various modes have well known
attacks. We define such attacks as out of scope. Because we take a symbolic
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approach, rather than define these functions, we simply assume encryption
has the following properties.
• It is impossible to derive any information about m or k from Ek(m)
without knowing k, and if one knows k, then one can learn the entire
plaintext.
• It is impossible to produce a ciphertext for a given message m without
knowing k.
• There are no collisions in the ciphertext space. This means that we
ignore the possibility that Ek(m) = Ek′(m
′). This stems from our
“perfect cryptography” approach.
A common restriction that we do not require is that E be non-strict. A
non-strict function is one that if called twice on the same inputs, will give
different outputs. For example this can be achieved by injecting randomness
into the encryption process. We do not require E to be non-strict. This
allows an attacker to compare two ciphertexts and decide if they are both
encryptions of the same message under the same key.
Because we take a symbolic approach we represent ciphertexts as calls
to E, rather than as elements in the ciphertext space. We sometimes use the
notation {m}k as syntactic sugar for Ek(m).
2.4.3 Asymmetric encryption
Asymmetric encryption operates in a similar manner to symmetric encryp-
tion, in that it maps pairs of messages and keys to cipher texts, however the
decryption step is different. As the name implies, asymmetric encryption
uses different keys for decryption and encryption. Instead of keys, we refer
to key pairs, (pk(sk), sk). A key pair has a public part, pk(sk) and a private
part, sk. A keypair used for asymmetric encryption is called an asymmetric
keypair.
The encrypt and decrypt functions have the same types as in symmetric
encryption, but the relationship between them is different. We define the
relationship between E and D as follows.
Dsk(Epk(sk)(m)) = m
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This means that someone knowing pk(sk), i.e. the public part of the key
pair, henceforth the public key, can produce a ciphertext for any message,
but only someone knowing sk, i.e. the secret part of the key pair, henceforth
the secret or private key, can decrypt the ciphertext. We also place a further
restriction on the relationship between E and D.
Dpk(sk)(Esk(m)) = m
This means that someone knowing the secret key can produce a ciphertext
that anyone can decipher, but only someone knowing the secret key can
produce the ciphertext. This is called a signing operation, and it proves the
author of the ciphertext knows the secret key. A ciphertext produced in this
way is called a signature. A message with its signature appended is called a
signed message.
From a protocol design point-of-view, when using asymmetric key pairs
it is important to only use a given pair for signing or for encryption. If the
same key is used for both operations it creates the risk that an attacker
can use the signing mechanism as a decryption oracle. If the attacker has
a message encrypted with a public key, and does not have the secret key
to decrypt it, the attacker can ask the key owner to sign the ciphertext. If
the key owner uses the same key for encryption and signing, the signature
produced would be the plaintext of the message.[6]
We assume the following properties of asymmetric encryption.
• It is impossible to derive any information about the private key from
the public key.
• The mapping from public to private keys is a bijection, i.e. there are
no public keys with two corresponding private keys, and no private
keys for which there are two corresponding public keys.
• It is impossible to derive any information about the plaintext from the
ciphertext unless one knows the decryption key.
[6]Careful readers will note that this actually computes Esk(Epk(sk)(m)). In many asym-
metric cryptosystems the E and D operations are the same, for example both may be
modular exponentiation, with the only difference being intent.
28
2.4. Security primitives
2.4.4 Certificates
A certificate is a document proving the authenticity of something. In our
context, a certificate is used to tie an identity to a public key. A certificate
will have (1) an identity, (2) a public key, and (3) a signature (over the
identity and the public key). If Alice receives a certificate that contains the
identity “Bob”, a public key pk(skbob), and it is signed with the private key
of someone she trusts, then she can assume that “Bob”, and only “Bob”
knows the secret key skbob. We say that an actor owns a certificate if it
knows the secret portion of the public key in the certificate.
2.4.5 Public key infrastructure (PKI)
The Public key infrastructure (PKI) is a system for issuing such certificates.
A small number of certificate authorities issue certificates that have very
wide acceptance, i.e. they are trusted by the majority of actors. These certifi-
cate authorities are considered roots of trust, or root certificate authorities.
Some certificate authorities delegate their ability to sign certificates to other
organisations by providing them with a secondary signing certificate. These
organisations in turn delegate that ability. Certificates created by non-root
certificate authorities need to provide a chain of certificates leading back to
a root certificate. We discuss this more in Section 2.5.2.
In our work we mostly elide this, and assume that all parties agree on
a certificate authority, and that the certificate authority is infallible. We
consider the complexities of the public key infrastructure (PKI) out of scope.
2.4.6 Diffie–Hellman exchange (DHE)
The Diffie–Hellman exchange (DHE) is a method by which two parties with
no shared secrets can establish a shared secret over a hostile network. There
are two variants of the DHE that are used in the protocols in this work, finite
field and elliptic curve, but when represented symbolically they operate in
the same way. A DHE is an asymmetric key agreement protocol.
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For finite field DH, a set of initial parameters is agreed, including a
prime, p, and a generator for p, g.[7] A generator is a value such that for all
positive integers n less than p there exists an integer a such that n = ga
(mod p).
∀n : n 6= 0 (mod p)→ ∃a : n = ga (mod p)
If Alice and Bob wish to perform a DHE they each select a secret value,
a and b respectively. These secret values are the private portion of the DH
key pairs. Then Alice computes ga which she sends to Bob. Bob computes
gb which he sends to Alice. ga and gb are the public portions of the DH key
pairs. Alice can then compute (gb)a, and Bob can compute (ga)b. By the
principle of associativity of multiplication we get:
(ga)b = gab = (gb)a (mod p)
Alice and Bob now share a value gab. The computational DH assumption
says that given (g, ga, gb) it is computationally infeasible to compute gab. A
passive observer therefore, does not know gab.
An active attacker however, can perform a man-in-the-middle (MITM)
attack, pretending to Alice that it is Bob, and to Bob that it is Alice. To
prevent this a DHE is usually run with an authentication protocol.
On a symbolic level the process works the same way for elliptic curve
DHE, but in practice the elliptic curve version is much more computationally
efficient.[8]
2.4.7 Long-term keys (LTKs) vs ephemeral keys
As we have discussed, keys can be classified as symmetric or asymmetric.
However keys can also be classified as long-term keys (LTKs) or ephemeral
keys. LTKs are keys used repeatedly across many sessions, and are expected
to remain secure for a long time. Ephemeral keys, also known as session
keys, are used only within a single session, and are generated anew with
each protocol run.
[7]The term finite field refers to the fact that all operations are performed over Zp, i.e.
are computed over the natural numbers modulo p, forming a finite field.
[8]An elliptic curve is a curve described by an equation of the form y2 = x3 + ax + b.
The integer solutions of such a curve have special properties that make them useful in this
scenario.
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2.4.8 Hashing
A hash is a function that maps arbitrary length inputs onto a fixed length
output. We assume that a hash function has the following properties.
Property 2.4.1. Pre-image resistance. Given the output of a hash func-
tion h(x) it is infeasible to find an input x′ such that h(x′) = h(x).
This means that an attacker learns nothing about x from h(x), similar to
the property of symmetric and asymmetric encryption, but also, the attacker
learns nothing about other potentially colliding values. This can be thought
of as a non-invertibility property, i.e. it is infeasible to find the input of the
hash function given its output.
Property 2.4.2. Second pre-image resistance. Given a value x, it is
infeasible to find a value x′ 6= x such that h(x) = h(x′).
This means that an attacker learns nothing about other potential values,
x′, from x. Because we assume perfect cryptography we assume these tasks
are impossible.
Finally we require a collision resistance property.
Property 2.4.3. Collision resistance. For a given hash function h, it is
infeasible to find two values x 6= x′ such that h(x) = h(x′).
The second and third properties are similar, with the key difference being
that the attacker is allowed to choose both x and x′ if the hash function has
collision resistance.[9]
[9]For a more formal treatment of the definition of the properties of hash functions we
refer the reader to Rogaway et al. [RS04].
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We also require an independence property, i.e. given y = h(x) the at-
tacker learns nothing about y′ = h(f(x)), for any efficiently computable
function f where f(x) 6= x. When hashing a concatenation of values we
notate h(a++ b++ c) as h(a, b, c)
2.4.9 Message authentication codes (MACs)
A message authentication code (MAC) tag is a short value that is appended
to the end of a message. This value is created by taking the message and
a symmetric key, and combining them to create a value that proves that
the tag was created by someone who knows the key. The tag can be verified
by anyone who knows the key, but cannot be distinguished from random
by anyone not in possession of the key. This provides a proof that the tag
was created by someone who knew the message and the key.[10] Usually this
is used to provide authentication and integrity of a message. An attacker
should not be able to create a MAC tag unless it knows the key and the
message.
2.4.10 Hash-based message authentication codes (HMACs)
One common method for implementing a MAC is using an hash-based mes-
sage authentication code (HMAC). HMACs were initially proposed in work
by Tsudik [Tsu92] because MACs based on block ciphers were slow in soft-
ware and subject to U.S. export restrictions. By hashing the key concate-
nated with the message we produce a hash that can be computed by anyone
knowing the key, but cannot be computed without knowing the key. We no-
tate this HMAC(k,m), which is equivalent to h(k,m). We use the HMAC
notation to indicate intent.
2.4.11 Labels
Using MACs and fixed strings we can prevent the transplantation of mes-
sages from one context to another. By including a fixed string in the input
to a MAC, e.g. y = HMAC(k, “context 1”,m), an attacker who only knows
[10]This is related to the definition of signatures.
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y cannot derive anything about HMAC(k, “context 2”,m).[11] These fixed
strings are called labels.
2.4.12 HMAC-based key derivation functions (HKDFs)
Labels can also be used to create a number of independent keys from a single
master key. These independent keys are known as subkeys.
For example consider the case where two actors, Alice and Bob, share
a secret key ms, but want to use different keys for sending messages and
receiving messages. They could compute alice write key = h(“Alice”,ms)
and bob write key = h(“Bob”,ms). Alice would then encrypt all messages
she sends with alice write key and Bob would encrypt with bob write key.
Whilst both subkeys are easily derivable from ms, an attacker who acquires
one of the subkeys cannot derive the other. This method for computing
subkeys is called a HMAC-based key derivation function (HKDF).
2.4.13 Key schedules
A key schedule, in this context, refers to the method by which all subkeys
are derived. For example, TLS 1.3 uses an HKDF to derive 10 subkeys from
each handshake, each used for different purposes.
2.4.14 Session transcript hashes
Another use of hash functions is to ensure agreement on the transcript of a
run of a protocol. Both parties compute the hash of the transcript, and if at
the end of the protocol both parties agree on the hash, then they agree on
the entire transcript of the protocol.[12] This relies on the second preimage
resistance of hash functions. This transcript hash is usually computed as an
HMAC, to ensure authenticity.
[11]From the independence property of hash functions.
[12]In most cases this is computed incrementally with repeated hash functions. This is
called a rolling transcript hash. This provides two benefits, (1) each actor only needs to
store a updating hash output, rather than the complete transcript, and (2) the rolling
hashes can be compared multiple times throughout the protocol.
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2.4.15 Channel bindings
Channel bindings are a technique for securely layering or nesting security
protocols inside one another. A channel binding is a string that uniquely
identifies a protocol run, such that no two runs of a protocol with different
parameters have the same channel bindings. This is related to the session
transcript hash, in that a session transcript hash will be different for any
two runs with different parameters. However, when channel bindings are
used to securely layer multiple protocols they often need to include some
extra components, such as channel bindings for earlier runs and shared se-
crets, depending on what security guarantees they need to achieve [BDP15].
For example the channel bindings produced by TLS are based not only on
the sessions transcript hash, but also on the master secret. In Chapter 4 we
discuss the different guarantees that can be achieved with different channel
binding constructions. In Chapter 6 we develop this work further, and intro-
duce channel bindings that layer two-party protocols on top of multi-party
protocols.
2.5 Security properties
In this section we discuss the main security properties we use throughout the
thesis. We introduce further properties as necessary as we proceed through
the chapters.
2.5.1 Confidentiality
We describe a value as confidential if, at the end of a protocol run[13] between
two honest parties, the attacker can not derive it. We describe a value as
a shared secret if, at the end of a protocol run the value is known to both
parties, and not to the attacker. We describe a key as a pre-shared key (PSK)
if both parties are assumed to know the value at the start of the protocol
run, and the attacker does not know it.
[13]We define a protocol run as a sequence of messages sent or received by an actor, as
prescribed by the protocol definition, such that the parameters of the messages are consis-
tent with the steps defined in the protocol definition. We say that an actor has completed
a protocol run if they successfully completed the last step of the protocol in which they
were involved. A protocol run may end unsuccessfully or continue to completion.
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Aliveness
Weak Agreement
Non-injective
Agreement
Injective
Agreement
Figure 2.2: Lowe’s hierarchy of authentication
2.5.2 Authentication
In this document we use Lowe’s hierarchy of authentication [Low97]. Lowe
defines a series of different authentication properties of different strengths,
which we show in Figure 2.2. Lowe defines authentication for protocols run
between an initiator A and a responder B. We list these definitions here,
highlighting the progression between each definition.
The weakest guarantee Lowe defines is Aliveness.
Definition 2.5.1. Aliveness [Low97, p. 2] We say that a protocol guarantees
to an initiator A aliveness of another agent B if, whenever A (acting as
initiator) completes a run of the protocol, apparently with responder B,
then B has previously been running the protocol.
Aliveness is a very weak property, that does not require recentness, or
proof of who the responder thought they were communicating with. The
presentation of a certificate can be thought of as a protocol with Aliveness.
An attacker can replay a certificate as many times as they wish once they
have seen a copy. Such a presentation doesn’t prove the presenter owns the
certificate, merely that the owner was once alive. This is useful in the case
of certificate chains. A certificate chain is a list of certificates, starting at a
root certificate, with each certificate signing the next in the list. The root
certificate signs the first certificate, the first certificate signs the second,
and so on. In the simple case, a website may present a chain of certificates
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consisting of the certificate of a certificate authority, and its own certificate.
Upon receiving this chain the client can reason about the Aliveness of the
certificate authority.
Weak agreement is the next definition in the hierarchy.
Definition 2.5.2. Weak agreement [Low97, p. 3] We say that a protocol
guarantees to an initiator A weak agreement with another agent B if, when-
ever A (acting as initiator) completes a run of the protocol, apparently with
responder B, then B has previously been running the protocol, apparently
with A.
The only extra requirement over the Aliveness property is that the re-
sponder believes that it was running the protocol with the initiator. Proving
a protocol has weak agreement requires A to reason about the beliefs of B.
As we will discuss in Chapter 3, TLS 1.3 only claims weak agreement in
its peer authentication property. That TLS would apparently only require
such a weak property is surprising. However this requirement is misleading.
TLS 1.3 also requires other properties, such as requiring the client and server
to establish the same key. Requiring the client and server to agree on some
data is stronger form of authentication, namely non-injective agreement.
Definition 2.5.3. Non-injective agreement [Low97, p. 3] We say that a pro-
tocol guarantees to an initiator A non-injective agreement with a responder
B on a set of data items ds (where ds is a set of free variables
appearing in the protocol description) if, whenever A (acting as initia-
tor) completes a run of the protocol, apparently with responder B, then B
has previously been running the protocol, apparently with A, and B was
acting as responder in his run, and the two agents agreed on the
data values corresponding to all the variables in ds.
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A modified version of this property is used in Chapter 4 to reason about
EAs. Requiring non-injective agreement means that whilst EAs must not
be forgeable[14], under some circumstances, it is permissible for them to be
replay-able.
TLS 1.3 requires any two distinct sessions to produce a unique key. This
uniqueness requirement gives us the final layer of the hierarchy, injective
agreement. In cases where the context is clear we sometimes simply refer to
this property as agreement.
Definition 2.5.4. Injective Agreement [Low97, p. 3] We say that a protocol
guarantees to an initiator A agreement with a responder B on a set of
data items ds if, whenever A (acting as initiator) completes a run of the
protocol, apparently with responder B, then B has previously been running
the protocol, apparently with A, and was acting as responder in his run, and
the two agents agreed on the data values corresponding to all the variables
in ds, and each such run of A corresponds to a unique run of B.
This is the property we prove for TLS 1.3. Lowe’s hierarchy continues on
with a number of variants of authentication properties, but these properties
are sufficient for our purposes.
When speaking about messages, we say a protocol message is authentic
if it was authored by its purported author.
2.5.3 Freshness
A related property to authentication, particularly to injective agreement is
freshness. A protocol guarantees freshness of a run to a participant if when-
ever the participant completes a run of a protocol then its peer generated
its responses specifically for the current session [Gon93].
[14]A message is forgeable if it can be created by an attacker.
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This property is also related to recentness, i.e. if a protocol participant
completes a run of a protocol then its peer was also running the protocol
recently [Low97]. A protocol that has freshness and non-injective agreement
also has injective agreement. There are other methods to achieve injectivity,
but all the protocols we discuss in this thesis which require injectivity also
require freshness.
Freshness can be achieved through challenge/response protocols [NS78]
[BBF83] [OR87], counters [VK83], or timestamps [LG92]. Although using
timestamps allows for a single message to prove freshness, timestamps re-
quire clock synchronisation between the protocols participants. A survey of
different techniques for achieving freshness can be found in Gong [Gon93].
Freshness prevents certain classes of replay attacks known as classic replay
attacks [Syv94], where an attacker replays a message recorded from another
run of the protocol.
Freshness is often achieved through the inclusion of nonces in the mes-
sages, which would be classified as a truly random challenge/response under
Gong’s classification [Gon93], and this is the approach used throughout this
thesis. If a nonce is echoed back in an authentic message by the peer, then
the initiator can be sure the message was created in response to her mes-
sage. If a predictable value is used in a challenge/response[15] the protocol
is vulnerable to a wider range of attacks, and requires that the responder
trust the challenger [Gon93].
2.5.4 Integrity
Another closely related property to authentication is integrity. Voydock et al.
[VK83] define integrity of an encrypted message in terms of two properties.
First that if an encrypted message is changed in transit it will be detected
with high probability, and second that if an encrypted message is decrypted
with the wrong key it will be detected with high probability. [16] Because we
make the perfect cryptography assumption, we say that both these cases will
be detected. We do not restrict this definition specifically to encrypted mes-
[15]Classified as an asynchronous counter in Gong [Gon93].
[16]By this they mean that with very high probability a message can be correctly classified
as either modified or unmodified.
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sages, but require these properties of any messages, or portions of messages,
that claim to have integrity protection.
One way to achieve integrity with a MAC tag, as described in 2.4.9.
Because the tag can only be created by protocol participants, if the message
is tampered with then the tag will fail to verify, and the recipient can detect
the tampering. For a protocol to achieve agreement on some parameters
there needs to be some level of integrity.
2.5.5 Perfect forward secrecy (PFS)
Perfect forward secrecy (PFS) is one of the more complex properties we will
discuss in the background. First proposed in Gu¨nther [Gu¨n90], we say a
protocol has perfect forward secrecy (PFS) with respect to an LTK, ltk, if
the protocol’s confidentiality guarantees are not broken if ltk is compromised
after the session is complete. This is equivalent to saying that if the secrets
of the protocol cannot be derived by a passive observer even if it knows
ltk, then the protocol has PFS. This is usually achieved by agreeing an
asymmetric ephemeral key, such as the key derived during a DHE. A passive
attacker cannot, by definition, perform an active MITM attack. Therefore,
because of the computational DH assumption, the attacker cannot derive
the ephemeral session key.
2.6 Threat models
A threat model defines under what circumstances the properties are required
to hold. In general this means defining the attacker’s abilities. Dolev and Yao
in their seminal paper [DY83] defined what came to be known as the Dolev-
Yao attacker. The Dolev-Yao attacker is one that can read, write, intercept,
modify, and delete any message. This is sometimes referred to as “the net-
work is the attacker”. The only restriction placed on its abilities is that it
cannot break encryption. This is the “perfect cryptography” assumption.
A protocol can achieve different properties against different attackers.
For example, a protocol that guarantees injective agreement against a Dolev-
Yao attacker, might only achieve non-injective agreement against a stronger
attacker. If an attacker is too powerful then it can be impossible to achieve
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the desired properties, however if the modelled attacker is weaker than the
attackers that will be attacking the protocol in practice then the protocol
may have undiscovered flaws. This means that when defining the security
properties a protocol requires it is also necessary to define under what threat
model those properties are required to hold.
All the threat models we use in this thesis use the Dolev-Yao attacker as
a base point. We then give the attacker the ability to compromise various
keys by performing reveal actions. If all secrets are compromised then it
is nearly impossible to achieve any security guarantees [CCG16]. We thus
express the guarantees we require in terms of the attackers actions. For
example we might say something along the lines “if A completes a run of
the protocol and the attacker did not reveal the LTK of A, ltkA, before
the run completed, then the attacker never learns the ephemeral key k”.
In this way we can express the exact restrictions on the attacker, or more
practically, exactly what the attacker needs to achieve to break the protocol.
2.6.1 The Needham-Schroeder protocol
In this section we briefly digress and introduce the Needham-Schroeder pro-
tocol, which we use as a running example throughout the thesis to introduce
various concepts. We choose it as an example because it is a very well studied
protocol in the formal analysis field. An analysis of the Needham-Schroeder
protocol when introducing a new tool is almost de rigueur [BAN90] [Mil95]
[Low95] [Mea96] [FHG98] [Son99] [GK00] [Bla01] [Cre08] [Mei13]. We will
discuss the advent of tool-supported formal analysis, and attacks on the pro-
tocol. The Needham-Schroeder protocol[17] was published in 1978 [NS78],
and claimed to provide mutual authentication between two parties.
The protocol
We define two parties, Alice (A) and Bob (B), each of whom has an asym-
metric key pair (pk(skA), skA) and (pk(skB), skB) respectively. pk(skA) rep-
resents Alice’s public key, and skA the corresponding secret key. For sim-
[17]The Needham-Schroeder protocol technically refers to a pair of protocols, a symmetric
and an asymmetric version. In our example we will only discuss the asymmetric version.
40
2.6. Threat models
plicity we will assume that Alice and Bob know each others public keys,
pk(skA) and pk(skB) respectively. We will notate nonces nX .
The protocol proceeds as follows.
A→ B : {nA, A}pk(skB)
Alice sends Bob a nonce nA and her identity encrypted with Bob’s public
key.
B → A : {nA, nB}pk(skA)
Bob responds with Alice’s nonce, and one of his own, both encrypted with
Alice’s public key.
A→ B : {nB}pk(skB)
Alice then responds with Bob’s nonce, encrypted with Bob’s public key.
The idea of the protocol is that because only Alice and Bob can decrypt
the relevant messages nA and nB become shared secrets, and attacker cannot
intercept them.
In 1990 Burrows et al. formally analysed the protocol using the BAN
logic [BAN90], a manual authentication logic, and offered a proof that the
parties mutually authenticated each other. In 1995, 17 years after the proto-
col was first proposed and 5 years after it had been formally analysed Lowe
[Low95] found an attack on the protocol.
The attack
We introduce a new actor, the attacker (I), with its own public / private key
pair (pk(skI), skI). The attacker is allowed to act both as a legitimate actor
and an attacker.[18] We introduce the notation IX to indicate the attacker
[18]This is the description of the attacker given by Lowe, we offer a slightly different
perspective on the attacker in the next section. Our perspective simply makes it easier to
generalise Lowe’s result to our use cases.
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impersonating actor X. The attack proceeds as follows.
A→ I : {nA, A}pk(skI)
IA → B : {nA, A}pk(skB)
B → IA : {nA, nB}pk(skA)
I → A : {nA, nB}pk(skA)
A→ I : {nB}pk(skI)
IA → B : {nB}pk(skB)
Alice sends the attacker a request, which the attacker can decrypt because
it is encrypted with its public key. The attacker re-encrypts the request with
Bob’s public key and forwards it on, impersonating Alice. Bob, on receipt of
this message responds with a message encrypted by Alice’s public key. Even
though the attacker can intercept the message, it cannot decrypt it. The
attacker forwards this opaque blob on to Alice, who can decrypt it. Alice,
still believing she is in an entirely legitimate run with the attacker, decrypts
Bob’s message and encrypts Bob’s nonce with the attacker’s public key, and
sends the result to the attacker. At this point Alice and the attacker have
completed an entirely legitimate run. The attacker however, has now learned
Bob’s nonce. The attacker can now re-encrypt Bob’s nonce with Bob’s public
key, and send it to Bob. Bob now believes that he has completed a run with
Alice, however Alice does not believe she has completed a run with Bob.
Whilst this protocol does provide aliveness, as we can see from this at-
tack it does not even provide weak authentication to Bob, that is, Bob has
completed a run of the protocol ostensibly with Alice, but Alice has not
completed a run of the protocol ostensibly with Bob.
Limitations of formal analysis
This attack seems to invalidate the proof offered in Burrows et al. [BAN90].
However the BAN logic doesn’t consider that the attacker might act as a
legitimate actor. If the attacker cannot act as a legitimate entity then this
attack does not work, and the protocol is secure.
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Alternatively, we could model this difference with a Dolev-Yao attacker
extended with the ability to compromise long-term keys, as opposed to one
who could act as a legitimate actor. The protocol is not intended to be secure
against an attacker who can compromise all LTKs, but it should be secure
against an attacker who can only compromise the LTKs of actors other than
the principles, i.e. anyone other than Alice or Bob. However, if the attacker
were to compromise the long term keys of some third actor, Charlie, then
it can use those keys to attack Bob, by acting as Charlie to Alice. Thus an
implicit assumption of the BAN logic is that all LTKs are secure. Burrows
et al.’s proof is thus correct for the threat model it considers, however in
practice requiring the LTKs of every actor to remain secure is too strong an
assumption.
Lowe [Low96] then introduces a tool based analysis technique. Using a
tool called FDR[19] he rediscovers his attack before introducing a fix, which
he proves secure under his new formalism. The fix he provides slightly mod-
ifies the second message.
B → A : {nA, nB, B}PKA
By adding Bob’s identity into his response Lowe’s fixes the attack on the
original protocol. This tweaked protocol is sometimes known as the Needham-
Schroeder-Lowe protocol.
Lowe’s analysis only requires that the LTKs of Alice and Bob remain
secure. This is a much more limited assumption, and thus requires a stronger
proof of the security of the protocol. We use this example to highlights two
things about formal analysis, first, that a proof is only as good as its model,
and second, that it is important to consider the strongest possible attacker,
even if the protocol is not necessarily designed to be secure against such an
attacker.
In our work we take care to define the strongest possible attacker, and
iteratively restrict its actions until we find what we term the security bound-
ary, i.e. the point at which the security goals begin to hold. This gives us a
very clear set of assumptions, defining exactly what threat model the pro-
[19]FDR is a refinement checker for Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP)
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tocol protects against. By proving both positive and negative results about
protocols we can build confidence in our models. A model that holds when
it shouldn’t, or that doesn’t hold when it should is likely to have a flaw. By
finding the security boundary we show that at the very least our model isn’t
vacuously true or false, removing a potential source of error.
2.7 Tamarin
2.7.1 The Tamarin prover
The Tamarin prover is a formal protocol analysis tool that allows the analy-
sis of highly complex stateful protocols. Taking a symbolic analysis approach
it implements a Dolev-Yao style network attacker, which can be extended
by the user. It allows for the specification of detailed security properties and
has state-of-the-art support for protocols with branches, loops, state, and
equational theories. In addition to analysing trace properties, it also provides
support for some classes of hyperproperties (diff-equivalence). Tamarin has
been successfully used to analyse highly complex protocols such as TLS
1.3 [RFC8446]. For example an analysis of an early draft of the TLS 1.3
specification using Tamarin found a vulnerability in post-handshake authen-
tication [Cre+16].
When analysing trace properties, Tamarin takes a protocol model, writ-
ten as a multi-set rewrite system, and a series of security properties, written
as first-order logical formulas, and attempts to prove the properties hold
using a backwards search. The proof search essentially applies a constraint
solving algorithm to the negation of the property – if no solution exists, this
corresponds to a proof that the property holds, and if a solution is found, it
represents a counterexample. Tamarin also has an extensive graphical user
interface (GUI) which can be used to interactively construct proofs. This is
very helpful for exploring partial proofs, and deriving which factors are key
to security.
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Multi-set rewrite systems
A multi-set is an unordered collection of elements, allowing repetitions. A
multi-set rewrite rule r is a mapping from a multi-set F (called the an-
tecedent) to a multi-set G (called the consequent). A multi-set rewrite sys-
tem R is a collection of such rules. Starting from the empty multi-set, no-
tated “·”, rules from the system can be repeatedly applied, to produce some
multi-set, H.
2.7.2 The Tamarin specification language
A Tamarin model is specified by a list of multiset rewrite rules that model
the state machines for the protocol and any special attacker capabilities,
and security properties are specified using a fragment of first-order logic
with quantification over timepoints. Note that within Tamarin’s framework,
all (security) properties are referred to as “lemmas”. We introduce Tamarin’s
specification language with an example rule.
rule Example_Rule:
[ !Key($A,sk), Fr(n) ]
--[ Send($A,n,sk) ]->
[ Out(senc(n,sk)) ]
The rules are used to model a transition system, whose state is a multi-
set of facts; this is initially the empty multi-set. Tamarin rules have the
antecedents, or inputs, on the left-hand side (LHS), and their consequents, or
outputs, on the right-hand side (RHS). Roughly speaking, a rule can trigger
if the facts on its LHS are present in the current state, after which they are
replaced by the facts on the RHS. In the middle are placed actions, which
serve as the connection between the transition system and the property
specification logic.
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The actions of all the triggered rules form a tree called a trace. Actions
specify observable events in every trace, and we express security properties
as properties over this tree. Actions occur at symbolic times, for example
we might write Send(x,n,y)@j, meaning that the Send action occurred at
time j. Symbolic time, as opposed to regular time, forms a partially ordered
set. Thus we might be able to say that some actions occurred before or after
some other actions, but cannot necessarily derive a schedule of every action.
When a symbolic time is referenced somewhere other than an action we
distinguish it with a #, for example we might write #i < #j. This would be
read as “the time i precedes j”.
In our example, the rule takes as a pre-condition a pair of an actor,
$A, and a key, sk; and a fresh value, n. This rule uses Tamarin’s built in
Fr function which outputs an unpredictable, unique value. Fresh values are
always available in the state.
The identity $A is marked with a $ character, which makes it a public
value. The !Key(x,y) fact is marked with a ! character, which makes it a
persistent fact. This means that Tamarin will allow it to be consumed repeat-
edly, as opposed to only allowing it to be consumed once. The right-hand side
of the rule outputs senc(n, sk) to the network. The senc(message, key)
fact is a symbolic representation of symmetric key cryptography. We use the
Send($A, n, sk) action to reason about the trace of this rule.
To continue our example we might now extend our attacker with a rule
that allows them to reveal secret keys.
rule rev_sk:
[ !Key($A, sk) ]
--[ Rev_sk($A, sk) ]->
[ Out(sk) ]
This rule consumes a !Key(x,y) fact, and sends the key to the network.
Because Tamarin assumes a Dolev-Yao attacker, sending a message to the
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network is equivalent to revealing it to the attacker. This rule allows the
attacker to reveal a secret key by performing the action Rev_sk.
We are now in a position to specify a simple security property.
lemma secret_key_confidentiality:
"All actor nonce key #j #k.
Send(actor, nonce, key)@j
& K(nonce)@k
==>
Ex #i.
Rev_sk(actor, key)@i
& (#i < #k)"
This property says that if a Send action occurs at time j, and the attacker
learns the nonce at time k, then the attacker must have performed a Rev_sk
action before learning the nonce. We could also add the requirement that
(#j < #k) and prove that the attacker cannot learn the nonce before the
actor chooses it.
A rule for creating Key(x,y) facts is also needed.
rule Create_key:
[ Fr(~sk)
, In(<$A>)
]
--[ CreateKey($A, ~sk) ]->
[ !Key($A, ~sk) ]
The Create key rule takes a fresh value ~sk and a public identity, and
outputs a !Key fact, pairing the identity with the key. The Create key
rule also triggers an action, CreateKey, such that we can reason about key
creation.
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This protocol is sufficiently simple that the Tamarin prover can solve it
using its heuristic solver. For more complex protocols Tamarin provides an
interactive prover that allows the user to guide the proof.
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Transport Layer Security
3.1 Introduction
The IETF started drafting the latest version of the protocol, TLS 1.3, in
the spring of 2014. Unlike the development of TLS 1.2 and below, the
TLS WG adopted an “analysis-prior-to-deployment” design philosophy, wel-
coming contributions from the academic community before official release.
There have been substantial efforts from the academic community in the
areas of program verification– analysing implementations of TLS [BKB16]
[Bha+16b], the development of computational models– analysing TLS within
Bellare-Rogaway style frameworks [Dow+15] [KW15] [Li+14] [Dow+16]
[Fis+16] [Koh+14], and the use of formal methods tools such as ProVerif
[Bla+16] and Tamarin [Sch+12] to analyse symbolic models of TLS [AM16]
[Cre+16] [Hor16] [BBK17]. All of these endeavours have helped to both find
weaknesses in the protocol and confirm and guide the design decisions of the
TLS WG.
The TLS 1.3 draft specification however, was a rapidly moving target,
with large changes being effected in a fairly regular fashion. This often ren-
dered much of the analysis work ‘outdated’ within the space of few months
as large changes to the specification effectively result in a new protocol,
requiring a new wave of analysis.
The final specification [RFC8446] was published in August 2018. In this
work we contribute to the last wave of analysis of TLS 1.3 prior to its official
release. We present a tool-supported, symbolic verification of a near-final
49
3.1. Introduction
draft of TLS 1.3, adding to the large effort by the TLS community to ensure
that TLS 1.3 is free of the many weaknesses affecting earlier versions, and
that it is imbued with security guarantees befitting such a critical protocol.
3.1.1 Chapter overview
Over the course of the chapter:
1. We develop a symbolic model of draft 20 of the TLS 1.3 specification
that considers all the possible interactions of the available handshake
modes, including PSK-based resumption and 0-RTT. Its fine-grained,
modular structure greatly extends and refines the coverage of previous
symbolic models that were successfully used to discover sophisticated
interaction attacks, including that of Cremers et al. [Cre+16]. Our
model effectively captures a new TLS 1.3 protocol, incorporating the
many changes that have been made to the protocol since the develop-
ment of these previous models. We also note that our model is highly
flexible and can easily accommodate the removal of the 0-RTT mech-
anism, should the need arise.
2. We prove the majority of the specified security requirements of TLS
1.3, including the secrecy of session keys, PFS of session keys (where
applicable), peer authentication, and key compromise impersonation
resistance. We also show that after a successful handshake the client
and server agree session keys and that session keys are unique across
handshakes.
3. We uncover a previously unreported behaviour that may lead to secu-
rity problems in applications that assume that TLS 1.3 provides strong
authentication guarantees.
4. We provide a novel way of exhibiting the relation between the speci-
fication and our model: we provide an annotated version of the TLS
1.3 specification that clarifies which parts are modelled and how, and
which parts were abstracted. This provides an unprecedented level of
modelling transparency and enables a straightforward assessment of
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the faithfulness and coverage of our model. We anticipate that this
output will be of great benefit to the academic community analysing
TLS 1.3, as well as the TLS WG as it provides a clear and easy-to-
understand mapping between the TLS 1.3 specification and a TLS 1.3
model.
All our Tamarin input files, proofs, and the annotated TLS 1.3 specification
that shows the relation between the RFC and the model, can be downloaded
from [Cre+17b].
3.1.2 Related work
As mentioned, there has been a great deal of work conducted in the comple-
mentary analysis spheres pertinent to TLS 1.3. Of most interest to this work
are the symbolic analyses presented in [Cre+16], [AM16] and [BBK17].
The work in [Cre+16] by Cremers et al. offered a symbolic model and
accompanying analysis of draft 10 of the TLS 1.3 specification, using the
Tamarin prover. Since then, there have been multiple changes made to the
specification. These updates have included major revisions of the 0-RTT
mechanism and the key derivation schedule. In draft 10, the sending of early
data required a client to possess a semi-static (EC)DH value of the server.
This particular handshake mode was removed and replaced by a PSK 0-RTT
handshake mode– early data can now only be encrypted using a PSK. In fact,
the PSK mechanism has been greatly enhanced since draft 10 with new PSK
variants and binding values being incorporated in to the specification. Post-
handshake authentication was officially incorporated from draft 11 onwards
and a few drafts later, post-handshake authentication was enabled to operate
with the PSK handshake mode. Another change to be incorporated after
draft 10 was the inclusion of 0.5-RTT data - the server being able to send
fully protected application data as part of its first flight of messages.
All of these changes have resulted in what is effectively a very different
TLS 1.3 protocol, particularly from a symbolic perspective. As a Tamarin
model aims to consider the interaction of all possible handshake modes
and variants, changes to these modes, as well as the inclusion of new post-
handshake combinations, results in a very different different set of traces to
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be considered when proving security properties. Hence, this work presents a
substantially different model to [Cre+16], and follows a far more fine-grained
and flexible approach to modelling TLS 1.3.
The work in [AM16] is an analysis of TLS 1.3 by the Cryptographic
protocol Evaluation towards Long-Lived Outstanding Security (CELLOS)
Consortium using the ProVerif tool. Announced on the TLS WG mailing list
at the start of 2016, it showed the initial (EC)DHE handshake of draft-11 to
be secure in the symbolic setting. In comparison to our work, this analysis
covers only one handshake mode of a draft that is now somewhat outdated.
The ProVerif models of revision 18 presented by Bhargavan et al. in
[BBK17] include most TLS 1.3 modes, and cover rich threat models by
considering downgrade attacks (both with weak crypto and downgrade to
TLS 1.2). However, unlike our work, they do not consider all modes, as they
do not consider the post-handshake client authentication mode. While they
cover relatively strong authentication guarantees (which led to the discovery
of an unknown key share attack), their analysis did not uncover the potential
mismatch between client and server view that we describe in Section 3.5.2.
3.1.3 The final development of TLS 1.3
Our analysis is of draft 20 of the protocol, and the final draft before pub-
lication was 28. However unlike the change between draft 10 and draft 20,
the mechanisms remained very stable over the final eight drafts, with most
changes being typographical.
The most significant changes to the protocol were tweaks to make the
draft more amenable to middleboxes. When running deployment tests it was
found that some middleboxes would check the version number of a handshake
and block versions of TLS other than TLS 1.2. Whilst this prevents the use
of older, weaker versions of TLS, it also makes TLS 1.3 handshakes fail. The
TLS WG thus decided to tweak the protocol so that it looked more like
TLS 1.2, tricking the middleboxes, and adding a new version number field
to the extensions.
We enumerate the non-trivial changes here, along with an estimate in
the amount of effort required to model the change.
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1. TLS 1.3 has a series of alerts and errors which indicate various failure
conditions. In the final changes before publication a number of alerts
were made either more or less specific, and some alert types were
removed entirely. As we do not model the alert layer, these changes do
not affect us.
2. The semantics of the legacy_session_id field in the ClientHello
message were updated to improve middlebox compatibility. In version
18, unless the client had a session id set by a pre-TLS 1.3 server, this
field was required to be of zero-length. In version 28, if the client is
operating in so-called “compatibility mode”, then the field is required
to be non-empty, and if the client does not have a pre-TLS 1.3 session
id it is required to use an unpredictable 32-byte value. Because we do
not model earlier versions of TLS our model captures this as a blank
field. Updating the field to include a random value would be very quick
in terms of development work.
3. The ServerHello message was changed to add three fields to improve
middlebox compatibility.
(a) legacy version - A field with a fixed value of 0x0303.
(b) legacy session id echo - This field echoes the contents of the
client’s legacy session id field.
(c) legacy compression method - A field with a fixed value of 0.
Changing the model to capture these changes would be very simple.
Specifically it would require adding two fields of fixed value to the
ServerHello message, and carrying one extra piece of state in the
server. The ServerHello message was also changed to include the
version field in the mandatory extensions. This would require minor
refactoring of the code to move the version field from the beginning
of the ServerHello message to the end.
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4. The HelloRetryRequest message was changed to echo the structure
of the ServerHello message, essentially performing the same transfor-
mation as was applied to the ServerHello message, but also adding
an extra field labelled Random, which carries a fixed value equal to
the SHA-256 of the string ”HelloRetryRequest”. This is also a trivial
change to the model.
5. Support for RSASSA-PSS algorithms was changed. As we use abstract
perfect cryptographic functions this change doesn’t affect our model.
6. A nonce, ticket_nonce, was added to the NewSessionTicket mes-
sage, to ensure uniqueness of tickets. Adding a nonce to a message is
very simple in our model.
7. Messages sent in TLS 1.3 are broken down into typed records and, once
record protection starts, the records are encrypted using authenticated
encryption with associated data (AEAD). Record protection starts
once a set of keys have been agreed between the participants, i.e. part
way through the ServerHello. In the final version of the specification
the record header was added to the additional data in the AEAD
section of the record payload protection. Modelling this change would
require a moderate amount of refactoring the code.
8. A new type of message, the change_cipher_spec message type, was
added to the record protocol. This message type was added to improve
compatibility with middleboxes, and both sides are required to ignore
such messages during the handshake, unless they are malformed in
which case they are required to abort the connection. Modelling this
new message type would be relatively straight-forward.
9. The signature_algorithms_cert extension was made mandatory to
implement. This extension allows a server to support a different set
of algorithms for its certificate signatures and for the handshake sig-
natures. Modelling this change would be simple, because we do not
distinguish between cryptographic algorithms, assuming all to be per-
fect.
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Whilst modelling the changes would be reasonably simple, re-checking
the models would require a substantial amount of human effort. Further
few of these changes are security valent. The adding of constants to vari-
ous messages has no security impact, assuming that the protocol is secure
without them, and the adding of an extra nonce to the ClientHello and
ServerHello should make the protocol strictly more secure (or rather, re-
moving a nonce should be a fault-preserving simplification [HL01], and thus
our current proofs should also apply to the updated specification.). The
addition of a nonce to the NewSessionTicket message also has limited rele-
vance to our results due to a quirk of our model. The specification does not
require the ticket field to be unique, however our model makes the simpli-
fying assumption that it is, and models it as a nonce. Because we assume
perfect cryptography, and thus longer nonces are no more or less secure,
adding an extra nonce to a message (assuming it’s always treated exactly
the same) has no effect on the proof.
Adding a change cipher spec message that is ignored seems unlikely to
affect the security of the protocol. The change to the AEAD structure should
strictly improve the security of the protocol, and thus if we can prove the
properties we want in the current model, we would expect them to hold in the
more secure version. Finally the addition of the signature algorithms cert
should make no difference to the results of our analysis, because of our per-
fect cryptography assumption. We model the list of supported signature
algorithms in the handshake as a public constant, and would model the
supported certificate signature algorithms in the same way. Thus, because
removing public constant fields is a fault preserving simplification, if our
model can be proven secure, then the extended model should also be secure.
At the time of our analysis most of the cryptographic mechanisms in
the TLS 1.3 draft were stable, and other than fluctuations surrounding the
0-RTT mechanism [Mac17], we did not expect substantial changes to come.
3.1.4 Renegotiation and post-handshake authentication
In TLS 1.2 there is a feature called renegotiation, which allows an exist-
ing session to be renegotiated with different cryptographic parameters. A
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common use case was for only requesting a client certificate when the client
tried to access a protected resource, rather than requesting one for every
client. A serious flaw was found with renegotiation in 2009 [SR09], that was
patched in TLS 1.2 with extended master secret [RFC7627]. The vulnera-
bility was caused because the new session was not cryptographically bound
to the prior session. Renegotiation was deprecated in TLS 1.3 because its
utility was deemed not great enough to justify the effort necessary to secure
it. Instead a feature called post-handshake authentication was added to TLS
1.3, to cover the most common use case. Post-handshake authentication al-
lows a client to add a certificate to a session after the handshake has been
completed. In this chapter we analyse the post-handshake authentication
mechanism, in combination with all the other modes of TLS 1.3.
In Chapter 4 we discuss a proposed extension to TLS 1.3 that super-
sedes the post-handshake authentication mechanism. We further this work
in Chapter 5.
Between the tenth revision and the revision of the draft analysed in
this chapter a large amount of work was produced on securing the PSK
mechanism. PSKs established in an earlier session are a form of channel
binding, a topic we discuss at length in Chapter 4, and revisit in Chapters 5
and 6.
3.1.5 Chapter organisation
This chapter is organised as follows. In Section 3.2 we describe the TLS 1.3
protocol and the security properties claimed in the specification. Section 3.3
describes our Tamarin model and provides a few Tamarin prover fundamen-
tals. In Section 3.4, we describe our encoding of the security guarantees,
followed by Section 3.5 where we describe our results. Section 3.6 covers the
relationship between our model and the specification document, discussing
how we provide a website that describes our model side-by-side with the
specification, giving us unprecedented modelling transparency. We conclude
in Section 3.7.
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3.2 TLS 1.3
The TLS 1.3 protocol is made up of two main sections, the handshake and
the record layer.[1] The handshake establishes the cryptographic context
needed to create a secure channel, and the record layer provides a transport
mechanism. In this section we provide a description of the TLS 1.3 hand-
shake, and we outline the claimed security properties and guarantees of the
protocol.
3.2.1 New mechanisms
The four years of effort that has gone into crafting and fine-tuning both the
security and efficiency mechanisms of TLS 1.3 is readily apparent in the large
structural departures from TLS 1.2. The two protocols have broadly similar
goals but exhibit many differences. For example, a full TLS 1.3 handshake
requires one fewer round trip before a client can transmit protected applica-
tion data, and the new 0-RTT mechanism allows less sensitive application
data to be sent by the client as part of its first flight of messages.
TLS 1.3 has three key exchange modes, namely, DHE, PSK exchange,
and PSK coupled with DHE. These modes enable useful features like ses-
sion resumption and the transmission of early application data. Additionally,
there are a number of handshake variants that allow for group renegotia-
tion and the sending of context-dependent, optional messages. Each of these
variants has different properties and offers different security guarantees.
Furthermore, TLS 1.3 has three post-handshake mechanisms covering
traffic key updates, post-handshake client authentication, and the sending
of new session tickets (NSTs) for subsequent resumption via a PSK. The
handshake protocol maintains a rolling transcript, on which both parties
must agree. This transcript takes the form of a hash value of all of the hand-
shake messages. Post-handshake messages, however, are not included in this
transcript resulting in different security properties for the post-handshake
mechanisms.
[1]There is also an alert protocol layer, which we did not examine.
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Client Server
ClientHello
KeyShare
ServerHello
KeyShare
EncryptedExtensions
CertificateRequest*
Certificate
CertificateVerify
Finished
Certificate*
CertificateVerify*
Finished
[ApplicationData]
Figure 3.1: A full TLS 1.3 handshake (Section 3.2.2). Messages marked with
a ‘*’ do not occur in all modes.
TLS establishes a secure channel that is authenticated either unilater-
ally or bilaterally. A unilaterally authenticated channel is one in which only
one party is authenticated, and the other is anonymous. A bilaterally au-
thenticated channel is one in which both parties are authenticated. In the
context of TLS only the client may be anonymous, the server must always
authenticate itself.
We analyse all of the TLS 1.3 key exchange modes, handshake variants,
and post-handshake mechanisms simultaneously, considering all possible in-
teractions between them. We provide a brief description of these components
as well as associated message flow diagrams.
3.2.2 The main handshake
The main handshake of TLS 1.3 consists of three flights of messages over
one-and-a-half round trips. These flights are shown in Figure 3.1. The default
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mode of TLS 1.3 allows for ephemeral DH keys to be established either over
a finite field or using elliptic curves.
We now walk through a default DHE handshake.
3.2.3 The first flight
ClientHello
The first flight of messages consists solely of a ClientHello message. The
ClientHello message contains two fields of interest, a nonce and a list of
extensions. The message struct is defined in Figure 3.2. The list of extensions
contains extra values that the TLS client wants to signal or negotiate with
the server. In a vanilla handshake this list of extensions will include the
KeyShare extension, which contains a DH key share.
struct {
ProtocolVersion legacy_version = 0x0303; /* TLS v1.2 */
Random random;
opaque legacy_session_id<0..32>;
CipherSuite cipher_suites<2..2^16-2>;
opaque legacy_compression_methods<1..2^8-1>;
Extension extensions<8..2^16-1>;
} ClientHello;
Figure 3.2: Definition of ClientHello from [RFC8446, p. 28]
In Figure 3.2 we show the ClientHello struct, with fields of particular
interest highlighted. Each field has a type and often a range of acceptable
values. For example the random field has the type Random, indicating that it
holds random data, in this case a nonce. The extensions field has a range
of 8 to 216 − 1, i.e. [8 − 65535]. As we mentioned earlier the legacy ver-
sion number has been preserved to improve compatibility with misbehaving
middleboxes.[2] The opaque type means that the recipient is not expected
[2]There are specific rules about what a middlebox is allowed to do and what it is not
allowed to do. This behaviour is not allowed. To try and prevent this sort of atrophying of
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to understand or parse the contents of the field, but rather to treat it as
a “blob” of data. In this case the type is used to indicate that the fields
are actually unused, and are merely placeholders for values that would be
present in a TLS 1.2 handshake. In later examples it indicates data that
cannot be broken down, but can be compared, for example the output of a
hash function. An actor cannot reverse the hash, and thus analyse the con-
tents of the opaque type, but can recompute the hash from values it knows,
and check to make sure that the values match.
3.2.4 The second flight
The second flight of messages is sent by the server, and contains the Server
Hello, EncryptedExtensions, potentially a CertificateRequest, and a
sequence of messages, <Certificate, CertificateVerify, Finished>.
This latter pattern is at the heart of the security guarantees of both TLS
1.3 and EAs, which are the topic of Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.
ServerHello
The ServerHello is nearly a mirror of the ClientHello, with the server
replacing the client’s nonce with a nonce of its own, and the client’s key share
with its own. The server may also potentially send different extensions. We
defer in depth discussion of extensions to Chapter 5.
EncryptedExtensions
Once the client has received the ServerHello it has enough information to
compute a shared secret key. The client and server have completed an unau-
thenticated Diffie–Hellman exchange (DHE). The client and server compute
a set of keys, called the handshake keys, which they use to encrypt the re-
mainder of the handshake. This includes any extensions that aren’t needed
to compute the handshake keys. Because the handshake keys are unauthen-
ticated an attacker may have performed a MITM attack, which would cause
the handshake in future substantial work has gone into “greasing” the protocol. Greasing
involves sending messages that it is known the peer and any middleboxes will not under-
stand, and making sure they respond appropriately. Usually this is done by sending values
that have yet to be defined.
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the remainder of the handshake to fail. However, if the remainder of the
handshake succeeds, then the client and server can be confident ex post
facto that the encrypted extensions, and the remainder of the handshake
were confidential.
The handshake keys are computed using an HKDF, taking as input
both the established DH key, but also the client and server hello mes-
sages. This means the keys depend on the both the client and server nonce.
This is important, because the server’s hello message does not include the
client’s nonce. Therefore until it receives the EncryptedExtensions the
client doesn’t see its nonce reflected back, and thus cannot establish fresh-
ness. However if it can decrypt the EncryptedExtensions it can indirectly
establish freshness. If the client and server don’t agree on the nonces used
in the handshake so far they will compute different keys, and thus the de-
cryption will fail. Thus if the client can decrypt the EncryptedExtensions
the client knows that it computed the same handshake keys as the server,
and thus that the server used the same value for the client nonce in its com-
putation as the client did. This lets the client ensure that the handshake is
fresh.
CertificateRequest
If the server wants the client to authenticate itself, producing a bilateral TLS
channel, as opposed to a unilateral channel, then it sends a Certificate
Request message. The CertificateRequest message is defined by the struct
in Figure 3.3.
struct {
opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>;
Extension extensions<2..2^16-1>;
} CertificateRequest;
Figure 3.3: CertificateRequest definition from [RFC8446, p. 60]
It consists of a unique[3] certificate_request_context and a list of
extensions that define the properties of the requested certificate. In the con-
[3]Unique within the context of a given connection.
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text of a vanilla TLS 1.3 handshake the certificate request context has
a length of zero, but in other contexts it is assigned to other values.
3.2.5 Certificate
The server now begins to send its <Certificate, CertificateVerify,
Finished> message sequence. These messages bind the server’s certificate
to the handshake so far. The Certificate message is defined in Figure 3.4.
struct {
opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>;
CertificateEntry certificate_list<0..2^24-1>;
} Certificate;
Figure 3.4: Certificate definition from [RFC8446, p. 64]
In a vanilla handshake the certificate_request_context has zero
length, but in other contexts it has other lengths. The certificate request
context is paired with a certificate chain, chaining back to a certificate the
client trusts.
The CertificateVerify message
The CertificateVerify message is designed to provide proof that the
sender controls the relevant certificate. To do this the sender signs a value
with the certificate’s private key. To bind that signature to the session the
value signed includes the rolling transcript hash, which includes the nonces.
To make sure the CertificateVerify from the TLS handshake can’t be
used in another place, a label is used. For example if the server is sending
a CertificateVerify in the context of a TLS 1.3 handshake the context
string “TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify” is included. The struct given in
the TLS 1.3 draft is shown in Figure 3.5.
struct {
SignatureScheme algorithm;
opaque signature<0..2^16-1>;
} CertificateVerify;
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Figure 3.5: CertificateVerify definition from [RFC8446, p. 69]
The message consists of the choice of algorithm and a signature, which
is computed as follows:
• The octet 0x20 repeated 64 times,
• a context string,
• a separator byte,
• the value to be signed.
The value that is signed is the hash of all the previous messages, referred
to as the “Handshake Context”, concatenated with the Certificate message.
In a vanilla handshake the server uses the context string “TLS 1.3, server
CertificateVerify” and when the certificate is being signed by a client in
response to a CertificateRequest the context string “TLS 1.3, client
CertificateVerify” is used.
The Finished message
The Finished message is simply an HMAC over the message transcript.
This is intended to provide integrity protection for all the messages in the
transcript.
3.2.6 The third flight
The client responds to the server’s flight with Finished message, or, if
the server sent a CertificateRequest, with a flight of <Certificate,
CertificateVerify, Finished> messages.
3.2.7 Other modes
Pre-shared key (PSK)
In the event that a PSK has been established, a client and a server can begin
communicating without a DH exchange or exchanging certificates. This is
potentially attractive for low-power environments, however, without a DHE
the connection loses PFS. In a PSK handshake, the server authenticates via
a PSK, rather than a certificate.
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When running in a PSK mode the client includes a special extension,
pre_shared_key, in the ClientHello. The pre_shared_key extension con-
tains a list of PSK identities and a list of PSK binders. The PSK binders are
special values used to bind the PSK to the handshake. They are computed
as an HMAC over the handshake up to that point, only excluding the list of
binders itself.[4] For this reason the pre_shared_key extension is required to
be the last extension. The HMAC is keyed with the PSK. The PSK binders
are a type of channel binding. If the PSK is established out-of-band (OOB),
for example in a prior non-TLS protocol run, then it is possible to get the
guarantees of the non-TLS protocol in this mode. If the prior protocol run
has PFS then it is possible to establish a PFS secrecy property for PSK
mode. We discuss PSK binders in greater detail in Chapter 6.
PSK with DHE
In PSK modes By combining a PSK with DHE this mode maintains PFS
whilst limiting the number of expensive public key operations that the server
needs to perform. Neither the client nor the server needs to compute or verify
a certificate signature.
Group renegotiation
It can be the case that the groups sent by a client are not acceptable to
the server. In this case, the server may respond with a HelloRetryRequest
message. This indicates to the client which groups the server will accept, and
provides the client with the opportunity to respond with an appropriate key
share before returning to the main handshake.
New session ticket (NST)
After a successful handshake, the server can issue an NST at any time. These
tickets create a binding to a resumption-specific secret and can be used by
the client as PSKs in subsequent handshakes.
[4]The binders cannot be dependent on themselves, i.e. one cannot use the output of the
hash function as an input to the computation.
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PSK
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Finished
Finished
[ApplicationData]
Figure 3.6: A PSK resumption handshake (Section 3.2.7)
Session resumption and PSK
This handshake variant allows a client to use a key established OOB to start
a new session, or to use an NST established in a previous handshake to re-
sume the session. This avoids the use of expensive public-key operations and
in the case of a resumption, ties the security context of the new connection to
the original connection. Note that a server may reject a resumption attempt
made by a client, so the specification recommends that the client supplies
an additional (EC)DHE key share with its PSK when trying to resume a
session. Figure 3.6 depicts a PSK resumption handshake.
Zero round-trip time (0-RTT)
A client can use a PSK to send application data in its first flight of mes-
sages, reducing the latency of the connection. As noted in the TLS 1.3 draft
specification, this data is not protected against replay attacks. If the com-
municating entities wish to take advantage of the 0-RTT mechanism, they
should provide their own replay protection at the application layer. A 0-RTT
handshake is depicted in Figure 3.7.
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[ApplicationData]
Figure 3.7: A 0-RTT handshake (Section 3.2.7)
Post-handshake client authentication
After a successful handshake, the server can send a CertificateRequest
message. If the client responds with an acceptable certificate, then the server
might authenticate the client. However, because the specification allows cer-
tificates to be rejected ‘silently’, the client cannot be sure of its authentica-
tion status in general. We discuss this in greater detail in Section 3.5.2.
Key update
After a successful handshake, either party can request an application data
key update. Because the read and write keys for application data are in-
dependent, either party can immediately update their write key after re-
questing a key update. They must wait for a response from their peer before
updating their read key, because the peer may have messages in flight under
the old key. The write key on the other hand can be updated immediately
because TLS provides in-order delivery of messages, and thus once the peer
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has received the key update message it can be sure that all data that follows
was encrypted under the new key.
Key derivation
A TLS 1.3 handshake will generate a set of keys on which both the client
and server agree. The specification defines a key schedule which uses the
repeated application of an HKDF [RFC5869] to combine the secret inputs
with fixed labels so as to generate a set of independent keys.
The key schedule has two secret inputs, the (EC)DHE and the PSK.
Depending on the handshake mode, either one or both of these will be used.
The key schedule also includes the transcript hash in the key derivation.
Because the transcript includes nonces, even if the secret inputs are repeated,
the generated keys are guaranteed to be independent.
3.2.8 The security design of the TLS 1.3 handshake
Nonces
Both the client and the server send a nonce in their first message. A nonce
is an unpredictable fresh value that is echoed back to the sender. When a
client or server receives a nonce they created back from their peer they can
be sure that their peer is active, and that an adversary is not just replaying
messages from a previous session. In TLS 1.3 neither the client or server
echo back the nonce directly. They instead compute a shared secret that is
dependent on the nonces established. This means that if they agree on the
shared secret at the end of the run, then they agree on the nonces used.
DHE
A DH key exchange establishes ephemeral session keys. The purpose of this
key exchange is to prevent a passive adversary from being able to decrypt
sessions even if it has compromised the long term (i.e. static) keys of one of
the parties.
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If the DH problem is hard then a passive adversary cannot derive the
session secrets simply from observing the handshake because knowing gx and
gy, which both appear in the handshake, gives the adversary no advantage
in computing gxy, the ephemeral key.
In TLS 1.2 there are cipher suites that did not have a DHE. These modes
are commonly used in industry to monitor encrypted connections to a server.
These were all deprecated in TLS 1.3. This was a controversial decision, and
the only non-ephemeral mode of TLS 1.3 is the OOB-PSK mode. We discuss
this at length in Chapter 6.
Transcript hashes
To ensure that messages are not modified in transit an accumulating hash of
the transcript to date is computed by both sides. By ensuring both parties
agree on this hash the two parties can be sure that they agree on the contents
of all the messages, and that nothing has been modified by an adversary.
Although the ClientHello doesn’t include a transcript hash, because the
hash is cumulative, agreeing on the hash by the end of the protocol gives
the ClientHello message integrity protection ex post facto. In PSK modes
the PSK binders provide integrity protection also. This protects any early
application data.
This relies on hash functions having second-preimage resistance, i.e. that
it is computationally infeasible to find two distinct inputs that hash to the
same value. If an adversary can find such inputs then it could potentially
cause the client and server to agree on the transcript hash, but have different
views of protocol run. This would be a session synchronisation attack, where
two different sessions output the same keying material. We discuss this at
length in Chapter 4.
Labels
Another potential route of attack is that an adversary could takes values
produced in one place and transplant them in another. This could be any
value generated by an honest party, from entire blocks of messages, to single
nonces, or even keys. For example the <Certificate, CertificateVerify,
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Finished> message pattern can be produced in other contexts, see Chap-
ters 4 and 5. If an attacker were able to transplant messages from one proto-
col to another it could potentially use some other protocol to acquire vaild
messages that were intended for a different context, and by using them in
the TLS handshake break the security guarantees. For example, by legiti-
mately acquiring a <Certificate, CertificateVerify, Finished> mes-
sage block from some other context it might be able to impersonate the
Certificate owner. To prevent such messages being misused in a TLS run
labels are included. These labels are simply fixed strings or numbers, but
by ensuring different labels are used in every place, and that such messages
have integrity protections, such as MACs, an adversary cannot transplant
them from one place to another.
The same logic is applied to keys. To prevent an attacker who can ac-
quire some keys from being able to derive other keys, keys are hashed with
a contextual label before use. This renders the keys used in different con-
texts independent, i.e. knowing one key gives the adversary no advantage in
deriving others.
This relies on hash functions having preimage resistance, i.e. that given
the output of a hash function it is computationally infeasible to find a value
produces that output.
3.2.9 Stated goals and security properties
The TLS 1.3 handshake protocol is intended to negotiate cryptographic keys
by defining an authenticated key exchange (AKE). These keys can then be
used by the record layer to provide critical security guarantees, including
confidentiality and integrity of messages. As stated in Section 3.2.1, TLS 1.3
makes use of independent keys to protect handshake messages and applica-
tion data messages: protection of the handshake messages starts with the
server’s EncryptedExtensions message, and in the majority of handshake
modes, protection of application data messages occurs after the transmis-
sion of the server and client Finished messages, respectively. In the case of
a 0-RTT handshake, early application data is protected with a PSK as part
of the client’s first flight of messages.
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The TLS specification [RFC8446, Appendix E.1] lists eight properties
that the handshake protocol is required to satisfy:
1. Establishing the same session keys. Upon completion of the hand-
shake, the client and the server should have established a set of session
keys on which they both agree.
2. Secrecy of the session keys. Upon completion of the handshake,
the client and server should have established a set of session keys which
are known to the client and the server only.
3. Peer authentication. In the unilateral case, upon completion of the
handshake, if a client C believes it is communicating with a server S,
then it is indeed S who is indeed executing the server role. An analo-
gous property for the server holds in the bilateral (mutual) authenti-
cation case.
4. Uniqueness of session keys. Each run of the protocol should pro-
duce distinct, independent session keys.
5. Downgrade protection. An active attacker should not be able to
force the client and the server to employ weak cipher suites, or older
versions of the TLS protocol.
6. Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS). In the case of compromise of
either party’s long-term key, sessions completed before the compromise
should remain secure. This property is not claimed to hold in the PSK
key exchange mode.
7. Key compromise impersonation (KCI) resistance. Should an
attacker compromise the long-term key of party A, the attacker should
not be able to use this key to impersonate an uncompromised party
in communication with A.
8. Protection of endpoint identities. The identity of the server can-
not be revealed by a passive attacker that observes the handshake, and
the identity of the client cannot be revealed even by an active attacker
that is capable of tampering with the communication.
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We model six out of the eight required properties, omitting downgrade
protection and the protection of endpoint identities. Also, as stated pre-
viously, 0-RTT mechanisms allow for replay of early data across sessions.
We discuss the reduced 0-RTT security properties as well as the properties
described above more fully in Section 3.4.
The draft specification refers to RFC 3552 [RFC3552] for an informal
description of the TLS 1.3 threat model. This model assumes a Dolev-Yao
attacker [DY83]– an attacker that can perform MITM attacks by being able
to replay, insert, delete, and modify messages at will. We consider a strictly
more powerful attacker, as we will explain in Section 3.4.1.
3.3 Modelling the protocol
3.3.1 The Tamarin prover
The Tamarin prover [Sch+12] is a symbolic modelling and analysis tool for
security protocols. Its specification language facilitates the construction of
highly detailed models of security protocols, their security requirements and
powerful Dolev-Yao-style attackers. The verification algorithm of Tamarin
is based on constraint solving and multiset-rewriting techniques, which al-
lows its users to prove intricate security properties in complex protocols
exhibiting branches and loops. Moreover, it offers state-of-the-art symbolic
Diffie-Hellman support. Tamarin inherently supports non-monotonic state
and it includes an extensive graphical user interface that enables the visu-
alisation and interactive construction of proofs.
These features make Tamarin a good fit for the modelling and in-depth
analysis of highly complex protocols such as TLS 1.3. In particular, the
support for branching allowed us to model the decisions that the protocol
participants can make during execution, the loops were instrumental in cov-
ering repeated connections within a single session, and the main security
aspects of TLS 1.3 critically depend on Diffie-Hellman key exchange. The
non-monotonic state support enabled us to model branching without hav-
ing to resort to custom-tailored hacks or having to rely on the considerable
over-approximation where all branches can be considered simultaneously.
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Lastly, the visualisations of attacks found by Tamarin provided us with a
way to quickly identify potential problems, with either the protocol or our
model– the graphical user interface was a great asset in guiding our TLS 1.3
verification workflow.
We defer the details of our Tamarin model to Section 3.4, and note
differences to other TLS 1.3 models in the next section.
3.3.2 A comprehensive model
Using Tamarin’s modelling framework we devised a comprehensive symbolic
model of TLS 1.3 that captures the specified protocol behaviours, as well
as unexpected behaviours that arise from a complex interaction of an un-
bounded number of sessions. Our model captures these behaviours in the
presence of a powerful adversary.[5]
Other TLS 1.3 analyses consider the constituent parts of TLS 1.3, view-
ing these as separate protocols, and proceed to tie the individual proofs to-
gether with a compositionality result. For instance, [BBK17] considers the
resumption mechanism as a separate protocol in which both the client and
the server take as input a symmetric value—the PSK. If the PSK remains
unknown to the adversary in every execution of the resumption protocol, a
gap remains to be filled before concluding that the full handshake always
completes without the adversary knowing the PSK. This gap is filled by a
manual compositionality proof. In our work, there is no need for such man-
ual proofs; composition is trivially satisfied by our comprehensive model, as
Tamarin considers all the possible interactions in proving each property.
Although our model undoubtedly draws from the Tamarin models de-
scribed in [Hor16] and [Cre+16], we opted to model TLS 1.3 with a signifi-
cant increase in fidelity to the draft specification. Such an approach resulted
in an improved ability to capture the full functionality of TLS, as well as a
broader class of realistic attacks. This class includes the coverage of compli-
cated interaction attacks, such as the post-handshake client authentication
attack in [Cre+16]. Additionally, by closely matching our model to the spec-
ification and allowing for an almost line-per-line comparison, we achieve full
[5]We defer discussion of our adversary capabilities to Section 3.4.1.
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transparency regarding which parts of the specification we abstract away
from, and which assumptions our modelling process relies on. We discuss
the relation between our model and the RFC in detail in Section 3.6.
Not only is our model more comprehensive than the Tamarin models that
precede it, it also incorporates the many changes to the TLS 1.3 specification
that have materialised since the development of these models. In the follow-
ing sections, we describe our modelling process, pointing out enhancements
over the previous models.
3.3.3 Closely modelling the specification
As with previous models [Cre+16], we employ the use of Tamarin rules
to model state transitions within the TLS 1.3 protocol. However, our state
transitions are far more fine-grained and modular in comparison to [Cre+16],
modelling the effective change in state as a result of transmission, receipt
and processing of cryptographic parameters. For instance, a basic, initial
TLS 1.3 handshake invokes up to 21 different rules and the associated state
transitions before post-handshake operations can commence. These state
transitions are depicted in Figure 3.8, and correspond to message flights
and cryptographic processing as described in Section 3.2.1, Figure 3.1. The
full state diagram can be found Appendix A.
We provide an example of one of our rules in Figure 3.9. This rule de-
scribes the sending of data. Although Tamarin provides a communication
primitive in its domain-specific language we define our own primitive here.
There are two facts that are consumed on the left hand side of the rule.
SendStream(~tid, $actor, $peer, auth status, app key out) means
that a connection exists. This connection has the ID ~tid and runs from
$actor to $peer. The auth status indicates whether or not the the actor
has been authenticated. Finally, app key out is the write key of the sender.
The Send(~tid) and SendData(~tid, $actor, $peer, auth status,
~data) are the send events triggered by the firing of the rule. The Send(~tid)
event simply records that something has been sent on the channel with ID
~tid. This simpler action allows us to write easier to read rules when not
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C0Client
C1
C2a
C2b
C2c
C2d
C3
C4
S0Server
S1
S2a
S2b
S2c
S2d
S3
S4
client hello
recv server hello
recv server auth
client gen keys
recv encrypted extensions
recv cert request OR
skip recv cert request
cert req ctxt 6= ‘0’
client auth OR
client auth cert
cert req ctxt = ‘0’
recv client hello
server hello
server auth
server gen keys
encrypted extensions
cert request OR
skip cert request
cert req ctxt 6= ‘0’
recv client auth OR
recv client auth cert
cert req ctxt = ‘0’
ClientHello
+Extensions
ServerHello
+Extensions
EncryptedExtensions
CertRequest
Cert CertVerify
Finished
Cert CertVerify
Finished
Figure 3.8: Partial state diagram for full TLS 1.3 handshake. Tamarin rules
are indicated in blue. The messages exchanged between entities are given in
green. Our full model contains many more transitions. We omit these here
for the sake of simplicity.
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1 rule send:
2 [ SendStream(~tid, $actor, $peer, auth_status,
app_key_out),↪→
3 Fr(~data)
4 ]
5 --[ Send(~tid),
6 SendData(~tid, $actor, $peer, auth_status, ~data)
7 ]->
8 [ SendStream(~tid, $actor, $peer, auth_status,
app_key_out),↪→
9 Out(senc{data_record(~data)}app_key_out)
10 ]
Figure 3.9: The send rule of our Tamarin model of TLS
all the fields are important. The SendData event records that data has been
sent on the channel, along with the data that has been sent.
On the right hand side of the rule we repeat the SendStream fact so that
the stream is not consumed and may be used again by subsequent rules. Note
that this is not a persistent fact, but a fact that is consumed and recreated.
This means we can always be sure of the order of any two send messages.
A persistent fact would allow for multiple messages to be sent concurrently.
The Out(senc{data record(~data)}app key out) fact captures that data
has been sent to the network using Tamarin’s Out primitive.
Tamarin’s In and Out primitives capture receiving and sending a message
from and to the network respectively. However, this primitive describes an
entirely unsecured channel with a Dolev-Yao attacker. The TLS record layer
defines how messages are to be transported across such a channel in such
a way as to create a secure channel. As can be seen in line 9 we use the
Out primitive inside our send rule. In this case we wrap the data inside a
special data_record frame. This allows the recipient to distinguish between
handshake messages and data messages.[6] We then encrypt the framed data
with a key we refer to as the app_key_out key. This key refers to the write
key of the sender.
[6]Alert protocol messages are wrapped in yet another frame type.
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We also note the extensive use of macros in our model, which is en-
abled by the m4 preprocessor and allowed us to cover most of the specifi-
cation, whilst syntactically keeping our model close to it. For example, our
ClientHello message is a macro that expands to:
handshake_record('1',
ProtocolVersion,
ClientRandom,
'0', // legacy_session_id
$cipher_suites,
'0', // legacy_compression_methods
ClientHelloExtensions)
which reflects almost exactly how it is written in our Tamarin files.
ClientRandom is itself another macro, defined to be the value of the client
nonce nc. In Tamarin’s syntax, constants are enclosed by single quotes. Con-
structing the model in this fashion enables a direct syntactic comparison to
the specification. In Section 3.6 we show this comparison, and link to our
website where we perform this comparison for our entire model. Previous
Tamarin models also employ macros, but the connection to the specification
is much less evident. For instance, in Cremers et al. [Cre+16] ClientHello
is defined to be the pair of values nc,pc, representing the client’s nonce and
“parameters”, which serves as a placeholder for handshake values that are
abstracted away.
In our model we have tried to define cryptographic components in a way
that is reminiscent of imperative programming. As in the specification, we
compute the handshake secret using the function HKDF-Extract(gxy,es),
and the handshake keys are computed by applying a Derive-Secret func-
tion to this value. This is not strictly necessary due to the assumption of
perfect cryptography, but it makes it easier to connect our model to the
specification.
3.3.4 Advanced features
In our model we capture a number of complicated interactions and logic
flows inherent to the TLS 1.3 handshake, greatly improving on preceding
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models, adding features to the model which we consider to be ‘advanced’.
In particular we discuss group negotiation and handshake flows.
Group negotiation
We model the client and the server as having a limited ability to negotiate
the group used in the Diffie–Hellman key exchange.
In Tamarin, any value can be used as a group generator. Typically, the
fixed (public) constant 'g' is used, which represents all parties agreeing to
use a single group ahead of time. On receiving a key share and storing it in
the variable gx, we simulate checking that the element resides in this group
by pattern matching the value as 'g'^x = gx. Intuitively, this corresponds
to checking that ∃x . gx = gx .
In Tamarin’s syntax, variables that are always instantiated with public
values are prefixed by $. In our model, the client starts with a pair of public
values $g1,$g2 that represent two supported groups, and offers these to the
server along with a corresponding key share for $g1. Similarly, the server
starts with a supported group $g. The model allows the server to return a
HelloRetryRequest to the client, enforcing that $g is not equal to $g1, and
expects the client to return instead a key share that matches $g2.
This interaction enables a much greater coverage of DH key exchange
with respect to previous models, and opens up the possibility of future ex-
tensions to this work. One such extension would be to model a weak group
by permitting the adversary to reveal the corresponding DH exponents.
Handshake flows
One of the most complex elements inherent to modelling TLS 1.3 is the vast
number of possible state machine transitions. After a session resumption,
the server can choose between using the PSK only, or using the PSK along
with a DH key share. Alternatively, the server might reject the PSK entirely,
and fall back to a regular handshake, or request that the client use a different
group for the DH exchange. Additionally, there are several complex messages
that can be sent in the post-handshake state: client authentication requests,
new session tickets, and key update requests.
77
3.4. Encoding the threat model and the security properties
Since all of the above interactions can happen asynchronously, the result-
ing model becomes very complex and requires sophisticated handling logic.
A number of complicated protocol flows, involving any number of sequen-
tial handshake modes and post-handshake extensions can, and will, transpire
and we deal with this eventuality by modelling all possible handshake modes
in a very modular fashion.
For example a client may connect unilaterally to a server, acquire a NST,
upgrade the connection to a mutually authenticated bilateral connection
using post-handshake authentication, then reconnect sending data in 0-RTT,
before performing a second post-handshake authentication. Each of these
stages has differing and complex security claims and guarantees. By creating
a very modular model we avoid having to explicitly model every combination
of modes and exchange modes.
For example the rules defining a 0-RTT handshake are entirely separate
from the rules establishing post-handshake authentication, but by carefully
maintaining the necessary state throughout we ensure that they can interact
with each other correctly, despite neither knowing of the other’s existence.
Other models are, by and large, not capable of capturing complicated pro-
tocol flows. This also enables us to add and remove modes for testing very
easily.
3.4 Encoding the threat model and the security properties
3.4.1 Threat model
We consider an extension of the Dolev-Yao (DY) attacker [DY83] as our
threat model. The DY attacker has complete control of the network, and can
intercept, send, replay, and delete any message. To construct a new message,
the attacker can combine any information previously learnt, e.g., decrypting
messages for which it knows the key, or creating its own encrypted messages.
We assume perfect cryptography, which implies that the attacker cannot
encrypt, decrypt or sign messages without knowledge of the appropriate
keys. In order to consider different types of compromise, we additionally
allow the attacker to do the following:
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• compromise the long-term keys of protocol participants,
• compromise their pre-shared keys, whether created OOB or through a
NST, and
• compromise their DH values.
Note that TLS 1.3 is not intended to be secure under the full combi-
nation of all these types of compromise. For example, session key secrecy
can be broken by an attacker who eavesdrops on the communication and
compromises the DH values of a single protocol participant.
A natural approach is to weaken the attacker model by adding realis-
tic constraints until either the claimed security goals of the protocol are
achieved, or the corresponding attackers become weaker than the ones we
expect to face in practice. By starting from a strong attacker and explicitly
stating the restrictions on its actions we can avoid the problem with the
BAN logic model of the Needham-Schroeder protocol, namely that there
was an implicit assumption that all LTKs keys were uncompromised. This
workflow requires us to express, with high granularity, exactly what needs
to be protected and when each of the claimed TLS 1.3 properties can be
expected to hold.
We now give our formal definitions of the TLS 1.3 security properties
mentioned in Section 2, noting where each property is covered in our model.
3.4.2 Security properties
We encode the claimed security properties of TLS 1.3 as lemmas in the spec-
ification language of Tamarin. Here we discuss the relationship between the
lemmas we prove in the model, and the desired properties in the specifica-
tion. We note that there is some overlap between the different handshake
security goals of TLS 1.3 expressed in Section 3.2.9. For example, the re-
quirement for PFS is effectively a modifier to the requirement for secret
session keys. Where possible, we will prove these properties via distinct lem-
mas to aid in the comprehension of the model. However, it is also possible
to combine many of the properties into a single, more complex lemma.
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1 lemma secret_session_keys:
2 "All tid actor peer write_key read_key peer_auth_status #i.
3 SessionKey(tid, actor, peer, <peer_auth_status, 'auth'>,
<write_key, read_key>)@i↪→
4 & not (Ex #r. RevLtk(peer)@r & #r < #i)
5 & not (Ex tid3 x #r. RevDHExp(tid3, peer, x)@r & #r < #i)
6 & not (Ex tid4 y #r. RevDHExp(tid4, actor, y)@r & #r < #i)
7 & not (Ex resumption_master_secret #r.
RevealPSK(actor, resumption_master_secret)@r)↪→
8 & not (Ex resumption_master_secret #r.
RevealPSK(peer, resumption_master_secret)@r)↪→
9 ==> not Ex #j. K(read_key)@j"
Figure 3.10: secret session keys (Section 3.4.2). The SessionKey action is
triggered at the end of a handshake. Rev* actions occur when the attacker
reveals a key. The K action indicates that the attacker knows the value.
Establishing the same session keys
The definition of this first property is taken from Canetti et al. [CK01], where
it is referred to as a consistency property. However, there is ambiguity in the
circumstances that are necessary and sufficient for two protocol participants
to establish the same keys. An answer to this question is typically given
through the well-established practice of defining session partnering [BR93]
[CK01] [LLM07]. One possible way to do so is to assign session identifiers
in terms of a value (or pair of values) on which the two parties agree. We
opted for the least restrictive session identifier, namely the pair of nonces
generated by the client and the server. Therefore, if a partnered client and
server complete the handshake, then they must agree on session keys.
Secrecy of the session keys
The secret_session_keys lemma is used to prove property 2 (secret session
keys) in Section 3.2.9.
The secret_session_keys lemma we prove in Tamarin appears verba-
tim in Figure 3.10. The intuition for this lemma is that if an actor believes it
has established a session key with an authenticated peer, then the attacker
does not know the key. However, given the capabilities of the attacker, this
will not hold without imposing some restrictions. This is why the additional
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clauses (lines 4-8) are required. In Tamarin a lemma is a property on traces,
i.e. potential runs of the protocol as described by the model. The additional
clauses effectively exclude some traces from consideration, in particular those
where the attacker performs some action which is beyond the scope of our
threat model. The Rev* actions all refer to the attacker compromising a key.
Line 2 simply lists the variables over which we (universally) quantify,
each given a name to indicate its purpose.[7] The five conditions stated in the
lemma are generally repeated across all lemmas, and encapsulate the basic
assumptions we make about our adversary. We describe them in more detail
here: The first (line 4) imposes the restriction that the long-term signing
key of the peer is not compromised.[8] This restriction can additionally be
understood to signify that the actor is communicating with an honest peer,
since the adversary can effectively simulate a party when in possession of
its long-term key. We quantify over the time the attacker compromises the
key, excluding traces where the attacker learns the peer LTK before time
“#i”. Time “#i” is the time where the actor has performed a SessionKey
action, which corresponds to the actor completing a successful run of the
protocol. Furthermore, it should be noted that the attacker is still allowed
to compromise the peer’s LTK after the session key is established. Hence we
show that the session keys achieve PFS with respect to the LTK.
The second and third clauses (lines 5 and 6) ignore traces where the
attacker reveals any DH exponents generated by the client or the server from
before the session key was established. The attacker may reveal exponents
that are generated after the session key is established.
The last two clauses (lines 7 and 8) specify that the adversary cannot
compromise a PSK associated with either the actor or the peer. Note that
the attacker is restricted from revealing these PSKs even after the session key
has been established, which corresponds to the proviso in the specification
[7]These names have no significance to Tamarin, given α-renaming, but they do have
implicit types, which are significant to Tamarin’s solver.
[8]We remind the reader that both the client and the server are equipped with long-term
signing keys, and the corresponding public key certificates, for the purposes of authenti-
cation.
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that the PSK-only exchange mode does not provide PFS. We discuss this
in more detail towards the end of this section.
Peer Authentication
The specification defines this property somewhat informally, as a form of au-
thentication whereby both parties should agree on the identity of their peer.
Looking at this more formally through the lens of Lowe’s hierarchy of authen-
tication [Low97], this definition corresponds to weak agreement, described in
Definition 2.5.2. In particular, we note that this does not imply recentness—
the requirement that the peer is currently running the protocol—nor does
it specify whether any other values should be agreed upon.
We initially model this property via our entity_authentication lemma.
Entity authentication is modelled in two parts so as to capture the distinc-
tion between the bilateral (mutual) and unilateral authentication cases. Au-
thentication in the unilateral case means that if a client completes a TLS
handshake, apparently with a server, then the server previously ran a TLS
handshake with the client, and they both agree on certain data values of the
handshake, including the identity of the server and the nonces used. Note
that this is already a stronger property than the peer authentication prop-
erty listed in specification, which doesn’t require agreement on any values.
This is because the same session keys property is actually an authentication
property. Here we prove non-injective agreement on the nonces, which ad-
ditionally provides recentness since both parties contribute a fresh nonce to
the handshake. The unilateral entity authentication lemma we prove appears
in Figure 3.11.
The intuition for this lemma is that if a client believes it has agreed on
a pair of nonces with a server, then the server was, at some point prior, run-
ning the protocol with those nonces. The CommitNonces action occurs when
the client completes a run of the protocol with the relevant nonces. The
RunningNonces action happens when an actor, in this case the server, has
seen both the client and server hello messages. We also require the client to
have committed to the server’s identity using the CommitIdentity action.
We again find the necessary restrictions on the attacker to achieve this prop-
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1 lemma entity_authentication [use_induction, reuse]:
2 "All tid actor peer nonces client_auth_status #i.
3 CommitNonces(tid, actor, 'client', nonces)@i
4 & CommitIdentity(tid, actor, 'client', peer,
<client_auth_status, 'auth'>)@i↪→
5 & not (Ex #r. RevLtk(peer)@r & #r < #i)
6 & not (Ex tid3 x #r. RevDHExp(tid3, peer, x)@r & #r < #i)
7 & not (Ex tid4 y #r. RevDHExp(tid4, actor, y)@r & #r < #i)
8 & not (Ex resumption_master_secret #r.
RevealPSK(actor, resumption_master_secret)@r & #r <
#i)
↪→
↪→
9 & not (Ex resumption_master_secret #r.
RevealPSK(peer, resumption_master_secret)@r & #r < #i)↪→
10 ==> (Ex tid2 #j.
RunningNonces(tid2, peer, 'server', nonces)@j
& #j < #i)"
Figure 3.11: entity authentication (Section 3.4.2).
erty. The property can only hold if the attacker does not acquire any of the
secrets prior to the client agreeing on nonces. While one might expect that
only the legitimacy of the signing key is necessary for authentication, if the
adversary is able to obtain the PSK through compromising cryptographic
material, or the PSK directly, then the adversary is able to resume a session
and impersonate the peer.
In addition to entity authentication, we consider a transcript agreement
property, where the value agreed upon is a hash of the session transcript.
This provides us with near-full agreement. However, there are a couple of
notable omissions. Firstly, the protocol technically continues after the initial
handshake, for example post-handshake authentication can occur after the
initial handshake has completed. None of these delayed handshake messages
are included in the session transcript. Secondly, we observed that the actors
do not necessarily agree on the current authentication status of the hand-
shake. Whilst each actor can be certain of the authentication status of its
peer, the client cannot be certain what the server believes its authentication
status is. We cover this case in more detail in Section 3.5.2.
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Finally, we also prove an injective variant of mutual transcript agree-
ment, which TLS naturally achieves by agreeing on fresh nonces. Hence, we
show that TLS achieves a relatively strong authentication notion: mutual
agreement on a significant portion of the state with recentness.
Uniqueness of the session keys
We prove in the straightforward way that for any two session keys generated,
if they match then they must be from the same session. This holds without
any restriction on the adversary, since it is a straightforward consequence of
the actor generating a fresh nonce for each session. We do not prove anything
about whether two session keys are related, since this trivially follows from
the assumption of perfect cryptography.
Downgrade protection
The specification cites the work by Bhargavan et al. [Bha+16a] for down-
grade protection. This definition is not directly equivalent to any of Lowe’s
classical agreement methods; it only requires that both parties negotiate the
same configuration parameters that they would do without the presence of
an adversary. Specifically, we observe that in our model agreeing on the pa-
rameters (in the sense of non-injective agreement) is sufficient to achieve this,
but not necessary. In the case of a single handshake we prove agreement on
the transcript, and thus the attacker cannot add or remove any parameters.
However the common method for causing downgrades is to break handshakes
that use one set of security parameters, which cause one party to use an-
other set of, usually weaker, parameters to try and achieve compatibility.
Because we do not have any dependencies between handshakes in our model
this attack cannot occur. Therefore, within our model we prove that TLS
achieves downgrade protection through our authentication lemmas.
However, we note that this does not accurately capture the spirit of
downgrade protection, due to the fact that we assume all cryptographic
primitives are perfect and we do not model previous versions of TLS. Further
we don’t model the real behaviour of trying different sets of parameters
after a handshake failure, assuming that the client and server will always
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1 lemma secret_session_keys_pfs:
2 "All tid actor peer role write_key read_key
peer_auth_status psk_ke_mode #i.↪→
3 SessionKey(tid, actor, peer, <pas, 'auth'>,
<write_key, key_read>)@i↪→
4 & running(Mode, actor, role, psk_ke_mode)@i
5 & not (Ex #r. RevLtk(peer)@r & #r < #i)
6 & not (Ex tid3 x #r. RevDHExp(tid3, peer, x)@r & #r <
#i)↪→
7 & not (Ex tid4 y #r. RevDHExp(tid4, actor, y)@r & #r <
#i)↪→
8 & not (Ex rms #r. RevealPSK(actor, rms)@r & #r < #i)
9 & not (Ex rms #r. RevealPSK(peer, rms)@r & #r < #i )
10 & not (psk_ke_mode = psk_ke)
11 ==> not Ex #j. K(read_key)@j"
Figure 3.12: secret session keys pfs (Section 3.4.2). We highlight the differ-
ences with the secret session keys lemma, see Figure 3.10.
treat every handshake independently. We simply note that this property
holds almost vacuously in our model, and make no claims about downgrade
protection in the real world.
Forward secrecy with respect to long-term keys
The PFS property was briefly mentioned in the context of the long-term
signing keys and the secrecy of session keys. However, in those cases, we did
not cover the requirement for forward secrecy with regards to the PSK. We
have an additional lemma secret_session_keys_pfs which captures that,
in either a full DHE or PSK-DHE handshake, the secrecy of the session keys
does not depend on the PSK remaining secret after the session is concluded.
To achieve this, we modify secret_session_keys depicted in Figure 3.10,
to create secret_session_keys_pfs, depicted in Figure 3.12. We highlight
the salient differences between the two definitions. By adding a condition for
the key-exchange mode, not psk ke mode = psk ke (line 10), we can loosen
the restrictions on the adversary such that the RevealPSK action is only
forbidden for time points before the session keys are established (lines 8 and
9). In proving this lemma, we show that the session keys are forward secure
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after a DHE, even if the PSK is later compromised. This is the definition of
PFS with respect to PSKs.
Key Compromise Impersonation (KCI) resistance
Observant readers will notice that the only restriction on compromising
long-term keys is that the peer’s LTK must not be compromised. None
of our security properties rely on the actor’s LTK being hidden from the
adversary.[9] Applying this fact to the authentication properties, therefore,
additionally shows that the protocol, as given in the draft specification,
achieves KCI resistance.
3.5 Analysis and results
In this section we provide a detailed description of our analysis, including
a discussion of our results and an exploration of an authentication anomaly
uncovered by our work.
In general we find that TLS 1.3 meets the properties outlined in the
specification that our modelling process was able to capture. We show that
TLS 1.3 enables a client and a server to agree on secret session keys and that
these session keys are unique across, as well as within, handshake instances.
Our analysis shows that PFS of session keys holds in the expected situations,
i.e., in the (EC)DHE and PSK+(EC)DHE handshake modes. We also show
that TLS 1.3, by and large, provides the desired authentication guarantees
in both the unilateral and mutual authentication cases. The situation in
which this is not the case is covered in the section to follow.
We remind the reader that our model does not truly cover downgrade
protection, or the protection of endpoint identities at this time. A treat-
ment of downgrade protection across TLS protocol versions would require
modelling the earlier versions of TLS in a way that is consistent with the
TLS 1.3 model as developed here. To consider the downgrade protection of
cipher suites, we would need to relax our current assumption of perfect cryp-
tography through rules that, for instance, allow for an attacker to learn the
[9]A minor exception to this is that the adversary cannot use the actor’s long-term key
to impersonate the actor to themselves since in this case, the actor is also the peer.
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payload of a particular kind of encrypted messages without knowing the key.
In spite of the fact that these additional considerations would substantially
complicate the model and the proof process, our model is perfectly suited
to their inclusion and could form the basis of future work.
3.5.1 Positive results
We now present our results for TLS 1.3, commenting on our proof methods
and findings.
Proof strategies
For models as complex as TLS 1.3, proving lemmas in Tamarin is a multi-
stage process, and proving complex lemmas directly is often infeasible. For
protocol models of this size the proof trees can become very large. Tamarin
provides a number of features that allow complex proofs to be broken down
into more manageable sections. Writing sublemmas provides hints to the
Tamarin constraint solving algorithm, allowing it to solve complex sections
of a larger proof directly, making the overall proof more manageable. For
the TLS 1.3 model, we used several types of lemmas. Helper lemmas can be
used to quickly solve repetitive sections of a larger proof without repeatedly
unrolling the entire subtree. Source lemmas provide hints to the Tamarin
engine about the potential sources of messages, reducing the branching of
a proof tree.[10] Inductive lemmas instruct Tamarin to prove the lemmas
inductively, allowing us to break out of loops in the protocol, which otherwise
can produce infinite proof trees. Proving the main properties of TLS 1.3
required many helper lemmas, of all of these types.
The Tamarin engine can also use heuristics to auto-prove lemmas, which
proved invaluable in quickly re-proving large sections of properties after
making changes to the model. By investing time in writing auto-provable
sublemmas, we could flexibly incorporate changes made to the specification
without having to restart our analysis from scratch.
[10]We discuss Source lemmas in great depth in Chapter 5.
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The more complex lemmas used in our analysis of TLS 1.3, however,
required manual proving in the Tamarin interactive prover. We note that
by manual proving in this context we mean manually guiding the Tamarin
prover through a proof by using the Tamarin graphical user interface.
Using the m4 preprocessor to generate restricted subsets of the model we
were able to prototype lemmas in a simpler environment without expending
unnecessary effort. To give an indication of the number of helper lemmas re-
quired, and the relationship between all of our lemmas, we have constructed
a ‘lemma map’, displayed in Figure 3.13. The map also indicates which lem-
mas were auto-proved by Tamarin, and which ones needed manual guidance
for Tamarin to prove them.
In total, the modelling effort represents approximately 3 months worth
of work. However, the vast majority of that is the process of writing lemmas
to break down the overall proving effort into smaller, autoprovable chunks.
With these lemmas in place, proving the entire model takes about a week
of work, and significant computing resources. The model itself takes over
10GB RAM just to load, and can easily consume 100GB RAM in the course
of a proof. In one instance, an automatically-computed proof was almost 1
million lines long. Once the proofs have been produced, they can be verified
in the space of about a day, although still requiring a vast amount of RAM.
Findings
We summarise our results in Table 3.1. For each property discussed in Sec-
tions 3.2 and 3.4, we indicate our findings. We use ∗ to indicate that the
property holds in most situations. Cases in which the property does not hold
to the expected degree, are covered in sections to follow. We also list the
applicable Tamarin lemma(s).
3.5.2 Possible mismatch between client and server view
During the development of our model, and in particular the analysis of the
post-handshake client authentication, we encountered a possible behaviour
that suggested that TLS 1.3 fails to meet certain strong authentication guar-
antees.
88
3.5. Analysis and results
uniqueness
one_s_per_tid
*s in {ALL STATES}
S1_vs_S1_PSK_DHE
S1_PSK_vs_S1_PSK_DHE
S1_PSK_vs_S1
C1_vs_C1_PSK_DHE
C1_PSK_vs_C1
C1_PSK_vs_C1_PSK_DHE
s_vs_s_cert
*s in {C3,S3}
s_vs_s_PSK
*s in {C2a,S2a,C2d,S2d}
DH chal
dh_chal_dual
DH injectivity
dh_exp_invariant(i)
one_dh_per_x
rev_dh_ordering(i)
rev_dh_before_hs
invariants
tid_invariant(i)
one_start_per_tid(i)
cert_req_origin(t)
nst_source(t)
secret helpers
ku_extract(i)
ku_expand(i)
ku_hs
ku_ltk
ku_fresh_psk
hsms_derive
posths_rms_weak(i)
posths_rms(i)
matching_transcripts_posths
matching_rms_posths
matching_rms_actors
sig_origin
invariant_post_hs
matching_sessions(i)
auth_psk
matching_hsms
post_master_secret
invariant_post_hs(i)
handshake_secret(i)
handshake_secret_pfs(i)
auth helpers
matching_nonces
consistent_nonces
invariant_nonces
matching_rms_nonces
Properties
secret_session_keys
secret_session_keys_pfs
unique_session_keys
session_key_agreement
entity_authentication(i)
transcript_agreement
mut_entity_auth(i)
mut_transcript_agreement
injective_mut_entity_auth
Figure 3.13: Lemma Map. Lemma names with a purple background indicate
where manual interaction via the Tamarin visual interface was required. The
remaining lemmas were automatically proven by Tamarin, without manual
interaction. An arrow from one category to another implies that the proof
of the latter depends on the former. The Properties box contains the main
TLS 1.3 properties.
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Property proven Lemma(s)
(1) Same session keys session_key_agreement
(2) Secret session keys secret_session_keys
(3) Peer authentication∗ entity_authentication
mutual_entity_authentication
(4) Unique session keys unique_session_keys
(6) Perfect forward secrecy secret_session_keys_pfs
(7)
Key compromise
impersonation
entity_authentication
mutual_entity_authentication
Table 3.1: TLS 1.3 Tamarin results
While there are many definitions of authentication, the common thread
among strong authentication guarantees is that both parties share a common
view of the session, i.e. that they agree on exchanged data, keys, etc. During
our analysis of the post-handshake client authentication, it became apparent
that the client does not receive any explicit confirmation that the server has
successfully received the client’s response. Due to the asynchronous nature
of the post-handshake client authentication, the client may keep receiving
data from the server, and will not be able to determine if the server has
received its authentication message. As a consequence, the client cannot be
sure whether the server sent the data under the assumption that the client
is authenticated.
We formally modelled this property by adding a variable to the client
and the server that records the current status of the connection, and in
particular, if the connection is unilaterally or mutually authenticated. We
discovered that even when the server asks for a post-handshake client au-
thentication, and the client responds, the client cannot be sure that the
server considers the channel to be mutually authenticated.
A discussion with the TLS 1.3 working group revealed that a similar
problem exists within the main handshake. During the main handshake,
the server can request a client certificate, and may decide to reject the cer-
tificate (for example because it violates certain domain-specific policies),
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but still continue with the connection as if the certificate were accepted.[11]
Therefore, the client cannot be sure (after what appears to be a main hand-
shake with mutual authentication) that the server considers the client to be
authenticated. Thus, this phenomenon leaves the client in the dark about
whether or not the server considers it to be authenticated, even though the
server asked for a certificate and the client supplied it.
To see why this may become a problem at the application level, consider
the following application. Imagine a client and a server that implement TLS
1.3, where the server has the following policy: any data received over a
mutually authenticated connection are stored in a secure database; all data
received over connections where the client is not authenticated are stored in
an insecure log. The client connects, the server requests a certificate, which
the client duly provides, but the server rejects and continues regardless. Since
the server rejected the certificate, it continues to store incoming messages in
the insecure log. However, the client may assume it has been authenticated,
and start sending sensitive data, which ends up in the insecure log.
The TLS working group has decided not to fix this behaviour for TLS
1.3, and has not introduced any mechanism that informs the client of the
server’s view of the client’s authentication status. The TLS WG did not
consider this risk sufficiently high to implement an acceptance mechanism
at the TLS layer. If a client wants to be sure that the server considers it to
be authenticated, this needs to be dealt with at the application layer. We
anticipate that some client applications will incorrectly assume that sending
a client certificate and obtaining further server messages indeed guarantees
that the server considers the connection to be mutually authenticated. As
we have shown, this is not the case in general, and may lead to serious
security issues despite there being no direct violation of the specified TLS
1.3 security requirements.
In Chapter 4 we analyse the Exported Authenticators specification, which
extends the certificate logic to the application layer. This behaviour is repli-
cated at that layer. In Chapter 5 we introduce an extension to the EA
[11]This highlights the difficulty of analysing a specification as long and as complex as
TLS 1.3. Despite a team of five people studying the specification in great detail for a
number of years, none of us were aware that this behaviour was permitted.
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specification that allows an actor to prove to its peer that it has accepted a
given certificate.
3.6 The relation between our model and the TLS 1.3 speci-
fication
While there have been many academic analyses of various revisions of TLS 1.3
[BBK17] [Cre+16] [Dow+15] [AM16] [KW15] [Li+14] [Dow+16] [Fis+16]
[Koh+14] [Hor16], they all (explicitly or implicitly) consider only part of
the specification. Most analyses, even those that claim to be “complete” do
not consider all possible modes, and many manual cryptographic analyses
consider modes only in isolation (and not their interaction). This is caused
by the inherent complexity of analysing TLS 1.3 and is not a problem in
itself; rather, it justifies the need for multiple approaches.
However, we are of the opinion that readers, regardless of whether or
not they are experts in the field, should be able to easily deduce the exact
coverage of a given analysis. To ensure this, we provide an unprecedented
level of transparency concerning the relationship between our model and the
RFC (the draft specification) by creating a website [Cre+17b] that contains
an annotated version of the RFC. We show an excerpt of our website in
Figure 3.14.
In the excerpt, the left-hand side is a direct copy from the RFC, and
the right-hand side contains our annotations. For example, they show how
the concrete data structures of TLS 1.3 are mapped into abstract term
structures. Additionally, we annotate the prose, describing the possible be-
haviours so as to indicate which Tamarin rules model them. The annotations
also show exactly which details we do not model (and often list the reasons
why).
We used these annotations ourselves during the development of our
model to keep track of the parts of the specification that we had already
modelled, and how we modelled them, which also simplified the task of keep-
ing track of updates to the specification, something which proved incredibly
useful given the rapid pace at which the draft specification would undergo
changes.
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Our annotated RFC has a number of desirable features:
• Readers can check which parts we abstracted, and how, without having
to reinvent the mapping between the Tamarin model and the RFC
themselves. In other words, one can read through our website to see
what is covered, and how it is covered, without having to understand
Tamarin’s formalism.
• If the specification is updated or changed, we can immediately track
where the model should be changed.
We encourage other analyses of TLS 1.3 to follow a similar transparent
approach, which would help the community to better understand which
details from the specification might still need to be covered. We envision
this will enable a faster convergence of confidence in all the details of the
standard.
3.7 Conclusions
In this chapter we modelled the draft 20 of the TLS 1.3 specification within
the symbolic analysis framework of the Tamarin prover, and used the tool
to verify the majority of the security guarantees that TLS 1.3 claims to offer
its users.
We focus on ruling out complex interaction attacks by considering an
unbounded number of concurrent connections, and all of the TLS 1.3 hand-
shake modes. We cover both unilateral and mutual authentication, as well as
session key secrecy in all of the TLS 1.3 handshake modes with respect to a
Dolev-Yao attacker. We also capture more advanced security properties such
as perfect forward secrecy and key compromise impersonation. Our Tamarin
model covers substantially more interactions than previous analyses due to
its modularity.
Besides verifying that revision 20 of the TLS 1.3 specification meets the
claimed security properties in most of the handshake modes and variants, we
also discover an unexpected authentication behaviour which may have seri-
ous security implications for implementations of TLS 1.3. This unexpected
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behaviour, at a high level, implies that TLS 1.3 provides no direct means
for a client to determine its authentication status from the perspective of a
given server. As a server may treat authenticated data differently to unau-
thenticated data, the client may end up in position in which its sensitive
data gets processed as non-sensitive data by the server.
During the course of our analysis we also developed a line-by-line mod-
elling aide that accurately captured which parts of the specification we were
able to model, and which parts were abstracted. This artifact allows us to
easily assess the faithfulness and coverage of our model, and also makes our
model highly amenable to all kinds of extensions, especially with respect to
the security properties and threat model. We expect that this artifact may
serve as a comprehensive informational aide to academic researchers and
well as the TLS Working Group.
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Chapter 4
Exported Authenticators
4.1 Introduction
The use of TLS to protect traffic is becoming more and more ubiquitous[1].
As the push to encrypt more and more of the internet increases the more
use cases TLS is expected to cover.
A draft was presented to the IETF that would allow certificates to be
added to a TLS connection after it was established. The draft, draft-
sullivan [Sul18a], describes a proposed optional feature for implementa-
tions of TLS 1.3 [RFC8446] and implementations of TLS 1.2 with extended
master secret support [RFC7627]. The draft defines a protocol that binds
additional certificates to an established TLS channel using exported au-
thenticators (EAs). This allows either party to prove they have additional
identities to those established in the TLS handshake.
The draft aims to supersede, and offer more flexibility than, both the
renegotiation feature in TLS 1.2 and earlier, and the post-handshake client
authentication feature in TLS 1.3.
The draft describes Exported Authenticators (EAs) as:
“[. . . ] a mechanism in Transport Layer Security (TLS) to provide an
exportable proof of ownership of a certificate that can be transmitted
out of band and verified by the other party.”
[1]See https://letsencrypt.org/stats/
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draft-sullivan [Sul17, Abstract]
Informally, the goal of exported authenticators (EAs) is to allow one
side of a TLS connection to prove to the other side that it controls a given
certificate. In this case, an exportable proof of ownership means that the
security of the proof is not weakened if the EA is public [RFC5056, p. 18].
This has two major use cases, providing a mechanism for post-handshake
client authentication that interacts better with higher level protocols, such as
HTTP/2, and allowing content distribution networks (CDNs) to send data
from multiple domains they control over a single TLS connection. CDNs host
content for services like Netflix, and deliver their content from locations often
geographically closer to consumers. Amongst other benefits, this reduces
lag for the client, and the amount of data that needs to be sent over long
distance connections. Whilst this connection coalescing improves efficiency,
it also dramatically changes the authentication guarantees of TLS.
Securely adding certificates to a connection is non-trivial, because unless
there is a strong cryptographic binding between the TLS channel and the
EA messages an attacker could potentially copy them from one channel to
another. This could allow them to perform a credential forwarding attack,
and thereby falsely claim to another party that they control a certificate,
improperly authenticating themselves. draft-sullivan uses so-called chan-
nel bindings to protect against this. However, as we will show later, channel
bindings are surprisingly difficult to get right.
4.1.1 Chapter overview
Our main contributions in this chapter are as follows:
1. draft-sullivan describes a number of informal authentication goals
and use-cases. We specify the formal security properties that draft-
sullivan requires to achieve its authentication goals.
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2. We extend existing work on compound protocols, defining compound
authentication for a larger class of protocols. Previous work describes
compound authentication for protocols with both a key-agreement
component and an identity tied to a LTK. We extend the definitions
in the literature to describe new forms of compound authentication for
protocols with either no key-agreement component or with no identity
tied to a LTK.
3. We prove that draft-sullivan meets its security goals, proving that
the TLS layer and the EA layer authenticate each other under a
strong threat model. We prove this by building a symbolic model of
draft-sullivan, and proving that it meets its security goals using
the Tamarin Prover.
4. We analyse the security boundary for EAs to identify its precise as-
sumptions and guarantees. Notably, our analysis reveals a security
dependency between multiple EAs sent on the same channel. Using
our extended definitions, we prove that under strong threat models
multiple EAs sent on the same channel fail to authenticate each other,
but under weaker threat models they do. While this does not violate
any of the intended properties of EAs, it paves the way for establishing
stronger properties.
4.1.2 Related work
Whilst draft-sullivan itself has not been analysed before, there is a large
body of related work. draft-sullivan defines a layered protocol that uses
channel bindings to securely add extra certificates to a TLS channel.
Channel bindings were proposed by Asokan et al. [ANN02], who found
numerous flaws in layered protocols, and the requirements on channel bind-
ings began to be standardised in RFC 5056 [RFC5056]. The properties
needed to prove channel bindings secure[2] were proposed by Bhargavan et
al. [BDP15], work which we extend here.
[2]We will specify precisely what we mean by ‘secure’ later in the chapter.
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The work by Bhargavan et al. [BDP15] allows analysis of channel bind-
ings for certain classes of protocol, which we extend to cover protocols like
draft-sullivan.
As we mentioned earlier, draft-sullivan is intended to replace the
functionality of renegotiation in TLS 1.2 and earlier. The renegotiation fea-
ture in TLS 1.2 and earlier was flawed [SR09]: an attack on the channel
bindings broke the authentication guarantees. The feature has been depre-
cated in TLS 1.3 because it was considered to add too much complexity.
draft-sullivan is also intended to supersede post-handshake authen-
tication in TLS 1.3. Cremers et al. [Cre+16] performed a formal analysis of
a proposed version of the TLS 1.3 specification using the Tamarin prover,
which found a vulnerability in post-handshake authentication that attacked
the channel bindings.
The work by Bhargavan et al. [BBK17], also using formal analysis, found
separate attacks on the channel bindings used for 0-RTT in draft 13 of the
TLS 1.3 specification.
4.1.3 Motivation
draft-sullivan is more complex than the renegotiation mechanism that it
intends to replace. Renegotiation allowed one certificate to be added, but not
multiple certificates to be active at once. Renegotiation in TLS 1.2 was found
to have a major vulnerability in its channel bindings, allowing an attacker
to prepend data to a client’s TLS connection. The feature was deprecated
from TLS 1.3 because it was thought that the complexity it brought to the
protocol brought more risk than the potential gains.
The draft is also more fully featured than post-handshake client authen-
tication, which allows only the client to add a single certificate. However
even the design of the simpler post-handshake mechanism was non-trivial.
An early draft of TLS 1.3 [Res15] was found to have a vulnerability. Cremers
et al. [Cre+16] performed a tool supported formal analysis, and found a cre-
dential forwarding attack where an attacker could use resumption to enable
it to perform an improper post-handshake authentication. This attack was
99
4.1. Introduction
highly complex involving 18 messages over 3 modes, and attacked a flaw in
the channel bindings implementation.
If the proposed authentication mechanism was insecure the consequences
would be significant. Not only could an attacker use this mechanism to
impersonate some service, they could even potentially impersonate some
group of services to clients or servers.
Cloudflare, a major CDN who claim nearly 10% of all internet requests[3],
and the major browser vendors have all shown interest in implementing
draft-sullivan. This combination of vulnerabilities in similar past proto-
cols and the potential for widespread deployment led the IETF to delay the
draft pending formal analysis. For TLS 1.3 the TLS WG adopted an analysis-
prior-to-deployment philosophy, explicitly asking for input from academics.
Following the success of formal analysis in raising issues that might otherwise
have been missed, the trend of academia being consulted on the construction
of complex protocols has continued [PM16]. As protocols become more com-
plex, both in terms of features and security requirements, attacks become
correspondingly more complex. Formal analysis, therefore, has become more
important for finding problems before the protocol is widely deployed.
In this work, we prove draft-sullivan meets its security goals. To do
this we develop a symbolic model of draft-sullivan and provide formal
specifications of its security goals. We then analyse the resulting model and
security properties using the Tamarin Prover [Sch+12].
This chapter details that analysis, which was presented at the IETF 101
meeting in London, allowing the draft to be progressed. The draft has now
entered last call.
4.1.4 Chapter organisation
This chapter is organised as follows: In Section 4.2 we discuss background
and related work and in Section 4.3 we introduce draft-sullivan EAs, and
enumerate the informal security claims. In Section 4.4 we use a framework for
analysing channel bindings to develop the informal security claims of draft-
sullivan into formal security properties. In Section 4.5 we develop a formal
[3]https://www.cloudflare.com/careers/departments/engineering/
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model for draft-sullivan in the framework of the Tamarin prover, and
describe in Section 4.6 how we formalized the security properties within its
framework. In Section 4.7 we discuss our results in the context of compound
authentication, and conclude in Section 4.8.
4.2 Background
4.2.1 Formal analysis
Up to this point our approach to formal analysis has constructed security
properties in terms of the security of primitives. For example we consider
the guarantees we get in situations where an attacker can acquire a secret
key. We could continue in this vein and simply analyse draft-sullivan
and TLS as a single complex protocol. However, this tells us little about the
relationship between the draft-sullivan protocol and TLS, only about
their security as a single piece. We thus introduce a framework that lets
us reason about the security properties of draft-sullivan in terms of the
security of TLS, and vice versa. This lets us describe the guarantees we get
in situations where, for example, an attacker can compromise TLS.
We use a channel bindings analysis framework [BDP15] to formalise the
security properties we need. We then create a symbolic model of the proto-
col, encode the security properties in the framework of the Tamarin prover
[Sch+12], and use it to prove that the properties hold for our model.
Channel bindings are used to secure a wide range of protocols, including
various modes of TLS. Using a channel bindings analysis framework we are
able to formalise the properties that protocols using channel bindings need
to achieve their goals.
4.2.2 Channel bindings
Channel bindings are values produced at the end of a protocol run than
can be used to cryptographically bind runs of authentication protocols to-
gether, in order to achieve stronger combined authentication properties. By
agreeing on the channel binding of one run in the course of another it is
possible to reason about the authentication status of both runs in terms
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of the other. draft-sullivan uses the TLS exporter interface to construct
channel bindings that are included in EAs to bind them securely to the TLS
layer, allowing us to reason about the security of the EA in terms of the
security of the TLS channel, and vice versa.
One of the earliest uses of channel bindings was to secure legacy protocols
by running them inside more secure outer protocols. The na¨ıve approach of
simply running the legacy protocol over the secure layer is not necessarily
more secure than simply running the legacy protocol.
For example, when discussing tunnelling insecure legacy protocols over
unilateral TLS, Asokan et al. show that a MITM attack can occur even
though TLS protects against MITM attacks. Consider the case where the
inner protocol is sometimes also used outside the TLS tunnel. This scenario
can occur in legacy environments where some equipment only supports in-
secure protocols. In this case the attacker can intercept an un-tunnelled run
of the inner protocol, and then start a tunnelled session with the server,
forwarding the messages from the client to the server, and unwrapping the
responses and passing them back to the client. From the server’s perspective
it is running a protected version of the protocol, but the connection is be-
ing MITMed. There are numerous examples of insecurely layered protocols
in Asokan et al. [ANN02], which discusses this topic at length. We illus-
trate this problem by returning to our example of the Needham-Schroeder
protocol.
Example
Recall that the Needham-Schroeder protocol intends to provide bilateral au-
thentication, but that it fails to properly authenticate the initiator (Alice) to
the responder (Bob). Consider an application where the Needham-Schroeder
protocol is run over unilateral TLS to protect it.[4] We assign Alice the role
of the client, and Bob the role of the server. We can see that the unilateral
TLS run does not protect the Needham Schroeder run.
[4]If bilateral TLS is used the protected version achieves bilateral authentication irre-
spective of the Needham-Schroeder run.
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The attacker induces the client to run an unprotected version of the
Needham-Schroeder protocol, and connects to the server over unilateral
TLS. By simply passing the messages between the unprotected client and
the protected server, the attacker can authenticate itself to the server using
the flaw discussed in Section 2.6.1. Further, even if the protocol is only run
over TLS, if the attacker can convince the client to perform a run with it,
acting as a legitimate actor, the attack is still possible.
A solution
Asokan et al. proposed a solution to this type of attack, which was to cryp-
tographically bind the inner and outer protocols, using channel bindings. By
binding the two protocols together the insecure protocol is protected by the
secure protocol. If the binding is well designed, values taken from protected
runs of the insecure protocol would not be useable in unprotected runs.
Informally a channel binding is a unique ‘name’ for a protocol run. If
two parties participate in a protocol run, and agree on the ‘name’ of that
run, then they know they both participated in the same protocol run. Prov-
ing agreement on the channel binding prevents MITM attacks where the
attacker maintains a separate session with each of the honest parties.
Formally, we define channel bindings as follows[5]:
Definition 4.2.1. Channel binding. A channel binding is a value pro-
duced at the end of a protocol run, such that no two protocol runs with
different parameters produce the same value.
For example the channel bindings used by TLS 1.3 are based on a tran-
script hash. By comparing the hash of all the handshake messages, any
discrepancy in either party’s view of the transcript is captured, as it is in-
feasible to find two different transcripts that give the same hash. However,
[5]This definition is loosely based on the definition of unique channel bindings as de-
fined in RFC 5056 [RFC5056], reformulated to ease discussion of channel bindings under
Bhargavan et al.’s framework.
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a simple transcript hash is not a robust channel binding. There are two
obvious places where discrepancies in the parties’ views might occur.
1. TLS 1.3 has post-handshake messages that are not included in the
transcript, and therefore even if the parties disagree on the result of a
post-handshake protocol they will compute the same transcript hash.
2. TLS 1.3 PSKs are not negotiated in the clear, but referenced by PSK
IDs. If two parties agree to use the PSK with PSK ID, x, but, for
example, the client thinks x relates to key y and the server thinks it
relates to key z, then they will have different views of the handshake,
but agree on the transcript hash.
Thus TLS 1.3 computes a more complex channel binding, that includes extra
information to make the channel binding robust.
Example continued
Consider a case where, for some reason, the message format of the Needham
Schroeder protocol cannot be changed, preventing us from using Lowe’s fix.[6]
If Alice and Bob at the end of the protocol agree on both the ‘name’ of the
TLS channel and the Needham-Schroeder run, then the protections of the
TLS run apply to the Needham-Schroeder run. This means that Bob knows
that he agrees with Alice on the identity of the server in the TLS channel,
i.e. that Alice believes she is talking to him.
One way to achieve this is for Bob to respond not with Alice’s nonce in
the second message, but with a hash of Alice’s nonce and a TLS channel
binding, cb.
A→ B : {h(nA, cb), nB}PKA
Because the attacker cannot decrypt the message it must pass it on to Alice.
If Alice isn’t running a protected version of the protocol then she will reject
the message because the returned nonce is incorrect. If Alice is running a
protected version of the protocol then she will reject the message because
the returned hash is computed using a different TLS run.
[6]This might, for example, be caused by middlebox incompatibility, as in TLS 1.3, see
Section 3.1.3
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Channel binding complexity
Today, many authentication protocols are layered on top of each other and
the layers bound using channel bindings, for example user authentication
in SSH. By careful construction of the channel binding of each layer, and
constructing the channel binding of each layer based on the channel binding
of the previous layers it is possible to prove strong authentication proper-
ties of composite protocols. By strongly binding each layer together it is
possible to achieve stronger guarantees than each of the protocols achieve
alone. However channel bindings are difficult to construct correctly, leading
to many attacks [ANN02] [BDP15] [SR09] [Cre+16] [BBK17].
In our case, if EAs were not bound to a specific TLS run, a client might
connect to a malicious server and request an EA for a certificate the ma-
licious server doesn’t control. The malicious server could then connect to
an honest server and request the appropriate EA, and pass it back to the
client, effectively using the honest server as an oracle. The client would then
receive a valid EA, but would not be communicating with its author.
Various works have studied channel bindings extensively, deriving a num-
ber of design principles. Channel bindings and their security goals are de-
scribed in RFC 5056 [RFC5056]. Bhargavan et al. [BDP15] extend this work,
and derive formal security properties that achieve these goals.
We will use and extend these works to look at the forthcoming EAs [Sul18a]
specification and derive formal properties that we can prove hold.
4.2.3 Channel synchronisation
As mentioned in the previous section, when a weak inner protocol is pro-
tected by wrapping it in a strong outer protocol the protections of the strong
outer run can sometimes be defeated. By forwarding values from an unpro-
tected run of the weak protocol to a protected run, the attacker can attack
the protected inner run. This is a credential forwarding attack.
Ostensibly it would seem that protocols that are always run inside an-
other protocol, such as draft-sullivan, are immune from Asokan’s attack.
Whilst we show that draft-sullivan is indeed not vulnerable to this at-
tack, the reasoning is subtle. Bhargavan et al. [BDP15] demonstrate that if
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there is an attack on the channel bindings then an attacker can defeat this
protection. If an attacker can exploit a flaw in the channel binding design to
find two different runs of the strong outer protocol with the same channel
binding, or ‘name’, then Asokan et al.’s credential forwarding attack is again
possible.
Asokan et al.’s suggested mitigation for his attack works by making the
channel binding produced by the protected inner run dependent on the chan-
nel binding of the outer run. If the protocol participants cannot get the inner
channel binding to match then the protocol fails. This means that even if
the same parameters are used for two runs of the inner protocol, if they
are run on top of different outer protocol runs they will produce different
channel bindings.
One way to achieve this dependency on the outer channel binding is
to make the values output by the inner protocol dependent on the channel
binding of the outer protocol. This is called an implicit channel binding. This
can also be done explicitly by achieving agreement on the inner binding in
some other way, for example by explicitly adding an authenticated copy of
the channel binding into the last message. This is called an explicit channel
binding. Explicit bindings require changes to the message formats of the
inner protocol however, and are uncommon in retro-fitted protocols.
Channel bindings protect runs by causing a mismatch in the values of
the inner protocol. However if two different runs of the outer protocol can
be forced to have the same channel binding then protocols run inside each
of the outer protocols will produce values transplantable between the two
outer runs. This is a channel synchronisation attack.
A channel binding collision can occur when the channel binding is im-
properly constructed. In an improperly constructed channel binding not all
relevant parameters are included in the channel binding’s construction. For
example the renegotiation attack [SR09] was possible because the context of
previous handshakes was not included in renegotiated handshakes. Thus an
ordinary handshake would have the same channel binding as a renegotiated
handshake with the same parameters. This meant that the server could be-
lieve it was participating in a renegotiation, whilst the client believed it was
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participating in an ordinary handshake. This allowed an attacker to prepend
data to a client’s connection.
A channel synchronisation attack uses a vulnerability in a channel bind-
ing to create a difference between the initiator’s view of the protocol and the
responder’s view of the protocol. An attacker who can attack both the chan-
nel bindings and the inner protocol can successfully attack the composite
protocol.
To briefly return to our running example, if an attacker can create two
TLS sessions, one with Alice, where Alice is acting as the client and a sepa-
rate one with Bob, where Bob is acting as the server, but where both sessions
have the same channel binding, then our channel binding version is still at-
tackable because Bob will compute the same value for h(nA, cb) as Alice,
even though they are referring to two different TLS sessions.
Because many composite protocols rely on the security of outer layers to
protect inner layers finding two different sets of parameters that synchronise
the outer layers channel bindings often leads to an attack.
The failure to include all necessary information in the channel binding
was behind the flaw found in post-handshake authentication in revision 10
of the TLS 1.3 draft [Cre+16], and the attack on 0-RTT in revision 12 of
the TLS 1.3 draft [BBK17]. In the attack in [Cre+16] the channel binding
of a resumed session was not dependent on the PSK used to authenticate
the resumption, and thus an attacker could resume one session with the
client, and another, different session with the server, and cause the resumed
sessions to have the same channel binding. The attacker, now acting as
a MITM, could forward a post-handshake authentication between the two
channels, allowing it to act as an authenticated client to the server.
In TLS 1.3 a post-handshake authentication run does not change the keys
used to encrypt the data sent on the channel, i.e. the authentication is not
directly bound to the data. Thus after the post-handshake authentication
the MITM attacker can insert data onto the channel and have it accepted
as authentic, even though it never learns the client’s private key.
In the attack in Bhargavan et al. [BBK17] the channel binding of a 0-
RTT handshake was not dependent on the PSK used to authenticate it. A
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0-RTT handshake sends authenticated data in the first flight of messages. A
malicious server could decrypt that data, and re-encrypt it under a different
PSK. The malicious server could then forward the re-encrypted data to any
other server with which it shared a PSK, and have it appear as if it was
coming from the original sender.
Both these attacks occur because the PSK of a previous handshake was
not factored in to every sub-protocol that TLS 1.3 offers. Although the
attacks, when viewed from this perspective, are similar, both were found
with machine-aided formal analysis.
Although here we describe attacks on inner protocols, as we will discuss
in Section 4.4.5, well constructed channel bindings can be used to protect
outer layers as well as inner layers.
4.2.4 draft-sullivan
draft-sullivan was designed to offer features currently not available in the
TLS 1.3 specification. TLS 1.3 deprecates its historical renegotiation mecha-
nism, and instead provides a mechanism for post-handshake authentication,
in which a server can ask a client to authenticate at any point after the nor-
mal handshake, thereby upgrading a unilaterally authenticated connection
to a mutually authenticated one. draft-sullivan aims to supersede the
functionality of renegotiation and post-handshake authentication. draft-
sullivan’s EAs are designed to be more flexible than post-handshake au-
thentication, allowing for authentication from either side (server or client,
as opposed to only the client) and support for multiple certificates per side.
It also aims to provide more control over when authentication happens to
higher layers, and to provide more context for that authentication.
This is useful to HTTP/2 connections that want to reactively ask for
a certificate when a client tries to access a particular resource. Due to the
multiplexed nature of HTTP/2, a client might have multiple outstanding
requests. Therefore a client cannot necessarily determine which request trig-
gered the servers request for post-handshake authentication. Furthermore in
TLS 1.3 post-handshake client authentication doesn’t cause any change in
the data channel, so the HTTP/2 layer doesn’t know whether a given piece
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of data was sent before or after the authentication. This makes reliably
determining the authentication status of any given piece of data impossible.
draft-sullivan does not require state changes in the TLS state ma-
chine, and provides better context to higher layers, so an HTTP/2 connec-
tion would be able to tightly couple authentication with specific requests
and responses.
The HTTP/2 specification explicitly prohibits the use of renegotiation
with HTTP/2 [RFC7540, p. 67]. This means even in TLS connections that
allow renegotiation, draft-sullivan is necessary.
As well as providing features that have proven a source of bugs in the
past [SR09] [BDP15] [BBK17] [Cre+16], draft-sullivan’s unusual layering
structure makes it an interesting protocol to analyse. Most layered protocols
have a single run of the inner protocol within the outer protocol. draft-
sullivan is unusual in that it allows multiple independent runs within a
single TLS session. Each of these runs shares keying material from the TLS
layer but is not otherwise cryptographically bound to other EAs on the same
channel.
draft-sullivan defines two protocol flows for sending EAs. Both flows
are heavily based on messages from the TLS 1.3 draft. This is because the
message formats for TLS 1.3 were carefully designed to provide strong guar-
antees and have been well studied.
To prevent messages in similar formats being mistaken for one another,
draft-sullivan and TLS.[7] include fixed strings in their key schedules that
unambiguously and securely identify the context in which the message was
created, effectively giving messages created in different contexts different
types. These fixed strings are known as context strings in draft-sullivan,
and constitute labels as defined in Section 2.4.11 In this particular case, they
ensure that while EAs and TLS share keying material, (parts of) messages
from one cannot be reused in the other.
[7]Both TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3.
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4.3 Exported Authenticators
In this section we define the EAs from draft-sullivan. The draft de-
fines two protocol flows, “Requested Certificates” and “Spontaneous Cer-
tificates”, which we describe in turn below. We also enumerate the security
goals of draft-sullivan, which we formalise in Section 4.4.
4.3.1 Requested certificates
The first protocol flow follows a request-response paradigm. As shown in
Figure 4.1a the initiator, which can be either the client or the server, sends
a CertificateRequest message, as defined in [RFC8446, p. 60], and the
responder replies with a series of messages. The responder sends the se-
quence Certificate, CertificateVerify, Finished. This series of messages
is defined in the TLS 1.3 specification [RFC8446, p. 64, pp. 69-72], see Sec-
tion 3.2.4 for a discussion of this message pattern.
CertificateRequest
The CertificateRequest message comes from the TLS 1.3 specification
[RFC8446, p. 60], see Figure 3.3, and consists of a unique certificate re-
quest context (CRC) and a list of extensions that define the properties of
the requested certificate. draft-sullivan says the CRC SHOULD also be
unpredictable, which we follow.
The response messages are defined as follows.
struct {
opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>;
Extension extensions<2..2^16-1>;
} CertificateRequest;
Figure 3.3: CertificateRequest definition (repeated from page 61)
Certificate
The Certificate message also takes the form described in the TLS 1.3
specification [RFC8446, p. 64], see Figure 3.4. The message’s CRC is carried
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over from the CertificateRequest message, and is paired with a certificate
chain.
struct {
opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>;
CertificateEntry certificate_list<0..2^24-1>;
} Certificate;
Figure 3.4: Certificate definition (repeated from page 62)
CertificateVerify
The CertificateVerify message also follows the same structure as the
TLS 1.3 draft, but signs a different value to ensure signatures cannot be
transplanted from a TLS handshake to an EA handshake, or vice-versa.
The struct given in the TLS 1.3 specification [RFC8446, pp. 69-71], see
Figure 3.5, consists of the choice of algorithm and a signature.
struct {
SignatureScheme algorithm;
opaque signature<0..2^16-1>;
} CertificateVerify;
Figure 3.5: CertificateVerify definition (repeated from page 63)
In TLS 1.3 the signature contains a context string and the value to be
signed. In TLS 1.3 the value that is signed is the hash of all the previous
messages, referred to as the “Handshake Context”, concatenated with the
Certificate message.
When the certificate is being signed by a server the context string used
is “TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify” and when the certificate is being
signed by a client is “TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify”.
In draft-sullivan the signature contents are formatted in the same
way, but the context string and the value to be signed are different. The con-
text string used is “Exported Authenticator”. The value that is signed is
the hash of a value referred to as the “Handshake Context”, and all previous
messages.
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In draft-sullivan, unlike in TLS 1.3, the “Handshake Context” does
not refer to a hash of all the previous messages. The “Handshake Context” in
this case refers to a special value computed using TLS’s exporter interface.
For convenience we will refer to draft-sullivan’s “Handshake Context” as
the HC Exporter. The exporter interface is used to construct channel bind-
ings, called exporters in TLS 1.3, for TLS sessions. The exporter interface
is defined in the TLS 1.3 specification [RFC8446, p. 97], which we replicate
in Figure 4.2.
TLS-Exporter(label, context_value, key_length) =
HKDF-Expand-Label(Derive-Secret(Secret, label, ""),
"exporter", Hash(context_value), key_length)↪→
Figure 4.2: The Exporter interface from [RFC8446, p. 97]
The exporter interface takes a label, and returns an exporter that is
bound to the label, and the master secret and transcript of the underlying
TLS connection.[8] An exporter is a value that uniquely identifies a TLS
connection, and is unique and independent for each label.
To compute the HC Exporter the label is set to the string
"EXPORTER-client authenticator handshake context"
or
"EXPORTER-server authenticator handshake context"
depending on whether the CertificateVerify is being generated by the
client or the server respectively. This makes CertificateVerify messages
specific to a particular TLS connection.
[8]In draft-sullivan all context values are of zero length.
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Finished
In the same way that the CertificateVerify message follows the TLS 1.3
specification but with different parameters, so does the Finished [RFC8446,
pp. 71-72] message. The Finished message consists of a single HMAC. The
key used for the HMAC in draft-sullivan is different to the key used in
TLS 1.3. In both TLS 1.3 and draft-sullivan the input to the HMAC is a
transcript of all prior messages, even if they have yet to be sent. In draft-
sullivan the HC Exporter is also included.
In TLS 1.3 the key used for the HMAC is the finished_key [RFC8446,
p. 72]. draft-sullivan instead uses the Finished MAC key, which is com-
puted using the exporter interface. The label in this case is set to
"EXPORTER-client authenticator finished key"
or
"EXPORTER-server authenticator finished key"
depending on whether the Finished message is being generated by the client
or the server respectively. The other parameters remain the same as for the
HC Exporter computation.
Both the CertificateVerify and the Finished messages rely on ex-
porters from the underlying TLS layer.
4.3.2 Spontaneous certificates
The second protocol flow defined by draft-sullivan defines un-requested
or spontaneous authenticators, see Figure 4.1b. The spontaneous flow is
intended to allow the server to provide certificates that it knows that the
client will require before the client requests them, effectively pre-loading the
certificates.
For example if a CDN hosts both thepiratebay.org and netflix.com,
and a user connects to The Pirate Bay (TPB) over TLS, the CDN will
present a certificate for TPB. If a page on TPB was to contain thumbnails
from Netflix, the CDN could spontaneously send a certificate for Netflix,
allowing it to send the thumbnails over the same connection.
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The message in this flow is much the same as the response to the
CertificateRequest message in the Requested Certificate flow. One of the
key differences is that only the server is allowed to initiate a spontaneous
certificate flow, whereas in the requested certificate flow either party may
take the role of the initiator.
A second difference is caused by the lack of CertificateRequest mes-
sage. As a result, the server does not receive values for the certificate
request context or the extensions. The server must therefore construct ap-
propriate replacements for these values. The extensions define what types
of certificate the initiator will accept in response, for example what signature
algorithms to use.
Sending certificates that the client cannot process, for example if it
doesn’t support a particular signature algorithm, or won’t accept loses all
the benefits of pre-loading, and further is an expensive failure. To prevent
this, the specification requires that the extensions used must be a subset of
the extensions argument from the underlying ClientHello message in the
TLS handshake. This gives the server a set of values that it knows the client
can accept, even if the client might have chosen a different set of values
when it requested the relevant certificate.
Historical development
Until the fifth version of draft-sullivan [Sul17] in a spontaneous flow the
certificate request context was left out of the subsequent messages. This
gave the spontaneous certificates a somewhat different set of security guaran-
tees to the requested certificate flow. For example, if there is no certificate
request context the client cannot detect replays. This difference of guaran-
tees makes the analysis of this flow more challenging. However, this is not
necessarily a security issue. For example in draft-bishop [BST17], which
discusses using EAs to authenticate individual HTTP/2 streams for a single
origin server, authenticators sent by the server are considered permanent for
the lifetime of the session. A replay of an EA, therefore, has no effect.
Following consultation with the authors of the specification, in the sixth
version of draft-sullivan [Sul18b] the server was allowed to choose the
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certificate_request_context arbitrarily. This change makes it possible
for a client to distinguish replays if the server uses a new value each time,
but its main purpose was to allow for an extended version of EAs, which we
analyse in Chapter 5.
At our request in the seventh version of draft-sullivan [Sul18a] the
server is required to use a value unique to the session for the certificate
request context. By requiring uniqueness only within the session it makes it
possible for the client to determine freshness in half a round trip. To achieve
global freshness in half a round trip the client would need to remember not
only every nonce that had ever been sent to it on any channel, but also all
nonces used amongst other parties. However because the nonces only need
to be fresh within the session[9], the client simply needs to keep a record of
nonces used on the TLS channel; a much more manageable task.
4.3.3 Security goals
draft-sullivan sets out a number of security goals.
1. “Authenticate one party of a Transport Layer Security (TLS) com-
munication to another using a certificate after the session has been
established.”
2. “This proof of authentication can be exported and transmitted out of
band from one party to be validated by the other party.”
3. “Endpoints that are authoritative for multiple identities - but do not
have a single certificate that includes all of the identities - can authen-
ticate with those identities over a single connection.”
4. “The application layer protocol used to send the authenticator SHOULD
use TLS as its underlying transport to keep the certificate confiden-
tial.”
5. “Authenticators are independent and unidirectional.”
6. “The signatures generated with this API [...] cannot be transplanted
into other protocols.”
[9]The TLS channel provides global freshness.
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In the next section we will formalise these goals into security properties
that can be formally reasoned about.
4.4 Channel bindings
4.4.1 Methodology
To prove that draft-sullivan meets it security goals we take a formal
analysis approach. We transform the protocol and the goals into a form we
can formally reason about.
We take the work of Bhargavan et al. [BDP15] as a starting point. In
particular, Bhargavan et al. suggest a number of properties that protocols
based on channel bindings need to satisfy to be free from credential forward-
ing attacks, and in particular channel synchronisation attacks. We start from
those properties. However, these properties have limited ability to describe
protocols such as draft-sullivan. This leads us to extend the work of
Bhargavan et al. to allow us to describe properties for a broader range of
protocols. Using our extended properties we show that if draft-sullivan
has these properties then it meets its goals.
We encode the protocol and the properties into the Tamarin specification
language, which lets us use the Tamarin Prover [Sch+12], a protocol analysis
tool, to prove that the protocol has the properties we want, and therefore
meets its security goals.
4.4.2 Channel bindings security
Recall that a channel binding is a unique ‘name’ for a run of a protocol,
and that by agreeing on the ‘name’ of the lower layer in an upper layer we
can bind the lower layer to the upper. By constructing the ‘names’ of higher
protocol layers based on the names of lower protocol layers agreement on
the ‘name’ of the upper layer binds the run of the higher layer to a specific
run of the lower layer. This gives us the ability to reason about the security
guarantees of a lower layer run in the context of a higher layer. Further,
by constructing the ‘names’ of higher protocol layers based on secrets es-
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tablished in lower layers we can reason about the security guarantees of a
higher layer run in the context of a lower layer.
Channel bindings provide a handle for reasoning about protocols in which
an authentic channel is established inside another authentic channel. The
goal of such reasoning is to prove that the actors at the end-points of the
inner channel are the same as the actors at the end-points of the outer
channel.
Bhargavan et al. formalised the security properties that composite proto-
cols need to achieve. They define two properties, agreement and compound
authentication, that together demonstrate that a layered protocol is secure,
i.e. free from credential forwarding attacks.
Informally “Agreement”, in this case, means that both parties agree on
the identity of their peer and some data sent in the protocol.
Compound authentication, again informally, is the property that, in a
series of layered authentications, as long as a single protocol run with an
honest peer credential remains uncompromised then the same peer partici-
pated in all the protocol runs.
Intuitively this would mean that if the certificate in an EA was un-
compromised or the master secret of the corresponding TLS channel was
uncompromised, then the author of the EA and the TLS channel peer are
the same actor.
4.4.3 Reasoning about channel bindings
To capture these properties formally Bhargavan et al. [BDP15] provide a
framework for expressing the layers of a composite protocol in a uniform
manner, which we enumerate here. This provides the language we will use
to reason about draft-sullivan.
To define two-party authentication protocols Bhargavan et al. define the
two principles or actors, a, b ∈ Actors, each of which has access to a set of
public credentials,[10] Creds := {c1, c2, . . . , cn}. For each public credential,
[10]For example a certificate.
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ci, there is a corresponding secret, si, proving ownership of the credential.
[11]
We define the set CredentialSecrets := {s1, s2, . . . , sn}.
Bhargavan et al. instantiate six variables at the end of each sub-protocol
run, called a protocol instance, l, as follows [BDP15, p. 3]:
• p ∈ Actors: the actor,
• l ∈ N: a fresh locally unique session identifier,
• role ∈ {initiator, responder}: whether the actor played the role of
initiator or responder (rather than client or server),
• params: public parameters each of which may be unassigned (⊥),
– ci ∈ Creds ∪ ⊥: the initiator credential
– cr ∈ Creds ∪ ⊥: the responder credential
– sid ∈ N ∪ ⊥: a global session identifier
– cb ∈ RunName: a channel binding for the current instance
– cbin ∈ RunName a channel binding for the previous / outer
instance
• secrets: session specific secrets, with the following distinguished field:
– sk ∈ SessionSecrets ∪ ⊥: an authentication key, which may be
unassigned (⊥)
• complete ∈ {0, 1}: a flag that indicates whether the instance com-
pleted its role.
Note that sk is a symmetric key, and further that CredentialSecrets ∩
SessionSecrets = ∅. When ci = ⊥ and cr = ⊥ we call the instance anony-
mous. When only one of them is assigned to ⊥ we call the instance unilateral.
When both ci and cr are assigned we call the instance bilateral. When sk 6= ⊥
we call the instance key-generating. We call a peer credential, ci, honest if
ci 6= ⊥ and the corresponding secret, si, is unknown to the attacker.
[11]For example the private key of a certificate.
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4.4.4 Threat model
The threat model in Bhargavan et al., and the model we use, is an extended
Dolev-Yao attacker. This attacker is extended with the ability to compromise
credentials with the event Compromise(ci), and local secrets with the event
Leaked(sk). Thus we say a protocol instance l has an honest peer credential
if:
Let cp =
{
cr role = initiator
ci role = responder
in (¬∃#j · Compromise(cp)@j) ∧ cp 6= ⊥
We say the session secrets of l as have not been leaked if:
(¬∃#k · Leaked(sk)@k) ∧ sk 6= ⊥
We assume the existence of a secure PKI that honestly issues certificates.
4.4.5 Security properties
Bhargavan et al. define two security properties that layered protocols need
to have to achieve their security goals.
The first is Agreement. Bhargavan et al. use a variant of Lowe’s non-
injective agreement.
Definition 4.4.1. Agreement (from Bhargavan et al. [BDP15, Defini-
tion 1]). If a principal a completes protocol instance l, and if the peer’s
credential in l is honest, and if the session secrets of l have not been
leaked, then there exists a principal b with a protocol instance l′ in the
dual role that agrees with l on the contents of params and any shared
session secrets (most importantly sk).
In particular, l and l′ must typically agree on each other’s creden-
tials, the session identifier sid and channel binding cb, and any negotiated
cryptographic parameters. We do not explicitly state the confidential-
ity goal for secrets, but many derived authentication properties such as
compound authentication implicitly depend on the generated sk being
confidential.
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l1 ... li ... ln
AuthenticatesAuthenticates
Figure 4.3: Compound Authentication says that if an instance li has an
uncompromised secret key and an uncompromised identity then past and
future instances are authentic.
Although Bhargavan et al. require agreement on the session identifier,
they do not necessarily require injective, i.e. one-to-one, agreement on the
number of sessions, two of a’s protocol instances may pair with a single in-
stance of b. This can happen when sid = ⊥, as in the spontaneous certificate
flow.
Definition 4.4.2. Compound Authentication (from Bhargavan et
al. [BDP15, Definition 2]). If a principal a completes a compound au-
thentication protocol consisting of protocol instances {l1, . . . , ln}, such
that some instance li has an honest peer credential and the session se-
crets of li have not been leaked, then there exists a principal b with
protocol instances {l′1, . . . , l′n} such that each l′j has the dual role to lj
and agrees with lj on paramsj and skj .
This property says that if an actor, a completes a run of a composite
protocol, ostensibly with b, and at least one layer of the protocol success-
fully authenticates b to a, then all layers of the protocol are authentic, see
Figure 4.3. That layer can be said to authenticate all the others.
4.4.6 Expressing draft-sullivan in the channel bindings framework
To apply the security properties to draft-sullivan, we need to map each
layer of the protocol onto the framework. To illustrate this mapping we first
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assign each variable set by the framework to the relative element of the EA
layer. The actors are the client and server, and the set of public credentials
correspond to the set of certificates issued by the PKI. The secret keys of
the certificates therefore correspond to the secrets that can be used to prove
ownership of the corresponding credential.
The roles of initiator and responder go to the appropriate actor for each
run. params is slightly different based on whether the EA is part of a Re-
quested Certificate flow, Figure 4.1a, or a Spontaneous Certificate flow, Fig-
ure 4.1b.
For the requested certificate flow we define:
params = (ci, cr, sid, cb, cbin) where
ci := ⊥,
cr := Certr,
sid := certificate request context,
cb := EA,
and cbin := HC Exporter
where EA refers to the 〈CertificateVerify, Finished〉 messages, which
are built with the TLS exporter and the private key of the responder’s Cer-
tificate. Because the CertificateVerify contains the certificte request
context, we know the channel binding must be unique within the TLS ses-
sion.
In the spontaneous certificate flow we define:
params = (ci, cr, sid, cb, cbin) where
ci := Certi,
cr := ⊥,
sid := ⊥,
cb := EA,
and cbin := HC Exporter
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In this case the initiator is always the server, but there is no public global
sid. The channel binding in this case is unique because the Finished mes-
sage performs a hash over the 〈Certificate, CertificateVerify〉, which
together include all the elements in params. Because we assume perfect
cryptography any two different inputs to the hash will give different outputs
For both the EA flows we define the secret sk := ⊥. The EA protocol
doesn’t establish any shared secrets, so there are no candidate values for sk.
sk is an authentication key that both parties must agree on, and is implicitly
required for compound authentication. We extend the work of Bhargavan et
al., defining the security guarantees that can be achieved without a shared
secret further in Section 4.4.7.
In both cases, because the authentication provided by EAs, per the speci-
fication, is not layered with other EAs, the outer channel is the TLS channel.
We therefore define cbin := HC Exporter, the channel binding exported from
the TLS channel.
This means draft-sullivan does not try and prove joint authentication
for two separate EAs. If we try to use draft-sullivan EAs to provide joint
authentication, rather than authentication of each certificate individually
they do not meet Bhargavan et al.’s definition of contributive channel bind-
ings, see Section 4.4.10. We therefore would expect that they do not meet
the security goal of compound authentication, see Definition 4.4.2.
We also need to define instances for the TLS layer. The actors are the
client and server, as they are in the EA instances, because we are trying
to prove they match. The roles are ‘client’ and ‘server’ respectively. For the
TLS layer we define params = (ci, cr, sid, cb, cbin) where
ci := Certc or ⊥,
cr := Certs,
sid := ⊥,
cb := HC Exporter,
and cbin := ⊥
It is worth noting that HC Exporter is derived from the exporter master
secret which in turn is based on a complete transcript of the TLS handshake.
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This binds all the parameters of the TLS session to the HC Exporter, so two
sessions with different parameters must have a different channel binding.
For TLS instances ci is either Certc or ⊥ depending on whether the TLS
channel is unilateral or bilateral.
Unlike EAs, TLS 1.3 does require injective agreement, however it doesn’t
operate on the basis of a public session ID, but based on matching sessions
as defined in Canetti et al. [CK01].
Therefore we assign sid := ⊥.
cbin := ⊥ because the TLS layer is the outermost layer we consider, so
there is nothing for the TLS channel to bind to.
For the TLS layer we define the master secret as the shared secret, sk :=
ms.
4.4.7 Extending the definitions of Bhargavan et al.
If we try and formalise the properties we want from EAs using Compound
Authentication we quickly run into problems.
Consider the case where a client connects to a server over unilateral TLS,
and completes a run of the request-response flow as the responder. Under
the definition of Bhargavan et al. the server cannot use the TLS layer to
authenticate the EA because it does not have an honest peer credential. It
also cannot use the EA to authenticate the TLS layer, because the session
secrets of the EA layer are unassigned, and thus ‘known’ to the attacker.
Using this definition, we can only prove two properties.
1. If a client receives an EA on an uncompromised TLS channel, then
the server controls the certificate in the EA.
2. If a server receives an EA on an uncompromised bilateral TLS channel,
then the client controls the certificate in the EA.
This means that under this definition we cannot use EAs to reason about
the security of the TLS channel, and that the server can only reason about
EAs sent over a bilateral TLS connection.
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l1 ... li ... ln
Authenticates
Figure 4.4: Outward Compound Authentication (OCA) says that if an in-
stance li has an uncompromised identity then past instances are authentic.
We therefore extend the concept of Compound Authentication with two
new definitions to capture stronger guarantees. Outward Compound Au-
thentication, which authenticates outer layers / prior instances, and Inward
Compound Authentication, which authenticates inner layers / subsequent
instances.
Definition 4.4.3. Outward Compound Authentication. If a principal
a completes a compound authentication protocol consisting of protocol
instances {l1, . . . , ln}, such that some instance li has an honest peer
credential and the session secrets of li have been leaked or are ⊥, then
there exists a principal b with protocol instances {l′1, . . . , l′i} such that
each l′j has the dual role to lj and agrees with lj on paramsj and skj .
Intuitively, this means that if a protocol layer has an honest peer cre-
dential, then it can authenticate all outer layers, see Figure 4.4. This has a
stronger threat model than standard compound authentication, because the
attacker is allowed to compromise any session secrets, if there are any.
This stronger definition lets us capture the property we want from EAs,
namely that if a client or server receives an EA with an uncompromised peer
certificate then it was authored by the TLS peer.
If a composite protocol has outward compound authentication (OCA)
for instance li then the same peer participated in all prior layers. Because
we assume that the authentication at layer li was successful, i.e. the au-
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l1 ... li ... ln
Authenticates
Figure 4.5: Inward Compound Authentication (ICA) says that if an instance
li has an uncompromised secret key then future instances are authentic.
thentication at layer li was performed by an honest actor, we can be sure
that there was no credential forwarding attack on prior layers. Consider for
a contradiction that a credential forwarding attack exists on layer lj where
j < i, meaning the peer in layer lj is dishonest. If the peer in layer li is
honest, and the actor in layer li and the actor in layer lj are the same actor,
then the actor in layer lj is honest. This is a contradiction.
We can similarly specify a property about unilateral and anonymous
protocols.
Definition 4.4.4. Inward Compound Authentication. If a principal a
completes a compound authentication protocol consisting of protocol in-
stances {l1, . . . , ln}, such that some instance li has no peer credential, or
a leaked peer credential, but the session secrets of li are uncompromised,
then there exists a principal b with protocol instances {l′i, . . . , l′n} such
that each l′j has the dual role to lj and agrees with lj on paramsj and
skj .
This property says that once a secret key is established, the actor can
be sure that any protocol layers run after it were indeed run by the same
peer, see Figure 4.5.
If a composite protocol has inward compound authentication (ICA) for
layer li, then the same peer participated in all subsequent layers. Because we
assume that the protocol at layer li was successful, i.e. the authentication
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at layer li was performed by an honest actor, we can be sure that there
are no credential forwarding attacks on future layers. This follows the same
logic as for OCA. Consider for a contradiction that there exists a credential
forwarding attack on layer lj where j > i, meaning that the peer in layer lj
is dishonest. Thus if the actor in layer li is honest, and the actor in layer li
is the same actor as the actor in layer lj then the actor in layer lj must also
be honest, a contradiction.[12]
This lets us describe the remaining property we want, namely that if
a server receives an EA on an uncompromised unilateral TLS connection,
then the TLS peer controls the certificate in the EA.
It may seem unintuitive that the actor cannot reason about earlier lay-
ers when the protocol has ICA, because many layered protocols use a key
generating protocol as a base layer to achieve confidentiality as well as au-
thentication. We illustrate this restriction through an example. Consider a
protocol where a client uses his private key to sign a server’s certificate,
and sends this signed certificate to the server in the clear. The client then
connects to the server using unilateral TLS and repeats the signed certifi-
cate. The server cannot be sure that it is talking to the client, and not
some attacker who observed the certificate exchange in the clear. Whilst
it knows that at some point the client wanted to communicate with it, it
doesn’t know that the TLS peer is that same client. However, as long as the
TLS channel remains uncompromised, the server can be sure any compound
authentication protocols run over it were indeed run by the TLS peer.
4.4.8 Formalising the properties
With these two new properties we can now work out what properties we
want draft-sullivan to have.
We want to show that the EA layer has OCA, and that the TLS layer
has compound authentication (CA), or ICA for the server in the unilateral
TLS case.
[12]We assume here that an actor cannot become malicious during a composite protocol
run.
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TLSU EA
ICA
OCA
(a) Unilateral TLS
TLSB EA
CA
OCA
(b) Bilateral TLS
Figure 4.6: On a unilateral connection the server can authenticate the EA
using the ICA property between unilateral TLS and EAs. On a bilateral
connection the server can authenticate the EA using the compound authen-
tication property between bilateral TLS and EAs.
Property 4.4.5. OCA of the EA layer with the TLS layer (using Defi-
nition 4.4.3). If an actor, a, with protocol instances {lTLS , lEA} receives
an EA, EAp, in layer lEA, and the attacker does not know the private
key of the certificate in EAp, i.e. lEA has an honest peer credential, then
there exists an actor, b, with instances {l′TLS , l′EA} such that each l′i has
the dual role to li and agrees with li on paramsi and ski. Specifically
EAp was generated by the TLS peer and both parties agree on the TLS
master secret.
Property 4.4.6. CA or ICA of the TLS layer with an EA layer (using
Definition 4.4.2 and Definition 4.4.4 respectively). If an actor, a, with
protocol instances {lTLS , lEA} receives an EA, EAp, in layer lEA, and
the attacker does not know the master secret of the TLS channel, i.e.
the session secrets of layer lTLS have not been leaked, then there exists
an actor, b, with instances {l′TLS , l′EA} such that each l′i has the dual
role to li and agrees with li on paramsi and ski. Specifically EAp was
generated by the TLS peer, and both parties agree on the TLS master
secret.
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It is interesting to note however, that in the ICA case this definition only
assures the server that the EA is bound to a given TLS channel, but because
the TLS peer is anonymous, if the EA’s certificate has been compromised
the TLS peer could be the attacker. This does however preclude an uncom-
promised client from acting as a signing oracle, i.e. signing any message a
potentially malicious server requests.
Together these guarantees allow the server and the client to use either
protocol layer to authenticate the other. It is interesting to note that despite
the fact that neither the TLS layer, nor the EA layer achieves full compound
authentication, i.e. both ICA and OCA, because there are only two layers,
and the inner layer proves OCA and the outer layer proves ICA, we can
reason about exactly the same cases as a protocol where all layers achieve
CA. We discuss this further in Chapter 5.
4.4.9 Relating the properties to the goals
In Section 4.3.3 we lay out six goals for draft-sullivan, which we recap
here. We then relate the goals to the properties we need to prove, see Ta-
ble 4.1 for a summary.
1. An EA authenticates the sender to the receiver.
2. An EA can be send out-of-band and validated by the peer.
3. A peer can authenticate with multiple identities.
4. Certificates sent in-band should be confidential.
5. EAs must be independent and unidirectional.
6. EAs can not be transplanted into another protocol.
129
4.4. Channel bindings
Goal Properties
Goal 1 Authenticate TLS peer
OCA and either ICA (unilat-
eral) or CA (bilateral)
Goal 2 Out-of-band validation OCA
Goal 3 Multiple identities
Consequence of Goal 1 and
Goal 5
Goal 4 Certificate confidentiality Not a requirement
Goal 5
EA independence and unidi-
rectionality
Consequence of Goal 1, OCA,
and secret session keys
Goal 6 Transplantation protection
Perfect cryptography assump-
tion
Table 4.1: Relationship between goals and properties
Goal 1 requires that we can authenticate one party of a TLS communi-
cation to another using a certificate after the session has been established.
This is the main goal of the protocol. To show this, we need to prove that if
an actor receives an EA bound to a TLS session, then the TLS session peer
controls the certificate in the EA. This maps closely to the definitions in
Section 4.4.8. OCA of EAs means that the receipt of an EA proves control
of the end point, and CA of TLS[13] means that control of the end-point
proves ownership of the certificate in a received EA.
Goal 2 requires that EAs transported out of band can still correctly
verify. Proving OCA for EAs proves that the security of the EA is not
dependent on the secrecy or the authentication of the TLS channel.
Goal 3 says that if multiple certificates are used they all authenticate a
given connection. Proving Goal 1, and that multiple EAs sent on the same
channel are independent, Goal 5, proves that each EA authenticates the TLS
channel.
Goal 4 says implementations “SHOULD” use the underlying TLS layer
to keep the certificates confidential. Because this is a should level require-
ment, as opposed to a must, we do not check this, but note that Cremers et
al. [Cre+17a] prove that data sent over a TLS channel is confidential.
Goal 5 requires that authenticators be independent and unidirectional.
Two authenticators can be said to be independent if the compromise of
[13]Or ICA for servers in unilateral TLS.
130
4.4. Channel bindings
one does not give any advantage in the compromise of the other. Proving
Goal 1 proves that to create an EA you need to know the private key of the
certificate contained in it. Thus knowing some other certificate’s private key
provides no advantage in deriving an EA, assuming that the private keys of
the certificates are themselves independent.
The only shared secret between two EAs on the same channel is the
master secret of the TLS channel.[14] Thus we still need to prove that the
master secret cannot be derived from the EA.
The final case is where the same certificate is sent over two different TLS
channels. In this case we need to show that knowledge of a certificate’s long
term key, and knowledge of the master secret of a TLS channel, does not en-
able an attacker to produce an EA for another TLS channel without knowing
the master secret of the other TLS channel. This is captured by the OCA
property of EAs. This scenario is equivalent to a channel synchronisation
attack.
Proving EAs are uni-directional comes from the agreement property on
params, which includes the context strings, which indicate the direction of
the EA.
Goal 6, which requires that the EA cannot be transplanted into other pro-
tocols, is unprovable without co-ordination between all protocols, however
we can show that EA messages cannot be transplanted into the TLS hand-
shake. Because the CertificateVerify message contains a context string
a CertificateVerify message from an EA cannot be directly transplanted
into a TLS handshake. Further, because we assume perfect cryptography,
we assume that an attacker cannot modify the contents of an encrypted
message without access to the key. The same reasoning applies to Finished
messages. Thus this goal is achieved a priori by our model.
4.4.10 Achieving compound authentication
To achieve compound authentication Bhargavan et al. propose contributive
channel bindings. Informally, this means that the channel bindings have to
accumulate a contribution from each layer of authentication.
[14]Or more properly the TLS exporter master secret.
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Bhargavan et al. hypothesise that if the channel bindings are contribu-
tive, and both parties agree on them, then, the compound protocol achieves
the two security goals in Section 4.4.5, i.e. agreement and compound au-
thentication. We call this the Bhargavan hypothesis.
Formally contributive channel bindings are defined as follows.
Definition 4.4.7. Contributive Channel Bindings (Definition taken
from Bhargavan et al. [BDP15, p. 10]). If a compound authentication
protocol consists of n protocol instances {l1, . . . , ln}, the channel bind-
ing of ln must be bound to the parameters and session secrets of all n
instances {params1, sk1, . . . , paramsn, skn}, so that agreement on the
channel binding guarantees compound authentication for the composite
protocol.
Bhargavan et al. [BDP15] find flaws in a number of compound authen-
tication protocols which do not use contributive channel bindings, and then
fix the flaws by making the channel bindings contributive. This provides
some evidence that the Bhargavan hypothesis is true, or at least a useful
approximation of the truth.
We note that the channel bindings used in draft-sullivan are con-
tributive when considering a single EAs, but that multiple EAs sent over
the same channel do not contribute to each other. This means that we would
not expect multiple EA to achieve OCA when considered as a single protocol
run with many layers. This aligns with the results of our Tamarin analysis.
4.5 Tamarin model
draft-sullivan repurposes messages from the TLS 1.3 handshake to con-
struct an authentication protocol to be used inside a TLS connection. We
analysed draft-sullivan with the Tamarin analysis tool [Sch+12]. In this
Section we describe the Tamarin model we used to verify and explore the
guarantees of draft-sullivan.
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Our channel bindings analysis gives us formal properties we can verify
for our model in Tamarin. The Tamarin model we built proves that EAs
have properties we describe in Section 4.4.8, and thus meets its security
goals. We also examine stronger properties using Tamarin.
4.5.1 Abstraction
draft-sullivan is designed to be part of a layered protocol. It is crypto-
graphically bound to the TLS layer. Therefore to accurately capture it in
Tamarin we must model both the TLS layer, and the EA layer.
In Chapter 3 we construct a comprehensive model of TLS 1.3. Because of
its accuracy, the model is inherently very complex. Extending it significantly
to include draft-sullivan, may not feasibly enable analysis, or would at
least require significant amounts of additional computing resource. To make
the analysis tractable, we consider an abstracted version of TLS, whereby
we run a version of the handshake without providing the attacker any rules
to attack it. We matched the TLS 1.3 model we used in Chapter 3 very
closely, using the same message formats and style such that integrating the
two models would be as simple as possible, and we leave this for future work.
We justify abstracting the TLS layer by noting that the security properties
we rely on were proven to hold in the TLS 1.3 model in Chapter 3.
Further, our abstracted model does not cover resumptions on the basis
that after a resumption the master secret changes, and thus from the per-
spective of an EA a resumption is indistinguishable from a separate session
between the same participants. The authentication guarantees of an EA do
not apply over a resumption boundary. In Chapter 5 we discuss a possi-
ble technique for bridging the resumption boundary, but here we stick to
simplified model.
Because EAs only interact with the TLS channel through the exporter
application programming interface (API), we do not give the EA layer access
to the TLS master secret. The client and server only perform computations
on exporters. This logical divide allows us to cleanly separate the two layers
with a simple interface.
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Figure 4.7: draft-sullivan state diagram
4.5.2 draft-sullivan’s state machine
The draft-sullivan protocol has four states for each actor,
1. the initial state,
2. the initiator state,
3. the responder state,
4. and the finished state.
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These states are illustrated in Figure 4.7.
The state transitions of the client and the server in draft-sullivan
can be described in approximately ten transitions, those denoted with solid
black lines in Figure 4.7. We include an example transition below.
1 //Send an EA, as per the request/response flow.
2 rule C_Send:
3 let
4 certificate=pk(ltkA)
5 //Compute the CertificateVerify.
6 signature=compute_signature(ltkA,
h(hccc, CertificateRequest, certificate))↪→
7 //Compute the Finished.
8 verify_data = hmac(fmc,
<hccc, CertificateRequest, Certificate,
CertificateVerify>)
↪→
↪→
9 in
10 [ State(~cid, 'C1', $C, $S, 'client', auth_status)
11 , PendingReqR(~request_id, ~cid, 'client',
CertificateRequest)↪→
12 , !Exporters(ms, 'client', ~cid, hccc, hccs, fmc, fms)
13 , !Ltk($A, ltkA)
14 //This fact binds the Client to the additional
15 //identity it has been assigned.
16 , DelegateLtk($C, ltkA)
17 , Fr(~msg_id)
18 ]
19 --[ C_Send(~cid)
20 , Owns($C, ms, 'client', <$A, ltkA>)
21 , Instance(~cid, $C, $S, 'client')
22 , Fulfil(~cid, $C, 'client', certificate_request_context,
<$A, pk(ltkA)>)↪→
23 ]->
24 [ State(~cid, 'C1', $C, $S, 'client', auth_status)
25 , TLS_Send(~msg_id, ~cid, $C, $S,
<Certificate, CertificateVerify, Finished>)↪→
26 ]
This transition details a client Send transition. The let statement al-
lows us to define shorthand names for more complex terms. For example
line 4 defines the variable certificate to be pk(ltkA), i.e. the public
key of ltkA, which is a long-term key taken as an input in line 13. The
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compute signature and hmac calls are m4 rewrite macros that rewrite the
function to a form that can be analysed by Tamarin. Using m4 in this way
allows us to write rules in a imperative pseudo-code style which makes it
easier to check for correctness against the draft, as opposed to complex and
abstract facts.
The State fact represents the State of the actor, tracking the session
ID, ~cid; current protocol step, 'C1'; actor identity, $C; peer identity, $S;
role, 'client'; and authentication status, auth_status, respectively. The
PendingReqR fact represents the client’s memory of receiving a request, as-
signing a ~request_id to ensure uniqueness, even in the case of a repeated
CertificateRequest. The !Ltk fact binds an identity, $A, to a LTK, ltkA.
The Owns action in line 20 indicates that an EA was created legitimately.
As we will describe later in this Chapter this pairs with a Recv action, which
captures an actor receiving an EA that validates. We will prove properties
of the form “Given some pre-conditions, if an actor receives an EA that
validates, then its TLS peer created a valid EA with the same certificate.”
The C_Send transition is only possible if a request was previously re-
ceived, and therefore cannot occur without an appropriate PendingReqR
fact.
The transition also needs an established TLS channel, as captured by
the State fact. The Exporters fact represents the client’s memory of the
exporter keys he has computed, the handshake contexts, hccc and hccs for
the client and server respectively; and the finshed MAC keys, fmc and fms
for the client and server respectively. We chose to model the exporters in
this way to capture the fact that the same exporter keys are used for all
EAs. The same fact is consumed for all runs of the EA protocol within a
single TLS session.[15] The signature and the Finished message are both
computed using the exporters, with no reference to the master secret.
Stasis of the model
draft-sullivan was designed to run inside a TLS channel and to pro-
vide authentication without changes to the TLS state machine. Our model
[15]Recall that the Exporter fact is marked with a !, and is thus persistent.
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captures this stasis of the TLS state machine, by having a state fact that
changes with the TLS handshake, but is left unchanged by draft-sullivan
transitions.
Because runs of the draft-sullivan are explicitly allowed to interleave
we model the draft-sullivan state machine as a bag-of-facts. We output
“memory” facts that capture the state of each run of the protocol, any of
which can then be consumed at any time. This means that rather than
waiting for the state machine to arrive at some particular state to continue
a run, an actor can pick up any run currently in progress and continue it at
any point.
This structure highlights draft-sullivan’s unusual protocol structure,
where there are multiple interleaving runs layered over a single run of the
base protocol. As we will discuss in Chapter 5, this structure can make it
difficult to reason about the ordering of runs of the EA protocol. In draft-
sullivan this is not an issue, because the security properties attained by a
given run is independent of any other run of draft-sullivan, however, in
Chapter 5 we show how this can become an issue.
4.5.3 Closely modelling the specification
The EAs model is written in a similar manner to our TLS model. We opted
for a high fidelity model of draft-sullivan, working to enable ready com-
parison between the draft messages and the wire formats.
Our abstracted TLS model only captures two modes of TLS, unilateral
authentication and bilateral authentication.
TLS 1.3 has eight security guarantees, however not all properties hold in
all modes. Rather than model all of these varying levels of security, our ab-
stract version of TLS only provides a subset of those properties that apply in
all modes. If we can prove the guarantees of draft-sullivan in conjunction
with a strictly weaker abstraction of TLS we can be sure that the guarantees
still apply when layered over a strictly stronger version of TLS. The proper-
ties we require of our abstract version of TLS are the first five guarantees of
the TLS 1.3 specification, namely (1) that both parties establish the same
session keys, (2) that those session keys are secret, (3) that each party can
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authenticate its peer as appropriate, (4) that session keys are unique, and
(5) that an attacker cannot perform a downgrade attack. Importantly, we
do not require perfect forward secrecy (PFS).[16] All modes achieve the first
five properties, but only modes with a DHE achieve PFS. By eliding the DH
handshake, similar to the PSK-only modes of TLS 1.3, and not establishing
a pre-shared secret, we create a strictly weaker abstraction of TLS.
By careful usage of the same message formats and modelling techniques,
we have left open the possibility of merging the two models into one larger
model, and we leave this for future work.
4.6 Encoding the threat model and security properties
4.6.1 Threat model
The threat model we used for our Tamarin analysis is an extended version
of the Dolev-Yao attacker [DY83], as we used in Section 4.4.4. The attacker
is given the abilities to leak the master secret from the TLS channel and the
private key of certificates using the actions Revms and RevLtk respectively.
Because we abstract the TLS layer we provide the attacker with special
actions to read and write to TLS channels for which they know the key. We
write our security properties so that this is equivalent to the attacker being
able to act as a legitimate host to one party to attack another. We achieve
this by proving the attacker cannot compromise a session without compro-
mising the master secret of that session, even if they have compromised the
master secrets of other sessions.
4.6.2 Security properties
We analyse four security properties for draft-sullivan:
1. that the master secret of the TLS channel is confidential,
2. proof of certificate ownership,
3. certificate linking, and
[16]For completeness, the final two properties are KCI resistance and the protection of
endpoint identities.
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Property proven Lemma
Secret session keys secret session keys
OCA of EAs cert ownership
ICA of unilateral TLS cert ownership
Compound authentication of bilateral TLS cert ownership
Table 4.2: Relationship between properties and lemmas
1 lemma secret_session_keys:
2 "All ms transcript #j #k.
3 SessionKey(ms, transcript)@j
4 & KU(ms)@k
5 ==> Ex actor peer #i.
6 Revms(ms, actor, peer)@i
7 & (#i < #k)"
Figure 4.8: The secret session keys lemma, edited for consistency of style,
states that if a session key is established, and the attacker knows it, then
the attacker must have previously revealed the session key.
4. Outward compound authentication (OCA) between EAs.
As we will discuss in the following paragraphs, the first two lemmas are
required to meet the goals of draft-sullivan.[17] As we discussed in Sec-
tion 4.4.9, all the goals of draft-sullivan are achieved if we can prove
the various compound authentication properties and the secrecy of the mas-
ter secret. We show the relationship between the properties we need and
the lemmas we prove in Table 4.2. The latter two lemmas examine more
complex properties not claimed by the specification.
Master secret confidentiality
To check that draft-sullivan EAs do not weaken the security guarantees
of the underlying TLS channel, we prove that the master secret cannot be
derived from EAs. The lemma is shown in Figure 4.8.
[17]For reference, these are (1) authentication of the sender, (2) validation by the peer,
(3) authentication of multiple EAs, (4) certificate confidentiality, and (5) independence
and unidirectionality of EAs.
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1 lemma cert_ownership[reuse]:
2 "All actor peer ms cert role #k.
3 Recv(actor, peer, ms, role, cert)@k
4 & not (Ex #i #j.
5 RevLtk(cert)@i
6 & (#i < #k)
7 & Revms(ms, actor, peer)@j
8 & (#j < #k)
9 )
10 ==> Ex role2 #h.
11 Owns(peer, ms, role2, cert)@h
12 & (#h < #k)
13 & not(role=role2)"
Figure 4.9: The certificate ownership lemma, edited for consistency of style,
states that if an actor receives an EA (line 3) and the attacker has not
compromised both the EA certificate (line 5) and the master secret of the
TLS channel (line 7) then the EA was created by the peer (line 11).
Certificate ownership
To check that EAs meet their authentication goals we prove that if an actor
completes a run of draft-sullivan and accepts an EA with certificate,
cert, then the certificate was signed by the peer, or the attacker knows the
private key of cert and the master secret of the TLS channel.
This is the logical conjunction of our OCA property, Property 4.4.5 and
our CA/ICA property, Property 4.4.6. The lemma is shown in Figure 4.9.
As long as either the TLS channel or the private key of the certificate is
uncompromised, then the recipient of an EA knows the TLS end-point it is
talking to controls the certificate in the EA. This is a very strong guarantee.
Certificate linking
Because EAs sent on the same channel share key material it is important to
define the relationship certificates have to each other. We prove properties
about the relationship between EAs sent on the same channel. Certificate
linking looks to prove that EAs are securely linked if the key material they
share, i.e. the TLS channel master secret, is uncompromised. Specifically we
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1 lemma cert_linking:
2 "All actor actor2 ms role role2 cert cert2 peer peer2 #j #k.
3 Recv(actor , peer , ms, role , cert)@j
4 & Recv(actor2, peer2, ms, role2, cert2)@k
5 & (#j < #k)
6 & not (Ex #g.
7 Revms(ms, actor,peer)@g
8 & (#g < #k))
9 ==> Ex role3 role4 #h #i.
10 Owns(peer, ms, role3, cert)@h
11 & not (role = role3)
12 & (#h < #j)
13 & Owns(peer2, ms, role4, cert2)@i
14 & not(role2 = role4)
15 & (#i < #k)"
Figure 4.10: The certificate linking lemma, lightly edited for consistency
of style, states that if two EAs are received (lines 3 and 4) on the same
uncompromised (line 7) channel, then both were created by the peer (lines 10
and 13). This applies whether they were sent by a single actor, or if each
actor sent one.
construct a lemma that shows what is needed for an EA to authenticate
another.
This property is the strongest compound authentication property that
can be proven about the relationship between multiple EAs. Because EAs
are non-key generating, i.e. have no shared secrets, we cannot consider the
session secrets of an EA layer to be un-leaked.
Thus the only layer we can prove authenticates an EA layer is the TLS
layer, but we can prove that multiple EAs sent on an uncompromised TLS
channel are all authenticated by the TLS channel.
The lemma we prove is shown in Figure 4.10. It states that if two EAs
are received on the same, uncompromised TLS channel, then both EAs are
authentic. This applies whether they are received by the same actor, or
whether each actor receives one. We prove this lemma to contrast the OCA
lemma discussed in the next paragraph.
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Outward compound authentication
We also look to prove whether multiple EAs sent on the same channel can
authenticate each other, rather than just the TLS channel. This would allow
us to consider multiple runs of draft-sullivan over a single TLS channel
as a single layered protocol run with multiple layers, rather than multiple
composite protocol runs with only two layers that run with some shared key
material. Because compound authentication as defined in Definition 4.4.2
can’t be used to reason about the security of an EA, because EAs are non-
key-generating, we might want to prove that EAs have OCA and thus that
later EAs authenticate earlier EAs.
We write a lemma that claims that if two EAs are sent on the same
TLS channel, and the second has an uncompromised certificate, then the
first is authentic. This corresponds to OCA between EAs, as discussed in
Definition 4.4.3. However we prove we do not have OCA between EAs by
way of counter-example.
4.7 Results
Our channel bindings analysis implies that if we prove draft-sullivan has
the properties we lay out in Section 4.4.8 then it meets its security objec-
tives. We proved that draft-sullivan has said properties. Additionally, we
analysed a stronger set of properties considering multiple EAs sent on the
same channel.
We proved that in a Tamarin model of draft-sullivan the lemmas we
constructed to capture the properties laid out in Section 4.4.8 hold. Thus,
EAs authenticate the underlying TLS layer, and the TLS layer authenticates
EAs bound to it.
When we consider the properties of multiple EAs sent on the same TLS
channel we get more mixed results. We were able to prove that if the TLS
channel was uncompromised then multiple EAs sent on the same channel
were authentic, i.e. the TLS channel can authenticate multiple EAs. EAs do
not, however, authenticate one another.
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1 lemma outward_compound_auth:
2 "All actor actor2 ms role role2 cert cert2 peer peer2 #j #k.
3 Recv(actor , peer , ms, role , cert )@j
4 & Recv(actor2, peer2, ms, role2, cert2)@k
5 & (#j < #k)
6 & not (Ex actor3 peer3 #f #g.
7 Revms(ms, actor3, peer3)@f
8 & (#f < #j)
9 & RevLtk(cert2)@g
10 & (#g < #k))
11 ==> Ex role3 role4 #h #i.
12 Owns(peer, ms, role3, cert)@h
13 & not (role = role3)
14 & (#h < #j)
15 & Owns(peer2, ms, role4, cert2)@i
16 & not(role2 = role4)
17 & (#i < #k)"
Figure 4.11: The outward compound authentication lemma, edited for con-
sistency of style, extends the certificate linking lemma by adding a single
restriction; that the attacker not compromise the second certificate (line 9,
highlighted in red). Thus an attacker may compromise the master secret of
the TLS channel, or the second certificate, but not both. This property does
not hold.
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4.7.1 Master secret confidentiality
We prove that the attacker cannot derive the master secret from any com-
bination of runs of the EA layer.
4.7.2 Certificate ownership
Our certificate ownership property is the logical conjunction of OCA between
an EA and its TLS channel, and ICA between the TLS channel and the
EA.[18]
By proving certificate ownership we proved that EAs authenticate the
TLS layer they are bound to, and that the TLS channel authenticates an
EA bound to it. As detailed in Section 4.4.9, along with the master secret
confidentiality lemma, this proves that draft-sullivan meets its security
goals.
4.7.3 Certificate linking
As we mentioned in Section 4.4.5, the draft-sullivan specification says
that joint authentication is hard to prove formally. Although EAs are inde-
pendent, there is a security dependency between the inputs of EAs sent on
the same channel. Because multiple runs of draft-sullivan within a sin-
gle TLS session use the same exporter keys there is a security dependency
between EAs.
Referring back to the definition of compound authentication, Defini-
tion 4.4.2, to prove that an actor is jointly authoritative over multiple cer-
tificates we would need to prove that both parties agreed that multiple EAs
were authored by the same actor. By proving our certificate ownership prop-
erty, we prove compound authentication between the TLS channel and each
EA.
We can strengthen our definition of compound authentication of the
TLS to cover multiple certificates. We prove that two EA sent over the
same channel are both authenticated by the TLS channel, and thus, as long
as the TLS channel is uncompromised, both EAs are authentic. This lemma
[18]Or regular compound authentication in the bilateral case
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captures a stronger version of compound authentication than required by
the security goals.
4.7.4 Outward Compound Authentication (OCA) between EAs
We strengthened our OCA lemma in the same way, considering multiple EAs
sent on the same channel, and tried to prove that an EA authenticates other
earlier EAs sent on the same channel. Our regular version of this property
only requires that EAs authenticate the TLS channel.
We proved that the stronger OCA property does not hold using Tamarin,
which produced a counter-example which violates the property. The counter-
example produced is as follows. If the attacker compromises a TLS channel,
forges an EA with a compromised certificate, and sends it to the client, and
the server later sends an EA with an uncompromised certificate, the latter
EA will be accepted by the client, violating the property.
Because prior EAs do not affect the production of later EAs they do not
meet the definition of contributive channel bindings, and thus Bhargavan’s
hypothesis would suggest that they do not authenticate each other, a result
borne out by our Tamarin analysis. This means that we cannot assume that
if an EA is genuine, that other earlier EAs ostensibly sent by the same actor
are genuine. We suggest a modification to EAs that claims this property in
Chapter 5.
Our models are available online [Hoy18a], and contain a full counter-
example along with proofs of all the other lemmas and their sub-properties.
The repository also includes an extensive guide to the model.
4.8 Conclusions
In this work we showed that draft-sullivan achieves its main security
goals. We formalised the goals of draft-sullivan into security properties,
extending previous work on channel bindings, and used the Tamarin Prover
to prove the protocol meets those properties.
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Previous work on layered protocols had limited ability to reason about
protocols like draft-sullivan. With layered protocols we look to prove
that if a given layer is uncompromised then some other set of layers is
authentic. This lets us reason about the security of one layer in terms of
another. Formalising draft-sullivan’s goals required the definition of two
new properties for composite protocols. Prior definitions could only reason
about protocol layers that authenticate all other layers, but our new defini-
tions let us reason about layers that only authenticate all past layers, or all
future layers. This lets us capture the authentication guarantees that can be
achieved by a wider class of protocols.
draft-sullivan’s security goals only define the relationship between
individual EAs and the TLS channel, a composite protocol with two layers.
We proved that if either layer is uncompromised then the other is authentic.
However, because draft-sullivan allows for multiple protocol runs over the
same TLS channel we also examined whether multiple EAs could achieve
the same guarantees when layered, effectively considering all these runs as
a single composite protocol. Our new definitions suggest that EAs do not
have the necessary features to authenticate future EAs, but that they do
have the necessary features to be able to authenticate prior EAs.
We proved that when considering these runs as a single composite proto-
col, whilst the TLS layer authenticates all the EAs, EAs do not authenticate
all past EAs.
In practical terms, this means that if draft-sullivan is deployed in an
environment where the threat model does not include an attacker who can
break TLS channels, then all EAs bound to a TLS channel were created by
one of the TLS endpoints.
However if the threat model does consider such attackers, then we cannot
use EAs to reason about the security of prior EAs.
The threat model where an attacker can compromise the TLS channel is
indeed a very strong threat model. However, we note that it is still common
in industry to use static RSA keys to allow traffic sent to a server to be
analysed by middle-boxes and passive taps. Our analysis shows that in this
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case the client and the server cannot prove any compound authentication
property between EAs.
Being able to prove and disprove properties increases the confidence in
the accuracy of our Tamarin model. The properties which we proved and
disproved precisely align with the cases that used channel bindings that
were contributive, and those that did not. This provides more evidence for
the Bhargavan hypothesis, that composite protocols that use contributive
channel bindings achieve compound authentication.
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Layered Exported Authenticators
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we introduced EAs, a draft-standard before the
IETF. EAs allow a participant in a TLS channel to add additional identities
to the channel. These identities are linked to certificates, and to add them to
the channel the participant constructs a special message, an EA, that proves
it controls the identity in the certificate. As discussed in the final sections
of the chapter these additional identities are not jointly authenticated. This
means that whilst the participant can prove it is authorised to act as each
of the identities individually, it cannot prove that it is authorised to act as
a group of them.
Compound authentication is a form of joint authentication. Compound
authentication proves that for a series of authentication protocols all the
identities are controlled by a single actor, as long as at least one of the au-
thentication protocols is successful. EAs, as discussed in the previous chap-
ter, have the relevant components to achieve a similar property, that we
call outward compound authentication (OCA). This means that later au-
thentication protocols authenticate earlier ones. OCA is a variant form of
compound authentication. However, even though EAs have the components
to achieve OCA they do not. In this chapter we describe an extension to EAs,
which we call Layered Exported Authenticators, that allows a participant
to prove joint authentication in the form of OCA.
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5.1.1 Chapter overview
Our main contributions in this chapter are as follows:
1. We present draft-hoyland, a draft standard presented to the IETF
introducing LEAs. LEAs extend EAs in a way intended to provide
compound authentication between EAs.
2. We discuss the design of LEAs with an analysis of LEAs in terms of
the Bhargavan framework.
3. We define authentication forests, a complex authentication property.
Authentication forests allow a complex layering of authentication prop-
erties between a client and server, with each branch providing OCA of
all ancestor nodes.
4. We provide a model of LEAs in Tamarin, along with an extended
discussion of Tamarin’s pre-loader and its treatment of source lem-
mas. Tamarin’s pre-loader is not well documented, and we provide a
detailed explanation of its operations. LEAs transform the multiple
independent runs of EAs, a two layer composite protocol, into an ar-
bitrarily deep composite protocol, and stretch the boundaries of what
it is possible to reason about with the Tamarin prover.
5. We give a partial proof of the security of LEAs using Tamarin, proving
that a LEA provides OCA of its immediate predecessor in those cases
where we would expect it.
5.1.2 Motivation
Joint authentication is useful in a number of cases, for example it can be
used to securely update a pinned certificate. Joint authentication can also
be used as an explicit signalling mechanism, proving an explicit proof that
a peer has accepted a particular certificate. Developing this extension to
provide joint authentication to EAs allows us to examine more fully com-
pound authentication and composite protocols, applying the definitions we
introduced in Chapter 4.
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5.1.3 Chapter organisation
In Section 5.2 we recall the definition of OCA and discuss the uses of OCA in
EAs. In Section 5.3 we introduce draft-hoyland, a draft standard before the
IETF, and we examine it under the Bhargavan framework in Section 5.4. We
also discuss the development of draft-hoyland alongside draft-sullivan,
and the ways in which both drafts have influenced each other. In Section 5.5
we describe various authentication structures that can be built with LEAs,
in particular authentication forests.
We introduce our Tamarin model in Section 5.6 and then proceed on to
a discussion of source resolution in Tamarin. We detail a set of experiments
we ran to analyse the pre-loader, discovering properties of the pre-loader
that were surprising to some of the authors of Tamarin. We also detail the
lemmas we prove about LEA, which allow us to show that they do not
weaken the security of EAs as well as a partial proof of the OCA property
we want to achieve. Finally in Section 5.8 we discuss our results and some
conclusions.
5.2 Background
5.2.1 Achieving Outward Compound Authentication (OCA)
In this Chapter we describe an extension to establish OCA for EAs. We
recall here the definition of OCA.
Definition 4.4.3. Outward Compound Authentication. If a principal
a completes a compound authentication protocol consisting of protocol
instances {l1, . . . , ln}, such that some instance li has an honest peer
credential and the session secrets of li have been leaked or are ⊥, then
there exists a principal b with protocol instances {l′1, . . . , l′i} such that
each l′j has the dual role to lj and agrees with lj on paramsj and skj .
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In this case instance l1 is the TLS layer, l2 is a run of the EA proto-
col, and instances l3 . . . ln are runs of the LEA protocol. We establish in
Chapter 4 that EAs achieve OCA with the TLS layer, but that subsequent
runs of the protocol do not achieve OCA with each other. Unlike compound
authentication and ICA which both require a protocol run to establish a
shared secret, OCA requires a protocol run to establish an identity. Thus it
should be possible for a protocol that only establishes identities to achieve
OCA. The Bhargavan hypothesis suggests that for a composite protocol to
establish compound authentication properties it must use channel bindings
of a certain form, i.e. they must be contributive.
Informally a contributive channel binding is one which takes as input the
channel bindings of all previous layers, amongst other things. The channel
bindings of EAs only take as input the channel bindings of the TLS layer.
To achieve compound authentication of any form, we thus need to include,
at least, the channel bindings of all previous layers.
5.2.2 Use cases
LEAs have a number of potential use cases. For example, they could be
used to securely update pinned certificates. When a client remembers a
server’s certificate from one connection to the next, we say the client has
pinned the certificate. This can protect clients from threat models where an
attacker can obtain a fraudulently issued certificate. If a server’s certificate
changes unexpectedly, a client will refuse to connect, protecting them from
this attack.
Historically being able to obtain a mis-issued certificate was considered
the preserve of a nation-state level attacker, however with the rise in both
automated certificate provisioning and cloud based hosting, where many
servers share resources such as IP address, fraudulently obtaining certificates
has become easier.
Permanently pinning a certificate, however, is not practical, because
servers do sometimes need to update their certificates for a variety of rea-
sons, such as expiry or compromise. The method for updating a pinned
certificate requires letting the pin expire whilst deploying a new certificate,
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running multiple certificates with overlapping time-frames, to ensure that
clients who connect rarely aren’t locked out, and that there is never a point
where no certificate is pinned. This makes updating certificates a slow pro-
cess, which is problematic in the case of key compromise.
Using LEAs a server could explicitly update a pinned certificate at any
point, even under a threat model when an attacker can obtain certificates
fraudulently. A client could connect to a server supporting LEAs, using its
pinned certificate. The server could send their new certificate in an EA,
and then send a LEA authenticating their new certificate with their old
certificate, which the client has pinned. The client can see that the server
is jointly authorised as the owner of both certificates and can update its
pinned certificate. Because older layers are authenticated by newer layers
the LEA constitutes a proof that the owner of the old certificate created the
EA, and thus controls the new certificate.
For an attacker to successfully attack this they need to achieve a number
of things. First the attacker needs to compromise a TLS channel between
the client and the server, or persuade the client to connect to the attacker,
mis-identifying the attacker as the server. Because of the use of EAs these
are not the same case, because in the latter case the attacker is not able to in-
clude EAs created by the server. To successfully attack the latter scenario,
the attacker needs access to the server’s private key, because we are dis-
cussing the case where the client already has the server’s certificate pinned.
To successfully attack the former scenario the attacker needs to trick the
server into signing a fraudulent EA. Second, the attacker needs to fraudu-
lently obtain a certificate for the server. This could occur if a government
compelled a certificate authority to create such a certificate, or if they broke
into a certificate authority to create one secretly, as happened in the case
of DigiNotar.[1] However it could also happen through attackers exploiting
poorly configured or abandoned servers and automated certificate issuance
mechanisms to acquire such a certificate. Using LEAs raises the bar for an
attacker, whilst simplifying the requirements of the server. An attacker at
least needs to be able to acquire both a fraudulent certificate and the pri-
[1]https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-14789763
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vate key of a server to be able to fraudulently update a pin. A server who
needs to update their certificate suddenly, for example because of key com-
promise, doesn’t need to allow the pin on that certificate to expire. It can
simply update the certificate in the pin, providing a proof that it is jointly
authoritative over both. As long as the attacker hasn’t fraudulently acquired
a certificate and the server’s private key, this is secure.
A second use case is providing a mechanism proving that an EA has
been accepted. Currently there is no TLS layer mechanism for establish-
ing whether or not a certificate, whether part of an EA or part of a post-
handshake authentication flow, has been accepted. By cryptographically
signing an EA that has been accepted, an actor can prove to its peer that
the certificate has been accepted.
A third use case, which we will consider in future work, is to re-establish
a chain of authentication across a resumption. Recall that if a client and
server establish a TLS connection, and establish a number of EAs over the
channel, and then perform a resumption, they must re-create all the EAs
from the previous session if they wish to use them, i.e. EAs are not valid over
a resumption. If they create an LEA binding to the last LEA in the chain
of the previous session they could prove that they believed all the EAs from
the prior connection were still valid. If both parties can agree that all prior
EAs are still valid they do not need to re-create them for the new channel.
This relies on the PSK remaining confidential, which, depending on the use
case, may be an acceptable security / convenience trade-off. Our work does
not cover this use case, but we plan to study it in future work.
5.2.3 Extensions
In both TLS and EA in nearly every message there is an “extensions” field,
which contains a list of extensions. Extensions are additional pieces of data
that can be added to a message to define some extra functionality. Extensions
are defined in RFCs, and lists of extensions and the messages in which they
can be used are maintained by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
(IANA) [NSS18]. IANA is the organisation that coordinates various parts of
the global internet, and in particular they maintain lists of unique codes used
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by protocols. This stops multiple protocols, and in our case extensions, using
the same values for signalling their type, helping prevent miscommunication.
Extensions are usually defined for multiple messages and form a request-
response pattern, although sometimes they are simply indicators. For exam-
ple the client can send the server name extension to tell the server the name
of the server it thinks it is contacting.
Some extensions are mandatory to implement in the absence of a spe-
cific application profile standard specifying otherwise, making them nearly
ubiquitous. For example the Key Share extension, which carries the DH key
shares in the ClientHello and ServerHello messages, is mandatory to im-
plement, and required in every mode other than the PSK-only mode. Other
extensions are entirely optional, and only supported when necessary.
Because the extensions field is already present in many messages, we can
add the extra functionality provided by extensions without any changes to
the underlying protocols. The use of extensions prevents fragmentation of
the ecosystem into hundreds of different incompatible variants of a protocol
each with slightly different functionality.
In early drafts of the TLS 1.3 standard a server was not allowed to send
an extension that had not first appeared in the ClientHello, and a client
receiving such an extension was required to abort the connection [Res16,
pp. 34-35]. However in the final specification this requirement was changed.
The requirement is now that if an actor receives the “response” part of an
extension for which it didn’t send the corresponding “request” then it must
abort [RFC8446, p. 36]. This gives the server more flexibility. This change
becomes important in Chapter 6.
5.3 Layered Exported Authenticators
Layered EAs were proposed to the IETF in draft-hoyland [Hoy18b] and
presented to TLS WG at the IETF 102 meeting. We include draft-hoyland
in Appendix B. The draft proposes adding an extension to the Certificate
and CertificateRequest messages in the EA flows, see Section 4.3. The
extension contains a reference to an EA that had previously been sent on
the channel, which we will refer to as the requested binding, to differentiate
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it from the requested certificate. A CertificateRequest containing this
extension would be requesting two things, (1) that the responder validate
in some way the requested binding, and (2) that the responder fulfil the
request as normal.
If the responder includes the requested binding in the Certificate then
it indicates that the responder believes the requested binding, i.e. the pre-
vious EA, was authentic. The aim is to achieve OCA between EAs. The
draft’s proposal is shown in Figure 5.1.
struct {
opaque prev_certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>;
opaque binding[Hash.length];
} LayeredEA;
Figure 5.1: LayeredEA definition from [Hoy18b, p. 3]. The [Hash.length]
notation indicates that the binding field has the same number of bits as the
hash function associated with the underlying TLS connection.
The prev certificate request context is the certificate request
context of the requested binding. The binding is the Finished message of
the requested binding.
The intention is that this extension constitutes a channel binding of the
requested binding. If the responder includes the extension in the Certificate
then both sides have agreed to this channel binding. Because the Finished
message of an EA is a transcript hash, if the recipient of an EA can validate
the Finished message then it knows that both sides agree, amongst other
things, on the CRC, and the Finished message. By including this extension
in the Certificate message the responder is claiming that they believe the
EA referred to by the requested binding is valid. Because extensions, such
as the one we propose, are included in the CertificateVerify message, in
creating the CertificateVerify the respondent signs the requested bind-
ing with the certificate contained in the EA. This relationship is highlighted
in Figure 5.2.
As can be seen in Figure 5.2b, the authentication property only goes
from EA2 to EA1, i.e. the later EA authenticates the earlier EA, but not
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TLS
EA1
EA2
(a) The TLS channel authenticates
both EAs, and each EA authenticates
the TLS channel, but neither EA au-
thenticates the other.
TLS
EA1 EA2
(b) The TLS channel authenticates
both EAs, and each EA authenticates
the TLS channel, and EA2 authenti-
cates EA1.
Figure 5.2: Compound Authentication in Exported Authenticators vs Lay-
ered Exported Authenticators.
vice versa. This is in line with our definition of OCA, because EAs do not
establish secrets they can only authenticate older EAs, and not future EAs.
As we proved via a counter-example in Section 4.7.4, EAs sent on the
same channel do not authenticate each other.[2]
5.4 LEAs under the Bhargavan framework
We here consider the authentication properties of LEAs under the Bharga-
van et al. framework [BDP15]. The analysis proceeds very similarly to the
analysis of EAs in Section 4.4.6, we simply have to adjust the params of
LEAs in order to account for the different channel binding.
Consider a channel, t, on which an EA, EA1, has already been sent.
The parameters, params2, of the second EA, EA2, are slightly different to
those of EA1 in this case, specifically cbin, highlighted in red, changes. The
cbin in this case is no longer the channel binging of the TLS channel, i.e.
exporter_master_secret, but the requested binding.
[2]An attacker who can compromise a TLS channel could send an illegitimate EA, and
later, legitimate EAs would be accepted.
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Alice Bob
EA1
EA2
(a) Alice first sends EA1, and then
EA2, which she binds to EA1. When
Bob receives EA2 he knows (1) that
Alice claims to own the certificate in
EA2, and (2) that Alice claims to own
the certificate in EA1.
Alice Bob
EA1
EA2
(b) Alice sends EA1, and then Bob
sends EA2, which he binds to EA1.
When Alice receives EA2 she knows
(1) that Bob claims to own the certifi-
cate in EA2, and (2) that Bob claims
that EA1 is valid.
Figure 5.3: Self-self bindings vs self-peer bindings
params2 = (ci, cr, sid, cb, cbin)
where
ci := ⊥,
cr := Certr2 ,
sid := certificate request context,
cb := EA2,
cbin := requested binding
The property we want to prove has two cases, illustrated in Figure 5.3,
depending on whether the requested binding refers to an EA created by
the recipient of the new EA, or by the author’s peer. If the peer signs a
certificate that it created, it is claiming that it controls both certificates. If
the peer signs a certificate it didn’t create, then it is claiming that it received
the referenced EA, and that the referenced EA passed its validation checks.
Consider an actor, A, receives an EA, EA2, of this type, i.e. one that is
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linked to an EA, EA1, which the peer, p, claims was authored by A. If A
does not recognise EA1, then it must reject EA2. If A accepts EA2 the peer
can know that A also believes EA1 is valid.
[3]
Property 5.4.1. OCA of an EA layer with an EA layer created by the
peer (using Definition 4.4.3). If an actor, a, with instances {l1, . . . , li}
receives an EA, EAp, in layer li, and EAp is bound to an EA, EAm,
received by a in layer lj such that j < i, and the attacker does not
know the private key of the certificate in EAp, i.e. li has an honest peer
credential, then there exists an actor b with instances {l′1, . . . , l′i}, such
that each l′k has the dual role to lk and agrees with lk on paramsk and
skk. Specifically b owns the peer credential in li and b generated EAm.
Property 5.4.2. OCA of an EA layer with an EA layer created by the
actor (using Definition 4.4.3). If an actor, a, with instances {l1, . . . , li}
receives an EA, EAp, in layer li and EAp is bound to a prior EA, EAm,
sent by a in layer lj such that j < i, and the attacker does not know the
private key of the certificate in EAp, i.e. li has an honest peer credential,
then there exists an actor b with instances {l′1, . . . , l′i}, such that each l′k
has the dual role to lk and agrees with lk on paramsk and skk. Specif-
ically b owns the certificate in EAp and b received EAm in layer lj and
believes EAm is valid.
An LEA may be linked to an ordinary EA, but it might also be linked
to another LEA, forming a chain. To prove that LEAs constitute a secure
composite authentication protocol we need to show two things.
1. That EA2 ← requested binding, i.e. that EA2 is dependent on the
requested binding in such a way that if the recipient of the EA accepts
EA2 then the signer and recipient both agree on the requested binding.
[3]Because of the two generals’ problem, both parties cannot simultaneously be sure that
their last acceptance was accepted.
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2. That EA2 has OCA with all EAs in the chain. According to Bharga-
van hypothesis[4] this can be achieved by showing the requested bind-
ing constitutes a contributive channel binding over all the EAs in the
chain.
We recall the definition of a contributive channel binding.
Definition 4.4.7. Contributive Channel Bindings (Definition taken
from Bhargavan et al. [BDP15, p. 10]). If a compound authentication
protocol consists of n protocol instances {l1, . . . , ln}, the channel bind-
ing of ln must be bound to the parameters and session secrets of all n
instances {params1, sk1, . . . , paramsn, skn}, so that agreement on the
channel binding guarantees compound authentication for the composite
protocol.
By linking multiple EAs into a chain we can produce a composite au-
thentication protocol of arbitrary depth, so we need to show that the re-
quested binding is dependent on all the previous layers. The base layer is
always the TLS channel, so the requested binding needs to be dependent
on the master secret of the TLS channel. Because the Finished message is
an HMAC keyed with an exporter from the TLS channel this dependency is
met, only someone who knows the exporter key can generate (or validate)
the Finished message. This is what allows the TLS channel to authenticate
EAs, even though they have yet to be produced.
No other layer generates secrets and so the requested binding is vacuously
dependent on sk2 . . . skn.
[5]
[4]See Section 4.4.10 for a full description of the Bhargavan hypothesis.
[5]Alternatively, we could say the EAs themselves are secret, in as much as an at-
tacker cannot predict them. Thus the binding would have to be dependent on the
CertificateVerify messages. The Finished messages are, by construction, dependent
on the CertificateVerify messages.
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Because params are defined to be public values we simply need to create
a dependency on the params of the requested binding to create a dependency
on the full chain. The params of the requested binding include a cbin which
is dependent on the EA referenced in the requested binding, i.e. the re-
quested binding of the requested binding, or the exporter master secret,
depending on whether the requested binding refers to an LEA or an EA re-
spectively. Secret values, i.e. sk, need to be explicitly included every time to
prove that the author still has access to the secret value, with public values,
the author only needs to ensure the recipient agrees on the values, thus an
inductive agreement property suffices. The Finished message portion of the
requested binding includes all the params as part of the transcript hash, and
thus is dependent on all the params, including the cbin.
5.4.1 Development of draft-sullivan and draft-hoyland
Before draft-hoyland was formally proposed to the IETF work was done
in collaboration with the authors of draft-sullivan and HTTP/2.[6] The
initial proposal was to use a technique called “CRC smuggling”, where the
requested binding was packed into the CRC, along with a fresh value that
provided the security of the CRC. This technique meant that LEAs could be
implemented without changes to draft-sullivan. However as of the fifth
draft of draft-sullivan [Sul17], spontaneous certificates did not include
a CRC. This meant that one could not create a reference to a spontaneous
EA. However this was one of the most likely use cases, a server sending a
number of joint authentications to the client at the start of a connection.
In the sixth draft of draft-sullivan [Sul18b] the spontaneous certifi-
cate flow was changed such that the CRC could be arbitrary, as opposed
to blank. This meant that a server that wished to use LEAs could simply
include a CRC in all spontaneous certificates it might wish to bind to.
However, the CRC smuggling approach still had a problem. How would
the recipient of an EA know whether the peer was aware of LEAs? The CRC
smuggling proposal therefore suggested a simple transformation of the CRC
in the response, to indicate that the author was aware of LEAs.
[6]Thanks to Nick Sullivan and Martin Thompson
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This was considered an overly complex solution, and meant that im-
plementations of LEA would be non-compliant with draft-sullivan, thus
the decision was taken to instead add a new LayeredEA extension to the
CertificateRequest and Certificate messages. The TLS specification
requires that both clients and servers ignore unrecognised extensions. Thus
a respondent who was aware of EAs but not LEAs, would simply ignore the
extension. An author who was aware of LEAs would echo the extension back
in the Certificate message.
This still left some unresolved issues.
1. A server who sent a number of linked certificates could not determine
if the client understood or accepted the binding.
2. Because a server might always choose to use the same CRC in a spon-
taneous EA[7], a client could not distinguish between a replay attack
and an honest server legitimately creating the same EA twice. An EA
has no other source of randomness, within the context of a single TLS
session, other than the CRC, so if given the same stimulating event,
it may send the exact same EA.
3. A misbehaving or poorly implemented server might simply echo the
extension back, rather than correctly ignoring it. This is particularly
a risk in the case where a CDN is being employed. If the origin server,
rather than giving its keys to the CDN, is simply signing blobs sent to
it by the CDN, the origin server might sign a LEA even if it doesn’t
recognise the extension let alone the requested binding.
We discuss each of these issues in turn. Issue 1 is very similar to the
mismatch issue in our TLS 1.3 analysis, see Section 3.5.2. In TLS 1.3 the
client is never sure if the server has accepted his certificate, because there
is no explicit acceptance signalling mechanism. In this case the issue occurs
in the reverse. Because the client has no acceptance signalling mechanism,
the server doesn’t even know if the client has accepted the EA, let alone
understood or processed the binding. The server can only know if the client
[7]Recall that until draft six of draft-sullivan this was compliant behaviour
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has accepted its binding if the client binds to them in turn. To achieve this,
the server would need to send a layered CertificateRequest to the client,
with a requested binding to the last LEA the server sent. If it receives a
bound response the server knows the client accepted all the certificates in
the chain. This in effect becomes a signalling mechanism, and is a potential
use case for LEAs.
Issue 2 was resolved by requiring that LEAs with duplicate certificate re-
quest contexts be rejected. We could thus ensure that an honest client would
never accept the same LEA twice. Whilst a server might create the same
spontaneous EA twice, by rejecting spontaneous certificates with the same
certificate request, an honest client would never accept a repeated certifi-
cate. After discussion with the authors of draft-sullivan at the IETF 102
meeting, the seventh draft of draft-sullivan [Sul18a] required an honest
server to never reuse a CRC for EAs on a given channel. A client still needs
to maintain a list of EAs sent on a channel, or at least their certificate re-
quest contexts, to ensure freshness, because the spontaneous flow is a single
message protocol, so nonces cannot ensure freshness in the usual way. How-
ever, because the scope within which nonces must be unique is restricted to
a single TLS session, this is a viable approach.
Issue 3 was raised in discussions at the IETF 102 meeting. Because for-
mal analysis generally does not consider misbehaving actors this was a par-
ticularly useful contribution.[8] The suggested resolution was to limit the
request to the first half of the Finished message, and require the responder
to include the second half. Although we treat the Finished message as an
atomic symbol in practice it is the bit-string output of a hash function. A
server that simply returns all extensions would return the first half of the
Finished message, not the second. If two EAs had the same prefix this
would introduce an ambiguity. However, because the hash function with the
smallest output offered by TLS 1.3 is 256 bits [Res18, p. 131], it is infeasible
to find a collision even on half of the hash output.[9] Although this requires
the server to at least minimally process the extension, and to prove that it
[8]Thanks to Eric Rescorla for pointing this out.
[9]Specifically a 2−128 chance. This is not derivable from the properties we describe on
hash functions, but stems from properties of well behaved hash functions like diffusion.
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has a record of the previous hash, it doesn’t obviously solve the problem
caused by a misbehaving CDN treating the origin server as a signing oracle.
Further analysis of this tweak is left for future work. An alternative proposal,
enabled by the uniqueness of CRCs, was to simply include the CRC in the
CertificateRequest, and the Finished in the Certificate. This has the
advantage of an actor being able to request a chain of LEAs without having
to wait to receive each LEA, and its attendant Finished message, before
being able to request the next one. Analysis of this suggestion is also left to
future work, but we note that this still establishes agreement on the channel
binding, as the Finished message is dependent on the CRC, so even though
the CRC is not included explicitly in the response, the requester can be sure
that the sender agrees on its value.
5.4.2 Achieving full compound authentication between EAs
It is interesting to note that it is possible to achieve full compound authen-
tication in this design by requiring the author of the EA to sign an EA with
the private key of every EA it authored in the chain for each new EA it
creates. This effectively creates a “secret” value, i.e. the chain of signatures,
which cannot be guessed by the attacker in advance, and then immediately
publishes it. Whilst this method might be theoretically interesting, it is not
practical. The signing operation is expensive to compute, and the signature
is large, making the EA difficult both to construct and to validate. Further
this would require a change to the structure of the EA message, adding ex-
tra Certificate and CertificateVerify messages. Finally, in practice a
TLS server might not have continuous access to the private keys of certifi-
cates, for example a CDN might not have direct access to the private keys
of the origin server. The origin server might perform signing operations as
necessary and pass them back to the CDN.
5.5 Authentication forests
Because at any time either party can initiate a request, and the server can
send spontaneous certificates the parties may not agree on the order that
they saw various EAs. When EAs are not linked this is not problematic,
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because one EA can not affect the authentication status of another. However
when building a chain of authentication this is more problematic.
If both parties are trying to build a single chain, and two requests pass
each other in mid-flight then at least one party will have to make their
request a second time to bind the response into the chain. Consider a TLS
channel, t, on which an EA, EA1, has been established. Let the server and
client both send a layered request binding to EA1, R
EA1
S , R
EA1
C , respectively.
If both parties respond the authentication tree forks, with EARS and EARC
binding to EA1. To construct a single chain one party, for example the client,
then must remake its request to bind to the new EA, R
EARS
C2 , and the server
must recompute its response, EARC2 .
We propose two mechanisms by which such clashes can be resolved with-
out either side having to compute an extra authenticator.
1. Separate the client and server LEAs into two distinct chains.
2. Require that the server EA always be placed first on the chain.
By separating the authentication chains of the client and the server we
avoid any ordering issues where two EAs pass each other mid-flight. Each
actor maintains the order of its own LEAs, and thus no excess LEAs are
ever computed. This approach has a number of drawbacks.
1. If a client request and spontaneous server certificate cross in mid-flight
the client still needs to re-request the certificate, although no extra
computations are done by the server, it can simply ignore the request.
2. Neither party gets any confirmation that its EAs are being accepted.
One of the advantages of LEAs is that the actor knows whether the
peer has validated its EAs.
The second approach requires both sides to fulfil all requests before mak-
ing one of their own, and further that the client remake any request if it
receives a request between making a request and receiving a response. This
approach also has drawbacks.
1. The server can prevent the client from ever successfully making a re-
quest.
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2. Both parties could potentially spend a lot of time waiting.
An alternative to both these approaches is to accept authentication
forests. By viewing authentication properties not as chains, but as trees, with
each ordinary EA forming the root of a new tree, creating a forest. This al-
lows for either party to construct highly complex authentication properties.
These may have uses in complex CDN set-ups, where a CDN is authorised
to act for multiple groups of servers, but not for all servers together.
5.6 Tamarin model
LEAs are simply EAs with an extra extension. We therefore simply extend
our EA model from Chapter 4. Whilst the changes ‘on the wire’ are minimal,
the only difference being an extra extension is added to the list, the client
and server logic become notably more complex. The guarantees we require
are also more complex.
5.6.1 Protocol changes
Our EA model treats the extension field as a ‘blob’, i.e. a field with no spe-
cific meaning. Specifically we declare a static public value $certificate
extensions. This is a fault-preserving simplification, assuming that exten-
sions are not dependent on secret values. For example if an extension in-
cluded the master secret as a parameter, modelling it as a static public
value would not detect the mistake. However given that new extensions can
be defined we assume some general unspecified notion of well-behaved-ness
of extensions.
To extend our model to capture LEAs we redefine the certificate exten-
sions to be a pair[10]:
1 <$certificate_extensions,
2 <prev_certificate_request_context,
3 prev_Finished>
4 >
[10]Lightly edited for clarity.
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Because Tamarin implicitly types variables in rewrite rules, this change
does not make the EA model incompatible with the LEA model. If we were
to use the rules of the EA model for the server and the rules for the LEA
model for the client, the models should still interact correctly. An actor that
was not aware of this change would simply continue to treat the certificate
extensions as a blob, correctly ignoring the extension it didn’t understand.
5.6.2 Processing logic
To process the LEA variant we must duplicate all the processing rules, to
allow for processing a LEA and an ordinary EA. This is necessary because
to send a LEA there must either be a earlier LEA or an EA for it to bind
to. Thus all the rules for EAs must remain in place to be able to run the
layered section of the protocol. We split the rules into “free” and “bound”
versions, to indicate whether they deal with EAs or LEAs respectively.
The extra processing logic we require is as follows:
1. We need to remember past authenticators and past bindings, such that
we can reference them in future LEAs and requests.
2. We need a mechanism for deciding to request a binding.
3. We need to verify that requested bindings are in memory before signing
them.
4. We need to be able to validate layered responses.
Remembering EAs and bindings
Only the first of these affects the “free” rules.
We extend the “free” rules to output a fact that acts as a reference to
an EA that we call an EA handle.
The handle we use for server rules is as follows.
!EA_HandleS(~ea_id, ~sid, certificate_request_context,
Finished)↪→
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We provide a sample rule using this fact in Figure 5.4. The rule is pre-
fixed with a !, indicating to Tamarin that the fact is persistent, i.e. that it
shouldn’t be consumed on use. This allows an actor to reference a previous
EA multiple times, allowing for a tree of authentication properties.
The ~ea_id is a unique number used internally by the actor to reference
the EA. Although the CRC is supposed to be a unique reference number for
an EA because it is at least sometimes chosen by the peer an actor cannot
be sure it is unique. A misbehaving or malicious peer could be duplicating
CRCs, or an attacker could be inserting extra EAs into the channel. The
Finished message is unique for a given transcript, however a misbehaving
server might send the same spontaneous certificate twice, and thus a client
cannot be sure that a given Finished message is unique without comparing
it to all previous Finished messages. By using a number generated internally
an actor can be sure the reference is unique, as indicated by the ~-prefix.
As in both the TLS and EA models, the ~sid indicates the server’s
thread ID. The certificate request context and Finished fields capture
the information needed for a requested binding.
For the “bound” rules we need the EA handle, but we also need to add
facts for remembering bindings.
!EA_Binding(~ea_id, ~prev_ea_id, ~sid, ms, Finished, binding,
'local')↪→
As in the EA handle fact, the EA binding fact is persistent. The binding
fact contains the ea id of both the current EA and the previous EA.
The binding fact also contains the master secret, ms, to simplify the
lemma writing. Although the master secret is included in the Finished and
binding arguments, having it separated out into an argument allows it to
be referred to directly.
The binding argument is the previous Finished message, assigned a
different name to prevent a name clash with the Prev Finished in the cer-
tificate extensions.
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The final parameter is the place where the binding was generated. If the
actor performed the binding this value is set to ‘local’. If the peer performed
the binding this value is set to ‘remote’. Figure 5.4 shows the S Send Bound
rule that outputs this fact.
Requesting a binding
To minimise restrictions on the usage of LEAs, we simply allow the actor to
bind to any EA in its memory, i.e. for which it has an EA handle.
Verification of LEA requests
When an actor receives a request before it sends a response it needs to
ensure that the requested binding is valid. By only producing EA handle
facts (1) after a received EA has been validated, or (2) when an EA is
created by the actor, the simple presence of an EA handle in memory[11] is a
sufficient check. This corresponds to the two potential meanings of a LEA,
that the requested binding refers either to an EA that the actor accepted,
or that the actor created. In Figure 5.4 we show a bound server send rule.
The server requires an EA Handle fact from the environment (line 14), and
creates a new EA Handle fact for the newly created EA (line 34).
Verification of LEAs
When receiving a LEA, simply consuming the relevant !EA Handle fact is
sufficient. If the fact is in memory it means that the actor considers the
referenced EA valid. This follows the same logic as EA requests.
5.7 Proving the model
In this section we discuss the process of proving properties of our model.
We prove a partial result about LEAs, proving that in most cases LEAs
authenticate the EA they are bound to. The case that does not prove is in
fact one we do not expect to hold. In particular, if an actor binds an LEA to
an EA that it previously received it does not learn anything new about the
[11]Note that although the bag of facts is global, including the tid in the handle gives
each actor a disjoint memory space.
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1 rule S_Send_Bound:
2 let
3 binding = prev_Finished
4 certificate=pk(ltkA)
5 signature=compute_signature(ltkA, h(hccs, CertificateRequestB,
CertificateB))↪→
6 verify_data = hmac(fms, <hccs, CertificateRequestB,
CertificateB, CertificateVerify>)↪→
7 in
8 [ State(~sid, 'S1', $S, $C, 'server', auth_status)
9 , !StateInvS(~sid, cid, ms, $C, $S, 'server', certC, certS)
10 , PendingReqR(~request_id, ~sid, $S, $C, 'server',
CertificateRequestB)↪→
11 , !PendingReqRSBInvariant(~request_id, ~sid, $S, $C,
CertificateRequestB)↪→
12 , !ExportersS(ms, 'server', ~sid, hccc, hccs, fmc, fms)
13 , !Ltk($A, ltkA)
14 , !EA_HandleS(~prev_ea_id, ~sid, p_crc, binding)
15 , DelegateLtk($S, ltkA)
16 , Fr(~msg_id)
17 , Fr(~ea_id)
18 ]
19 --[ S_Send(~sid)
20 , Owns(S, ms, 'server', <$A, pk(ltkA)>)
21 , Instance(~sid, $S, $C, 'server')
22 , Source_In(~sid, ms, crc)
23 , Source_In(~sid, ms, p_crc)
24 , Source_In(~sid, ms, binding)
25 , Source_Out(~sid, ms, Finished)
26 , Fulfil(~sid, $S, $C, ms, 'server', crc, <$A, pk(ltkA)>)
27 , FulfilB(~sid, $S, $C, ms, 'server', crc, <$A, pk(ltkA)>,
binding)↪→
28 , Bind(~ea_id, ~prev_ea_id, ~sid, ms, Finished, binding,
'local')↪→
29 , Finished_In(~prev_ea_id, ~sid, ms, p_crc, binding)
30 , Valid_Finished(~ea_id, ~sid, ms, crc, Finished, 'local')
31 ]->
32 [ State(~sid, 'S1', $S, $C, 'server', auth_status)
33 , TLS_Send(~msg_id, ~sid, $S, $C, <CertificateB,
CertificateVerify, Finished>)↪→
34 , !EA_HandleS(~ea_id, ~sid, crc, Finished)
35 , !EA_Binding(~ea_id, ~prev_ea_id, ~sid, ms, Finished, binding,
'local')↪→
36 ]
Figure 5.4: The S Send Bound transition. The lines marked in black (9, 11)
highlight invariant shortcuts, see Section 5.7.2 Experiment #9. The lines
marked in red (14, 34-35) highlight memory facts, see Section 5.6.2. The lines
marked in blue (22-25) highlight source actions, see Section 5.7.2 Experiment
#10.
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validity of the received EA. Although we do not expect this case to hold,
that it does not makes it challenging to reason about the security of LEAs
inductively. We thus prove a partial result, showing that, where expected,
LEAs authenticate the EA they reference.
Even proving this partial result tests the limits of Tamarin. The arbi-
trarily deep layering of LEAs gives Tamarin difficulties. We discuss at length
the internal mechanisms of Tamarin that struggle, before describing how we
model the protocol, allowing us to prove the results we do achieve.
5.7.1 Source resolution in Tamarin
One of the difficulties we faced in building our LEA model was simply getting
the model to load in Tamarin. Specifically we had issues with the way the
Tamarin pre-loader determines where specific values could have come from.
Whilst performing a backwards search Tamarin looks at the facts in the
desired end state and attempts to reason about where they could have come
from. To do this it enumerates the rules which output those facts. It then
selects a rule that produces a given fact and replaces the fact with the inputs
or preconditions to the selected rule. It proceeds on this basis until it reaches
an impossible state, i.e. one where no possible rule could be applied[12], or it
arrives at the empty state, i.e. it has found a sequence of rules that, starting
from the empty state, reach the desired state. Because of the way lemmas
are commonly written, generally if Tamarin can prove a state unreachable
then the lemma is proven, and if Tamarin reaches the empty state then the
trace is a counter-example.
To make the backwards search more efficient Tamarin pre-computes all
the potential sources of each fact. This pre-computation step allows Tamarin
to exclude many impossible traces from consideration. By applying some
heuristics Tamarin is usually able to resolve all sources in the model[13],
however, in some cases Tamarin’s heuristics fail, and some sources remain
[12]If no rule can be applied in backwards search, then from a forwards search perspective,
the state is unreachable.
[13]A resolved source is roughly one in which Tamarin can fully derive where everything
came from. Often a single fact will have many sources, each fully unrolled to the empty
state.
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unresolved, these cases are said to have partial deconstructions. Cases where
all sources have been resolved are said to have complete deconstructions.
These unresolved sources dramatically increase the difficulty of proving,
even in the human-guided prover, because they introduce many spurious
cases that must be shown impossible. We describe a case as spurious if we
can easily derive from meta-reasoning that it must be impossible without
proving properties about it in Tamarin. For example Tamarin might not be
able to exclude the possibility that an honest actor uses its key as a public
nonce during the precomputation phase. In the case of our LEA model these
spurious cases number in the hundreds for each proof, rendering a manual
proof infeasibly time consuming. Further, because some unresolved sources
may have cyclic dependencies, some spurious branches may be insoluble.
Usually these hard-to-resolve sources revolve around actions performed
by the attacker. We illustrate the problem with our running example of the
Needham Schroeder protocol, or rather with the Lowe variant.[14] This is
the protocol used in the Tamarin manual [TAMARIN], and we reuse their
example code, providing a fuller exposition of the functioning of Tamarin’s
internal mechanisms.[15]
One of the properties achieved by the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol
is nonce secrecy. By this we mean that an attacker who does not reveal the
LTKs of the participants cannot learn the values of the nonces.
When loading the model Tamarin looks for all potential sources of knowl-
edge for an attacker. If we load the protocol model Tamarin tells us that there
are twelve sources with partial deconstructions. These all revolve around the
attacker’s !KU fact. The !KU fact is a special fact, that signals that the at-
tacker has learned something new, e.g. !KU(ltk) indicates that the attacker
has learned ltk.
The attacker’s rules for deriving information from messages are split
into two sets, those that operate on !KU facts, called K up rules, and those
that operate on !KD facts, called K down rules. K up rules construct new
[14]Although the issue occurs in both variants the Lowe variant is easier to work with. In
the non-Lowe variant Tamarin can find the attack even without resolving all the sources.
In the Lowe variant Tamarin simply cannot decide the protocol one way or the other.
[15]We reproduce the code of their example in full in Appendix C.
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objects from previously known objects, whereas K down rules deconstruct
previously known objects, to learn their components. This split is used to
prevent Tamarin considering traces where an attacker repeatedly constructs
and then deconstructs the same object. This is achieved by requiring all K
down rules to come before all K up rules. There is a special rule, coerce, see
Figure 5.6b, that transforms a !KD fact into a !KU fact, but no rules that
perform the opposite transformation.
In Figure 5.5 we see one of the partial deconstructions. We will describe
this figure over the next few paragraphs. We enlarge portions of the figure
in Figure 5.6. In this figure Tamarin is attempting to derive all places an
attacker could derive some new piece of knowledge, i.e. solving for !KU facts.
In this case, the attacker learns the responders nonce from the initiators
second message.
For the deconstruction of a source to be complete Tamarin must be able
to show that every antecedent can be unrolled until it reaches the empty
set. Tamarin’s heuristics stop it unrolling the same rule twice, to prevent it
looping on cyclic derivations. The simplest way for Tamarin to show that a
source can be fully unrolled is to unroll the antecedents until they reach the
empty set. However Tamarin does not always need to fully unroll every rule.
The Fr fact is always available, for example, so Tamarin can stop unrolling
when it reaches a Fr rule, and know that it can be unrolled to the empty
set.
As we can see in Figure 5.5 there are two !KU facts that haven’t been un-
rolled.[16] A fact that hasn’t been unrolled is marked with an oval, whereas
unrolled rules are marked with rectangular boxes. Unrolled rules have three
layers, along the top are the antecedent facts, in the middle are the actions,
marked with a symbolic time, and on the bottom are the consequent facts.
Tamarin uses backwards search, so these diagrams are read from the bottom
upwards. Solid arrows indicate the direct sources of facts, and dotted arrows
indicate unrolled facts that must precede a given rule.[17] For example, the
rule at time #vr.10, see Figure 5.6c, shows the attacker decrypting a mes-
[16]These facts are enlarged in Figures 5.6d and 5.6e.
[17]Tamarin can also have actions that it knows must precede a given rule, although there
are none in this example.
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(a) The I 2 rule captures the Initiator receiving a message from the Responder,
and replying in turn.
(b) The coerce rule
tranforms a !KD fact
into a !KU fact.
(c) The decrypt rule is a K down rule, breaking a large
encrypted message, into it’s constituent components.
(d) This unrolled !KU fact has type !KU(~t.1).
(e) This unrolled !KU fact has type !KU(aenc(t.1, t.2)).
Figure 5.6: Enlarged rules
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sage. Tamarin knows that at some point the attacker must have learnt the
key to decrypt the message. Thus even though it doesn’t know when, where,
or how the attacker learns the key, Tamarin draws a dotted arrow from the
point where the attacker learns the value (through a !KU fact) to where the
attacker uses the value.
As we mentioned previously Tamarin can determine a source can be
unrolled by unrolling it, however Tamarin can also use inductive reasoning to
determine that a source can be unrolled to the empty state. When searching
for the sources of all !KU(~t.1) facts, for each case Tamarin can either show
that !KU(~t.1) can be reached without preconditions, or show that it can
be reached if some other !KU(~t.1) fact can be reached. Assuming there
is at least one case that can be reached without preconditions, cases with
a dependency on an older !KU(~t.1) fact can be reached.[18] Thus when
Tamarin is sourcing !KU(~t.1) and it reaches a !KU rule with arguments of
the same type[19] it can apply the inductive hypothesis, and stop unrolling.
This makes Tamarin’s heuristic of unrolling until it reaches the same
rule very effective in general. However, as we can see in our case, when
Tamarin reaches a !KU rule with a different type it also stops unrolling. In
this case we have a !KU rule at time #vk.9, see Figure 5.6e, which takes an
argument of type aenc(t.1, t.2) as opposed to ~t.1. Thus Tamarin stops
unrolling, but cannot apply the inductive hypothesis, and thus cannot be
sure that every antecedent unrolls to the empty state. This gives us a partial
deconstruction.
Partial deconstruction are problematic because it means Tamarin can-
not derive any restrictions on the data the attacker learns. In our example
Tamarin cannot derive any restrictions on what the value of nr.7 might be.
nr.7 appears in the unrolled !KU fact at #vk.9, and passes through the blue
isend rule, which indicates the attacker sending a message. This message is
passed on to the I 2 rule, shown in Figure 5.6a. The I 2 rule represents the
[18]In this instance, an attacker can, without preconditions, learn a fresh value from a
!KU(~t.1) fact, thus the base case is trivial.
[19]!KU rules with arguments of a different type can be considered overloaded rules, i.e.
although they have the same name, because they have a different type, they are different
rules.
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initiator receiving the responder’s {nA, nB, B}pk(ltkA) message and sending
its response. In this case nr.7 represents the responder’s nonce, nB.
Though it is intended to be a nonce, there might be some complex in-
teraction of rules that cause an honest actor to use some other value. If,
for example, the attacker could trick the responder into using the private
portion of their LTK as the nonce the attacker could learn their private key.
This means that every time we wish to prove the attacker has not learned
an actor’s LTK we must prove that it was never used as a respondent’s
nonce. If the attacker can acquire a message that appears to come from
the responder in which the respondent uses the key as its nonce, then the
initiator will repeat this value, potentially allowing the attacker to learn it.
Because Tamarin uses backwards search it will look for the source of this
responder message, and find two possible sources.
1. Either the responder sent it, or
2. the attacker knows the responder’s secret key, and constructed the
message.
We can exclude the first of these possibilities, as the respondent always
chooses a fresh value for its nonce, but we must consider the second case.
Because our nonce secrecy lemma requires that the attacker not perform a
key revelation, Tamarin looks for other places the attacker might have learnt
the key. However, as we have just shown, Tamarin believes that the attacker
can learn keys from the initiator’s second message. This creates an infinite
chain of key derivations, where Tamarin decrypts a key using a key it learned
earlier, which it learned using an even earlier key, and so on. From a forward
search perspective it is clear that the attacker cannot learn anything new
from this chain. For the attacker to create a message containing the key it
must have already known the key. Thus it must have already learned the
key from some other source.
To solve this problem Tamarin introduces source lemmas. Source lemmas
are provided by the modeller and give hints to Tamarin’s pre-computation
step that allow it to resolve complex sources. Tamarin divides the pre-
computation step into three phases:
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1. Tamarin resolves all the sources it can, producing a set of sources
called the raw sources, potentially with partial deconstructions.
2. Tamarin then attempts to automatically discharge any source lemmas
using induction.
3. Tamarin applies the source lemmas to the raw sources, producing a
new set of sources called the refined sources.
A source lemma might prove that all traces for a given rule, a are pre-
ceded by some action (or set of actions) b. Any raw source that contains a,
but does not have b as a possible precursor is thus excluded as impossible.
This can exclude sources both with partial deconstructions and complete
deconstructions. The goal is to construct source lemmas such that we can
exclude as impossible all partial deconstructions.
In Figure 5.7 we show a fragment of the source lemma Meier uses in his
Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol model. This lemma states that either the
attacker knows the nonce before the initiator receives it and thus that the
attacker cannot learn the nonce from the initiators message, or the message
was sent by an honest actor. Looking at Figure 5.5 we can see that this will
split the partial deconstruction into two cases around the I 2 rule, which
contains the IN_I_2_nr(nr, m2) action.
The first is where the attacker knows nr.7 before it sends the message
to the initiator. Although a multi-set allows duplicates, Tamarin will not
consider traces where an attacker learns a fact it has already learnt. This
allows Tamarin to discount this trace.
The second is where the message was honestly sent by the responder.
Because the nonce chosen by the responder is always fresh Tamarin can be
sure that the value is not used elsewhere as a key.[20] This allows Tamarin
to restrict the information it can learn from this source to fresh nonces.
By excluding traces where the attacker learns a key from this source in
pre-computation Tamarin removes the problematic loop.
[20]Rather, Tamarin can be sure that it is distinct from all other fresh values, including
those used as keys.
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1 lemma types [sources]:
2 " [...]
3 & (
4 All nr m2 #i.
5 IN_I_2_nr(nr, m2) @ i
6 ==>
7 ( (Ex #j. KU(nr) @ j & j < i)
8 | (Ex #j. OUT_R_1(m2) @ j)
9 )
10 )"
Figure 5.7: A fragment of Meier’s source lemma for the Needham-Schroeder-
Lowe protocol model. This lemma says that if the initiator uses nr for the
responder’s nonce in message m2 then either the attacker knew nr before the
initiator received m2 or an honest responder sent the message m2, triggering
the OUT R 1(m2) action.
5.7.2 Proving lemmas during pre-computation
In our LEA model we had many unrefined sources which introduced many
spurious branches within proofs, to the extent that manually discharging
them became infeasible. However, we struggled to write source lemmas that
refined the sources. Some source lemmas did not refine the sources, and some
source lemmas caused Tamarin to loop apparently indefinitely. All our work
was done on a server with 32 cores and 500GB of RAM.
The way in which Tamarin discharges lemmas during pre-computation
is not well documented. We thus applied the scientific method to try and
construct source lemmas that refined all the sources.
Experiment #0: Problem statement
Our first attempt to load the model with no source lemmas produced 112
unrefined sources. The Tamarin interactive prover has a section called “Raw
Sources”. This section has diagrams detailing the precursors for all the
sources Tamarin has computed. Sources are marked with the phrase “partial
deconstructions” if there are pre-conditions that Tamarin cannot resolve.
Careful exploration of these partial deconstructions indicated that there
were three values that Tamarin could not fully deconstruct. The first was
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the CRC, which was a problem in our EA model, that we resolved with a
source lemma. The other two problematic values were the previous CRC and
the previous Finished, i.e. the two items that make up the requested bind-
ing. The two values are created in different places, and thus require different
source lemmas. The previous CRC was created in one of three locations:
1. The client request,
2. the server request or
3. the server spontaneous send.
The previous Finished, however is created in:
1. the client send,
2. the server send,
3. or the server spontaneous send.
To resolve these we wrote three lemmas, crc n source, p crc n source, and
binding source. The crc n source lemma was taken from the EA model,
and the other two lemmas followed the same style.
lemma crc_n_source[sources]:
"All tid ms crc #k.
CRC_In(tid, ms, crc)@k
==>
( Ex tid2 #i.
CRC_Out(tid2, ms, crc)@i
& (#i < #k)
)
|
( Ex #j.
KU(crc)@j
& (#j < #k)
)"
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We added a CRC In action every time a CRC was received from the
network, and a CRC Out action every time a CRC was created. This lemma
thus claims that if a CRC is received over the network at time #k then either
it was created by an honest agent at some earlier time #i or the attacker
knew the value at some earlier time #j. Because an honest agent only uses
fresh values as a CRC Tamarin can derive that the only new knowledge the
attacker can learn from a CRC is a fresh nonce. This effectively restricts the
type of the CRC, such that Tamarin can mark as impossible any path that
requires a different type.
The other two lemmas proceed similarly, with the caveat that the binding
is also required to be valid.
However when these lemmas were inserted the model would no longer
load, exhausting all the available RAM and crashing.
Experiment #1: Lemma correctness
At the suggestion of the authors of Tamarin[21], our first attempt was to
load our source lemmas not as a source lemmas, but as an ordinary induc-
tive lemmas, and see if Tamarin’s automatic prover could discharge them.
Tamarin’s pre-computation step does not use helper lemmas, so the lemmas
had to be constructed such that they prove automatically without the aid
of any helper lemmas.
After a small number of iterations this produced lemmas that would
prove automatically under the ‘S’ heuristic.[22] These lemmas auto-proved
in seconds when loaded as ordinary inductive lemmas. However when at-
tempting to load these lemmas as source lemmas, Tamarin would exhaust
all available memory and crash.
Experiment #2: Model subsets
Our second experiment was to exclude spontaneous certificates from our
model. In all other cases the unresolved sources came from both the actor
[21]Thanks to Kevin Milner and Cas Cremers.
[22]The ‘S’ heuristic orders goals using the “smart” heuristic, and allows so called “loop
breakers”. Loop breakers are goals that Tamarin usually demotes because they are likely
to cause a loop.
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and the peer, i.e. if the previous CRC was created by one party, then the
binding came from the other. This meant that both parties had contributed
something to the agreed value. However this test had no impact on the
result.
Further consultation with the authors of Tamarin revealed that, although
the pre-computation step does not use helper lemmas, if there are multiple
source lemmas they do interact. In the pre-computation phase Tamarin al-
ways unrolls actions if they appear on the LHS of a source lemma. When
Tamarin found the source of binding, i.e. in a Send rule, the rule would have
an unresolved CRC.[23] Tamarin would attempt to apply the crc n source
lemma, which would unroll to a Request rule. If the request was a bound
rule, i.e. a request for an LEA it would contain an unresolved binding.
Tamarin would attempt to unroll this leading to a Send rule, creating an
infinite loop.
Experiment #3: Restrict actions
In our third experiment we restricted the rules in which the actions occur to
the minimum set of points possible in an attempt to prevent this loop from
occurring. We cut the prev crc n sources lemma entirely, merging it with
the crc n sources lemma. However, limiting the set of actions enough to
break the loop meant that Tamarin was unable to resolve the sources, be-
cause the reasoning chains became too long and Tamarin’s heuristics stopped
unrolling before the source was found. This meant that although the model
loaded, the sources remained unresolved.
Experiment #4: Increase pre-computation
The authors of Tamarin suggested we try a development version of Tamarin
with a more aggressive un-roller in the pre-computation phase.[24] This, it
was hoped, would make the restricted actions sufficient to resolve the sources
without re-introducing the looping behaviour. The more aggressive un-roller
[23]Except in the case of a spontaneous send. A spontaneous send creates its CRC in the
same rule.
[24]This version of Tamarin can be found at https://github.com/kmilner/tamarin-
prover/tree/actionprecomp-and-annotes.
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however would unroll the unresolved sources much further, which caused
many more case splits, and was still unable to capture the sources, resulting
in more than 1000 partial deconstructions.
Experiment #5: Restrictions
Tamarin allows the user to define restrictions. These are effectively lemmas
that Tamarin assumes hold at all times. They can be used to define relations
such as equality.
restriction Eq_check_succeed: "All x y #i. Eq(x,y)@i ==> x = y"
This rule says that if two variables are present in an Eq action then they
must be equal. This lets a user exclude cases where the terms are not equal
from consideration. Using this feature we could thus attempt to resolve the
sources in a two-step process.
1. Prove the crc n source and binding source lemmas as regular in-
ductive lemmas.
2. Reload the model with the two source lemmas as restrictions, effec-
tively short-circuiting the partial deconstructions.
We attempted this, and found that Tamarin still found partial deconstruc-
tions. After discussion with the Tamarin authors we discovered that there
was an undocumented restriction on restrictions. Tamarin only excludes
sources that do not match restrictions if the RHS has no first order terms.
The source lemmas have complex RHSs, and re-expressing them such that
they have simple RHSs did not prevent the partial deconstructions appear-
ing.
Experiment #6: Oracle
Our experiments had shown that each of our source lemmas could be made
to load and resolve the sources they were designed to resolve individually,
even in the unmodified Tamarin prover. By controlling the order of the
preconditions of various rules we could make any of the source lemmas load
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individually.[25] This technique worked by finding a path that resolved the
source without touching on other unrefined sources. The problem was that
choosing a path that, for example, avoided the rules that had unresolved
bindings, letting the crc n source lemma resolve, would mean that when
we tried to solve binding source any rule on the path that intersected
with the crc n source path would start to follow the same path as the
crc n source. However this path was designed to avoid bindings, which
meant Tamarin would search further and further up the tree, but never find
the source. A path that was always finite for CRCs was infinite for bindings,
and vice versa.
Solving at least one of the lemmas meant that we could remove at least
some of the spurious cases. For example loading just the crc n source
lemma resolved all but 28 of the 112 partial deconstructions.[26] We thus
looked to methods we could use to more precisely control the order goals
were solved.
Tamarin provides an oracle heuristic, which allows the user to provide
a program that Tamarin will call to order the goals. If we could provide a
different goal ordering for the two lemmas we would be able to solve both
lemmas even though they needed different paths.
However, our experiments quickly showed that Tamarin does not honour
the oracle heuristic during the pre-computation phase. This surprised some
of the authors of Tamarin.[27]
Experiment #7: Identifying the pre-computation heuristic
We then ran a series of experiments to discern which of the heuristics
Tamarin uses to resolve sources in the pre-computation stage. This experi-
ment revealed that Tamarin does not honour any heuristic during the pre-
computation stage, and uses its own undocumented heuristic. Discussion
with the Tamarin authors revealed that, in contrast with the documenta-
[25]Controlling the unrolling through the order of the preconditions does not appear to be
an intentional feature of Tamarin, but an artefact of the way the pre-computation phase
operates.
[26]Because of state space explosion discharging even 28 spurious branches takes an in-
feasibly long time.
[27]Personal correspondence with Kevin Milner.
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tion, Tamarin does not actually prove source lemmas in the pre-computation
stage, but merely assumes them. It then uses those lemmas to guide its un-
rolling.
Experiment #8: Customising Tamarin
One of the authors of Tamarin produced a patch that would force Tamarin
to only solve an action goal once whilst resolving sources. It was hoped
that this would prevent sources from entering an infinite loop, terminating
after one iteration. However it transpired that Tamarin will unroll rules for
a number of different reasons, not just because it appears in the LHS of a
source lemma. Thus the patch did not prevent the looping behaviour.
Experiment #9: Constructing shortcuts
In work on proving the security of Distributed Network Protocol 3 (DNP3)
Cremers et al. [CDM17] present a novel approach to producing proofs of com-
plex looping protocols in Tamarin. The DNP3 protocol has a state called
“Security Idle” to which the protocol returns repeatedly. This is similar to
the state machine of the LEA protocol, when considered as a single compos-
ite protocol. This gave them similar modelling difficulties, with many states
leading to repeated loops. They identified invariants of the various transi-
tions and created persistent facts that linked directly to their instantiation,
i.e. the first point at which the invariant held. By prioritising solving these
facts they could solve complex properties of this looping protocol skipping
over the looping behaviour entirely.
By imitating this approach in our LEA model we were able to construct
“short-cuts” to various sources, by producing persistent facts at the place
they were generated and consuming them every time they are generated.
This created a one-step resolution for many sources. This substantially de-
creased the amount of memory and time the model took to load, but did
not resolve the underlying looping issue. The looping in our sources was
caused by multiple sources interacting, not just the structure of the state
machine. Figure 5.4 shows our S Send Bound rule, which uses two invariant
facts. Line 9 captures the state invariant. Once the TLS channel is estab-
184
5.7. Proving the model
lished there are various aspects of the protocol state that do not change,
such as the actor’s role, and the server and client’s thread identifiers. By
emitting a persistent fact when a session is established and consuming it at
every future state we can resolve all these variables in a single step. Line 11
captures the invariants associated with a pending request. Note that the
variables are virtually identical to those in the non-persistent PendingReqR
fact on line 10.[28] Having a non-persistent fact as an antecedent prevents the
persistent invariant fact from being consumed multiple times, which would
allow an actor to improperly respond to a request multiple times. Struc-
turing the rules in this way allows us to take advantage of the invariant
shortcut logic without introducing an over-approximation into our model.
The PendingReqRSBInvariant fact is particularly crucial to resolve because
the CertificateRequestB macro expands to include all three hard to re-
solve sources, namely the CRC, the previous CRC and the previous binding.
Experiment #10: Unified lemma ping-pong
Our final approach was successful in resolving all the partial deconstructions.
The issue of the dual infinite paths seemed unresolvable. So we decided to
write a single lemma that would resolve all sources simultaneously. Instead
of having separate CRC In and Finished In actions we created a single
Source In action.
Because we were creating a single sources lemma there was no need to
try and restrict the locations of Source In actions, as we attempted in Ex-
periment #3. Because source lemmas are proven inductively, if a rule with
a Source In action unrolls to find another Source In action with the same
parameters the lemma is considered to hold, by the inductive hypothesis.
By placing Source In actions at every point that a source was used, and
a Source Out action when the source was created, most cases of the uni-
fied source lemma were solved in a single step. In our S Send Bound rule,
shown in Figure 5.4, we use three Source In actions and one Source Out
[28]The only difference is the lack of the ‘server’ field. This is established by the re-
quirements on other antecedent facts, and by omitting this we can reduce memory usage.
Tamarin stores strings in full at every occurrence, so strings in persistent facts are partic-
ularly memory intensive.
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action (lines 22-25). Each of these sources resolves in a different rule. Whilst
we cannot unroll each source to its parent rule in a single step, by adding
Source In actions liberally throughout the model we can resolve many of
these using the inductive hypothesis. However this didn’t address the prob-
lem of cyclic path dependencies.
A path that resolved CRCs efficiently didn’t resolve bindings, and a path
that resolved bindings efficiently didn’t resolve CRCs. However, because we
now had a single source lemma, we could design a path that ping-ponged
between the two actors, visiting every use and every creation of every fact.
By testing this lemma on larger and larger subsets of the model we were
able to capture all the necessary cases on our path as efficiently as possible,
varying the placement of the persistent invariant facts to control the path
and prevent excess visits to non-resolving states. Loading the full model with
the unified source lemma requires virtually all of the 500GB of RAM we had
available. This is because the Tamarin is effectively verifying the sources of
every potential binding and CRC in the pre-computation step, including
previous CRCs, requiring it unroll two runs. Furthermore, because Tamarin
does not make use of helper lemmas in the pre-computation step the analysis
is not efficient.
5.7.3 Lemmas
LEAs have strictly stronger guarantees than EAs thus we need to prove
that all the EA lemmas continue to hold. In Chapter 4 we proposed an
OCA lemma that we would want to hold. However in our design for LEAs
the suggested lemma doesn’t hold, because not all LEA are linked to each
other. Each LEA links directly to at most one other EA. By linking LEAs in
this way we can construct complex authentication structures, namely trees.
This gives our LEAs design more flexibility, as opposed to linking all LEAs
into a chain.
Although the binding fact we define in Section 5.6.2 only captures the
direct link between LEAs, we want to reason about any pair that are on the
same path. We therefore define a fact that captures the transitive closure of
the binding relation.
186
5.7. Proving the model
1 !EA_BindStar(~chain_id, ~tid, ms,
~base_ea_id, base_crc, base_cert, base_binding,
~ea_id, crc, cert, binding)
↪→
↪→
To create a !EA BindStar fact we take an !EA Binding fact, and pair
it with a new ~chain_id. The requested binding becomes the base, and
the EA becomes the tip. We then consume !EA Binding facts that have
the tip as their requested binding, taking their EA as our new tip. This
allows us to build a chain from any given EA, even one that is not itself
layered, to any LEA that links to it. Constructing the closure in this way
would appear to be inefficient, generating many useless chain ids, however
because Tamarin uses backwards search, starting from the tip and working
backwards to the base, generating the closure in this way will only generate
a single ~chain_id.
The lemma we would like to prove is shown in Figure 5.8. This lemma
is very similar to the OCA lemma we disprove in Chapter 4. The key differ-
ences are on lines 4, 6, and 7. Lines 4 and 6 simply capture another action,
ValidFinished, that occurs in Recv rules, note they occur at the same
times, #i and #j, as their respective Recv actions, marked in blue. This
simply allows us to refer to other variables in the rewrite rule, and does not
impose any new restrictions. We could equivalently express the two actions
in a single action, but for our purposes it is more convenient to split them
in two. Line 7, marked in red, imposes the requirement that the EAs in the
two Recv messages be in the same chain.
To extend our result beyond the guarantees of EAs we needed to add
some new helper lemmas.
Our initial helper lemmas are similar to those used in our EA and TLS
models, simply ensuring various consistency properties, such as the requested
binding associated with a particular ~ea id remaining constant. We needed
fewer of these lemmas than we might have otherwise expected, because a
side benefit of the strategy of using persistent invariant facts is to make it
easier for Tamarin to automatically derive such properties. A downside of
this strategy is that the diagrams produced by Tamarin during a proof, a
key tool for understanding the bag of facts and what Tamarin has derived,
are harder to read. See Figure 5.5 for an example diagram. This is because
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1 lemma closure_outward_compound_auth[use_induction, reuse]:
2 "All actor actor2 role role2 cert cert2 peer peer2
chain_id tid tid2 ms crc finished p_crc binding
location location2 o_ea_id ea_id #i #j #k.
↪→
↪→
3 Recv(actor , peer , ms, role , cert)@i
4 & Valid_Finished(o_ea_id, tid, ms, p_crc, binding,
location)@i↪→
5 & Recv(actor2, peer2, ms, role2, cert2)@j
6 & Valid_Finished(ea_id, tid2, ms, crc, finished,
location2)@j↪→
7 & BindStar(chain_id, tid, ms,
ea_id, finished,
o_ea_id, binding, location)@k
↪→
↪→
8 & (#i < #j)
9 & not (Ex actor3 peer3 #f #h.
10 Revms(ms, actor3, peer3)@f
11 & (#f < #i)
12 & RevLtk(cert2)@h
13 & (#h < #j)
14 )
15 ==> Ex role3 role4 #d #e.
16 Owns(peer, ms, role3, cert)@d
17 & not(role=role3)
18 & (#d < #i)
19 & Owns(peer2, ms, role4, cert2)@e
20 & not(role2=role4)
21 & (#e < #j)"
Figure 5.8: OCA of LEAs
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(1) they have many more edges, because every fact has an extra edge to the
persistent fact’s source; (2) the extra edges are longer, because they all have
direct edges to facts generally near the top of the graph, as opposed to just
immediate neighbours; (3) there are lots of overlapping edges, because many
rules have edges to a small number of rules.
The main helper lemmas we prove are single step versions of our main
lemma, i.e. given a LEA prove that its requested binding is valid. There are
four cases for a single step binding, (1) self-self, (2) self-peer, (3) peer-self,
and (4) peer-peer.
Case (1) is the case where both the LEA and the requested binding were
created by the actor. Case (2) is the case where the LEA is created by the
actor, but the requested binding was created by the peer. Case (3) is the
inverse of this case, where the LEA is created by the peer, but the requested
binding was created by the actor. Case (4) is the case where both the LEA
and the requested binding are created by the peer.
In each case we try and prove that, assuming the second EA is authentic,
the first must also be authentic, even if the attacker knows the secret key of
the first.
Proving that an actor can be sure that an EA it created is authentic, the
self-self case, is trivial. An honest actor will not sign any requested binding
it doesn’t recognise, and our model does not capture any form of forgetful
signing. We can prove this without any restrictions on the attacker. Even
an attacker that can compromise all keys cannot convince an honest actor it
signed a message it did not sign. We leave the self-peer case for the moment,
and continue on to the peer-self case.
The peer-self case is similarly trivial. Assuming that the peer certificate
is uncompromised, if we receive a LEA signed with that certificate we can be
sure that the peer thinks the requested binding is valid. Further if the actor
does not recognise the requested binding, i.e. it does not believe it created
the EA referenced in the requested binding, then it will reject the LEA.
The peer-peer case is somewhat harder to prove. We include the lemma
in Figure 5.9. The lemma is very similar to the closure OCA lemma in
Figure 5.8. The key differences are in the LHS of the implication. They prove
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1 lemma peer_peer_bind[reuse]:
2 "All actor peer role cert cert2 ea_id prev_ea_id tid ms
finished prev_crc prev_finished #i #k.↪→
3 Recv(actor, peer, ms, role, cert)@i
4 & Valid_Finished(prev_ea_id, tid, ms,
prev_crc, prev_finished, 'remote')@i↪→
5 & Recv(actor, peer, ms, role, cert2)@k
6 & Bind(ea_id, prev_ea_id, tid, ms,
finished, prev_finished, 'remote')@k↪→
7 & (#i < #k)
8 & not (Ex #f #g.
9 Revms(ms, actor,peer)@f
10 & (#f < #k)
11 & RevLtk(cert2)@g
12 & (#g < #k))
13 ==> Ex role2 #h #j.
14 Owns(peer, ms, role2, cert)@h
15 & (#h < #j)
16 & not(role = role2)
17 & Owns(peer, ms, role2, cert2)@j
18 & (#j < #k)"
Figure 5.9: The peer-peer binding lemma, edited for consistency of style,
claims that if an actor receives two EAs, and one is bound to the other,
then if the second is authentic then so is the first.
the property for a narrower scope, the cases captured by the LHS are a strict
subset of those capture by the LHS of the OCA lemma. The key differences
are on lines 4 and 6. Both cases require the last field, highlighted in red, to
be ‘remote’. This is the location field, and signifies where the actor believes
the Finished message was generated. In this lemma we are only interested
in EAs that, from the actors perspective, were created remotely. The other
key difference is also on line 6. We use the Bind action, as opposed to the
BindStar action in the OCA lemma. The BindStar action represents the
transitive closure of the Bind action. These restrictions restrict the captured
cases to a direct binding of an LEAs sent by the peer to an EA or LEA also
sent by the peer.
We now return to the self-peer case. The self-peer case is much more
problematic. The self-peer case is not captured by the closure OCA lemma,
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which reasons about a pair a received EAs, and the self-peer case is in fact
not true. The self-peer case tries to prove that if an actor binds to an EA
that it received, then if the actor’s key is uncompromised the received EA
is authentic.
It is easy to see that this case does not hold. An attacker who has com-
promised the peer’s private key can send a forged EA to the actor, and the
actor can still sign it, i.e. the actor will not detect that the EA is a forgery.
If the actor sends the LEA to its peer the LEA will be rejected, because
the peer would not recognise the forged EA, however, the actor never knows
this. Unless some higher layer tells the actor the LEA was rejected, it can
never know that the EA was not recognised by the peer.[29]
Given that this case is not required to prove the closure OCA lemma
it is tempting to ignore it. However, without this case it is impossible to
construct a proof of the closure OCA lemma by induction over messages.
This is because the closure OCA property is not inductive over messages.
This can be easily demonstrated.
An actor who receives an EA, and sends back a chain of n LEAs has
learned nothing about the authentication status of the LEAs. However, the
moment it receives an LEA bound to the end of its chain, it knows that all
the LEAs it sent were accepted.
We therefore need a new strategy. The closure OCA lemma appears to
be inductive over the receipt of messages. Our peer-peer binding lemma
functions as a base case of this lemma. We thus need a way to reason about
the inductive step, where there are a number of LEAs sent before another
LEA is received. Because there is a state change from knowing nothing about
the peer’s view of the LEAs’ authentication statuses to knowing all of them
are valid simultaneously we attempt to construct a proof that would give a
result in that way.
Receiving a second LEA implies that all intervening LEAs are considered
valid by the peer. We thus need a way to refer to, in a lemma, the inter-
vening messages. Usually we would achieve this by inductively unrolling the
[29]If the peer binds to the LEA the actor knows the peer accepted it, but if the peer
doesn’t bind to it then its status is still ambiguous to the actor.
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requested bindings until we had covered all the LEAs we wished, i.e. the
base case. However, as explained, in this case this is ineffective. Looking to
prior work in Tamarin, in particular [Sch+14], we find that Tamarin can be
used to reason about lists.
Tamarin provides a feature called multi-sets. These are a variables with
an associative, commutative + operator. For example you could have a mul-
tiset, m containing 1, and then refer to m + 1. This is slightly different to
the tuples we have previously described. With tuples you can store a fixed
number of values, and by nesting, produce list-like structures. However using
nested tuples you can only refer to the head of the list in a lemma. With
a multi-set we could store m := crc1 + crc2 + · · · + crcn, and then write a
lemma of the form ∀crc ·EA Handle(eaid, tid, crc, binding)&(∃x · crc+x =
m)→ Owns(. . . ). We briefly experimented with constructions of this form,
but rapidly ran into difficulties resolving sources. Consultation with the au-
thors of Tamarin suggests that multi-sets are particularly prone to these
sorts of difficulties, and are particularly taxing on RAM. We thus leave the
completion of this proof for future work.
5.8 Results and conclusions
In this Chapter we have introduced and analysed LEAs. Our research did not
find any problems with LEAs. Our analysis with the Bhargavan framework
suggests that our construction is sound, and our proofs of single steps of
the binding lemmas show that at least received LEAs achieve OCA with the
immediately preceding EA, as do LEAs when sent by the same actor. We
also introduced authentication forests, and discussed possible use cases of
various patterns of compound authentication.
Our model taxed the limits of what is possible with Tamarin, and high-
lights some unusual or unexpected behaviours of the model checker in ex-
tremis. Our work however leaves open a number of questions. Whilst a con-
ceptually small step, proving that LEAs provide closure OCA is still an
unknown. Our work also leaves open what the effects of splitting the hash
function, as proposed by the IETF, would be. Further, because our LEA
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model builds off our EA model, it is also an open question whether we can
prove something using a composite model.
Our work does however, provide a solid basis for continuing to consider
the security guarantees of LEAs, in conjunction with the IETF.
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Chapter 6
Messaging Layer Security with
Transport Layer Security
6.1 Introduction
The use of TLS is becoming ubiquitous on the public internet, but TLS is
not restricted to the world wide web. TLS is also heavily used on enterprise
and private networks.[1] Enterprises often secure connections between differ-
ent sites and within data-centres with TLS. For example, one common use
of TLS in the enterprise is to satisfy the requirements of the Payment Card
Industry (PCI) Data Security Standard (DSS) [PCI DSS]. The PCI DSS is
an industry standard for protecting credit card information, and one require-
ment is the use of “strong cryptography” to protect certain communications,
such as credit card transactions. Compliance with PCI DSS is required by
both VISA[2] and Mastercard[3], and in some jurisdictions is even enshrined
in law [NRS-603A]. According to the latest edition of the standard TLS 1.1
and newer versions of TLS are sufficient for this purpose, assuming they are
appropriately configured.
To detect attacks in their networks companies may use intrusion detec-
tion systems (IDSs) and intrusion prevention systems (IPSs). These devices
[1]Throughout this section we will make a distinction between public and private net-
works, however in practice there is no technical difference between them. The separation
is entirely notional.
[2]https://www.visaeurope.com/receiving-payments/security/
[3]https://www.mastercard.us/en- us/merchants/safety- security/security-
recommendations/service-providers-need-to-know.html
194
6.1. Introduction
sit on the corporate network and monitor traffic. If something suspicious is
detected the device might do anything from raise an alert to block the sus-
picious connection. Some IDSs and IPSs simply rely on metadata for their
analysis, for example profiling connections based on their destination, point
of origin, or size; whereas others make use of deep packet inspection (DPI).
DPI is when the device analyses the payload of the connection. When the
payload is unencrypted, such as in a vanilla HTTP connection, this pro-
cess is simple, however when the payload is encrypted the devices ability to
perform this type of analysis is curtailed. For convenience we shall refer to
all devices that analyse traffic in transit, as opposed to at the endpoint, as
middleboxes. Middleboxes can be inline, i.e. directly intercept and forward
traffic, or passive, i.e. receive a copy of all data sent to and from the server.
One solution used in industry for performing DPI on TLS connections is
to configure the server to use TLS 1.2 with a static RSA cipher suite. Using
a static RSA cipher suites means that a passive observer who knows the
server’s private key can decrypt all traffic sent to and from the server, we
discuss this in more detail later in this section. By providing middleboxes
with a copy of the server’s private key they are able to perform DPI with-
out needing to be inline on every connection. Using TLS in this way on the
public internet is controversial because it can be used for censorship and
anti-competitive behaviour, and breaks the security guarantees TLS clients
expect. Enterprise, however consider this use case vital, because, for exam-
ple, it allows them to block malicious connections to vulnerable devices on
their network that are impossible to update, for example because patches
do not exist.
The TLS 1.3 standard removes all static RSA cipher suites as insecure.
All cipher suites in TLS 1.3 are forward secret. We recall the definition of
perfect forward secrecy (PFS) from Section 2.5.5. We say that a protocol
is forward secure with respect to a LTK if an attacker that compromises
the LTK after the handshake is complete cannot decrypt the session. This
is equivalent to saying that passive attacker that knows the LTK cannot
decrypt the session. An active attacker may be able to MITM a session for
which it knows the LTK, but a passive attacker cannot.
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Because some industries have regulatory or contractual requirements to
monitor various traffic, removing all static cipher suites was controversial.
Further, some organisations wish to do more than the regulatory minimum
in terms of security, and plan to upgrade from TLS 1.2 to TLS 1.3 before
they are forced to, however with static cipher suites unavailable they do not
have a clear upgrade path. A number of proposals for achieving visibility of
TLS 1.3 connections have been made. Over the course of this chapter we will
examine some of the more significant proposals, looking at advantages and
disadvantages of each, before proposing and evaluating our own solution.
6.1.1 Chapter overview
Our main contributions in this chapter are as follows:
1. We describe the problem space and current approaches to achieving
visibility of the contents of a TLS connection.
2. We analyse and evaluate three proposals that would enable visibility
of TLS 1.3, each of which has serious drawbacks.
3. We make a new proposal, based on a composite protocol approach. We
construct a protocol that layers TLS 1.3 on to a multi-party protocol
called MLS. This approach avoids many of the pitfalls affecting the
other proposals.
4. We introduce pairwise channel bindings, channel bindings that authen-
ticate two members of a multi-party protocol to each other in other
protocol layers.
5. We suggest a new cipher suite that provides authentication and in-
tegrity guarantees to the TLS 1.3 record layer independent of the con-
fidentiality guarantees.
6. We provide an extended discussion of our proposal, comparing and
contrasting it with the earlier proposals.
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6.1.2 Related work
There is an extended body of work on decrypting TLS messages in flight
[Nay+15] [Gre+17] [HD18], each of which has been analysed extensively. We
will discuss three such proposals and objections brought to them.
The first proposal we will discuss is multi-context TLS (mcTLS) [Nay+15].
In mcTLS the middleboxes act as a series of active MITM, each decrypting
and re-encrypting the traffic, passing it from one to the other, until all have
seen it, and it is finally passed to the client or server as appropriate. mcTLS
provides fine-grained access control to the connection, offering differing lev-
els of visibility to different middleboxes, but it requires that all middleboxes
be on path. Requiring all middleboxes to be on path introduces practical dif-
ficulties, from network choke-points and latency to reliability and resilience.
The second suggested mechanism for achieving visibility into TLS 1.3
connections is by using static DH keys. This was proposed by Matt Green
in draft-green [Gre+17]. If a server always uses the same DH key share, gy,
then a passive observer who knows the private portion of the key share, i.e.
y, can decrypt the session. This mechanism doesn’t require changes to the
TLS 1.3 specification, simply being a configuration change, but it makes the
server’s key share into a long term secret. TLS 1.3 is designed to have PFS
with respect to long term secrets, however if static DH keys are used this
property no longer holds. An attacker who can learn y can passively decrypt
sessions. Although this might seem unavoidable for passive decryption, the
mechanism we propose in Section 6.8 maintains the PFS property of TLS.
The third suggested mechanism mirrored the static RSA method of
TLS 1.2. The static RSA key exchange mechanism makes use of a tech-
nique called key wrapping. Key wrapping is when one key is encrypted with
another. In static RSA the client encrypts a pre-master key with the server’s
public key. The server, on receipt of this message decrypts the pre-master
key and computes the master key. draft-RHRD [HD18] defines an extension
to TLS 1.3 which wraps the session secrets with a key that the server agrees
with the middleboxes ahead of time.
The most comprehensive analysis and critique of this work is by Farrell
[Far18]. Farrell deals with draft-green and draft-RHRD specifically, and
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visibility drafts in general, enumerating an extensive list of problems. Our
analysis is heavily based on this work.
The IETF also has a number of relevant policy positions. RFC 2804
[RFC2804] defines wiretapping, and states the IETF position against making
any provision for it in IETF developed protocols. RFC 7258 [RFC7258]
defines pervasive monitoring, and requires all IETF developed protocols to
mitigate against pervasive monitoring where possible.
6.1.3 Chapter organisation
In Section 6.2 we provide some background to the IETF’s objections to the
prior drafts, and on alternative approaches to achieving the stated goals
of enterprise [Fen18]. In Section 6.3 we introduce mcTLS, and give a brief
discussion, before introducing draft-green in Section 6.4, along with a
brief discussion. In Section 6.5 we introduce the third proposal, draft-
RHRD, and give a brief discussion. We use these three sections to motivate
a new approach in Section 6.6. Our new approach constructs a composite
protocol layering TLS 1.3 over a protocol called MLS, which we introduce in
Section 6.7. We define and analyse pairwise channel bindings in 6.9, before
defining a number of variant constructions in Sections 6.10-6.12.
In Section 6.15 we give an extended discussion of the various issues raised
with the various proposals including our own, based on the work by Farrell
[Far18], before concluding in Section 6.16.
6.2 Background
The attempts to re-introduce visibility to TLS 1.3, after the WG had de-
cided to remove all non-ephemeral modes have been highly controversial.
Members of the TLS WG were worried that any functionality that allowed
for inspection of TLS connections would be rapidly repurposed to allow
state surveillance and censorship. A number of countries in both historic
and modern times have carried out widespread surveillance of their popu-
lace, something the IETF is explicitly against. Despite industry assurances
that such mechanisms would only be used inside data centres and corporate
networks, TLS WG members worried that there was no way to enforce this,
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as from a technical perspective there is no clear distinction between a large
corporate network and that of a small country.
In its mission statement the IETF explicitly states that it is not value-
neutral [RFC3935], and that it is committed to values such as openness
and fairness. In RFC 7258 [RFC7258] the IETF explicitly lists pervasive
monitoring as an attack that should be militated against in IETF proto-
cols. The IETF also explicitly does not consider requirements for wiretap-
ping as part of the process for producing standards [RFC2804]. Together,
these documents[4] position the IETF against any changes to TLS 1.3 that
might enable wiretapping or pervasive monitoring. Both pervasive monitor-
ing and wiretapping are given specific definitions in their respective docu-
ments [RFC7258], [RFC2804]. Thus any suggested change to TLS 1.3 must
at least not exacerbate, if not militate against these two attacks.
6.2.1 Alternative approaches
There are a number of alternative approaches to performing the necessary
security functions other than decrypting the TLS connections in transit. We
briefly summarise these here, and the discussion around them. For some
enterprises these are sufficient, and no further work is necessary. However,
some of the largest and most heavily regulated enterprises have issues with
all of these, prompting the works described in the latter sections of this
chapter.
Meta-analysis
Many middleboxes are able to perform the majority of their functions only
being able to see the unencrypted portions of a TLS connection. This method
however makes diagnosis of specific connection issues more challenging.
Remaining on TLS 1.2
Another proposal was for corporate networks who could not sacrifice vis-
ibility in the short or medium term to remain on TLS 1.2. This is not a
long-term solution however, because eventually TLS 1.2 will be considered
[4]Numerous other related documents exist, but this subset are the most relevant.
199
6.2. Background
too insecure even for use on a trusted network. A counter-argument raised
was that the PCI DSS only proscribed TLS 1.0 and Secure Sockets Layer
(SSL) in May of 2018, almost 20 years after the publication of TLS 1.0, so the
prospect of TLS 1.2 being deprecated is particularly remote. Furthermore,
although a draft deprecating TLS 1.1 and earlier [MF18] was discussed by
the TLS WG at the IETF 102 meeting, it was not accepted as a WG item,
strengthening the argument that the deprecation of TLS 1.2 is a long way
off. It was also discussed that enterprise would like to take advantage of the
greater speed and security of TLS 1.3, and thus a solution that allowed them
to upgrade would be preferable.
Split TLS
In a corporate environment adding an extra certificate to the root-of-trust
for all devices would allow for split TLS. This effectively creates a new cer-
tificate authority controlled by the company. A middlebox at the network
gateway can create certificates for any server and sign them with the com-
pany certificate authority and have them accepted by devices inside the
network. Split TLS refers to the practice of terminating all connections at
the network edge, and creating a new connection to the destination. By forc-
ing all connections through a gateway middleboxes would be able to see all
traffic as it traversed the edge of the corporate network.
Gateways with access to internal server’s certificates can also split in-
coming TLS connections. This is a common practice on the web, allowing for
load balancing incoming connections across a number of servers. This solu-
tion requires installing an extra certificate on every device on the corporate
network, and requires the gateway to decrypt and re-encrypt every con-
nection. Further this solution does not assist with traffic of analysis within
the corporate network, whether internal to internal, or between the internal
node and the gateway. This creates a potential choke-point at the gateway,
both for traffic and analysis.
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Endpoint analysis
Installing security software at the endpoints may prove sufficient for some
networks, particularly with logging enabled. This solution however has two
major drawbacks. Endpoints might be lightweight devices, only powerful
enough to perform their designated functions. They may not be able to run
either security software or logging. Further if a device has a vulnerability for
which the patch is yet to be deployed, or even non-existent, then attempting
to do security analysis of the connection after it has been processed may
prove too late.
Export keys
A server could, using some other protocol, export keys to the relevant mid-
dleboxes. This would give the middleboxes full visibility, however doing this
in a real-time way is practically difficult at large scale and doesn’t allow anal-
ysis of packets before the are processed by the server. Further this would
act as a form of key revelation which goes against best practice [BCP200].
6.3 Multi-context TLS
mcTLS is a proposal by Naylor et al. [Nay+15]. Motivated by the increase
in TLS usage, and the inelegance of the then current solution space they
proposed an in-line mechanism whereby endpoints could explicitly authorise
different middleboxes to see different parts of the connection. mcTLS is not
simply aimed at security focussed middleboxes, but also load balancers,
caches, and other network management functions. mcTLS is a modification
of TLS 1.2, but we include it here because it has been proposed as an
alternative to visibility in TLS 1.3, and provides finer-grained control of
network access than static RSA. mcTLS can grant read and/or write access
to various subsets of traffic. Specifically it can restrict middlebox access to
headers and/or content for requests and/or responses. This allows for very
tightly controlled access, tailored to each middlebox.
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The European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) has pub-
lished a draft standard based on mcTLS [CYBER-27-2], called the Transport
layer Middlebox Security Protocol (TLMSP).
6.3.1 Mechanism
mcTLS operates by extending the TLS 1.2 handshake. After the server’s
second flight, the middlebox sends a flight of messages to the client and server
that is structurally the same as the server’s second flight.[5] This is used to
establish cryptographic contexts between the client and the middlebox, the
server and the middlebox, and the client and the server.
The middlebox requests a “context”[6] that defines what traffic it can
access. The traffic is broken into requests and responses, and into headers
and content. A middlebox could ask, for example, to have read and write
access to request headers, and read access to response content.
6.3.2 Discussion
A formal analysis of mcTLS by Bhargavan et al. found an attack [Bha+18].
It was shown that malicious clients could collude with middleboxes or servers
to attack other middleboxes. For example, a client could re-insert something
removed by a middlebox before it arrived at the server. This has serious im-
plications for security, as an attacker can circumvent protections provided by
middleboxes, and furthermore, convince the middlebox that such protection
had been effective. Bhargavan et al. in the same work proposed a fix that
could be shown to be formally secure. However this highlights that defining
a secure visible version of TLS 1.3 is non-trivial.
Some criticisms specific to mcTLS are that every middlebox becomes
a point of failure. Because every middlebox is on-path, if one middlebox
becomes unavailable then so does the entire connection. If use of a particular
middlebox is required by policy then this turns a denial-of-service (DoS)
attack on a middlebox into a DoS attack on the entire network. This brittle
structure is high risk to deploy in large environments.
[5]In the case of multiple middleboxes the middlebox sends this message to its two
neighbours, whether they be the client, the server, or another middlebox.
[6]Not to be confused with a cryptographic context.
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Another criticism is that it modifies the TLS handshake in a non-trivial
way, making the guarantees it achieves non-obvious and invalidates formal
analyses of the handshake. Further it is based on TLS 1.2, meaning that it
does not address the desire for visibility in TLS 1.3.
6.4 draft-green
Green proposed a configuration of TLS 1.3 that would allow for visibility of
TLS connections. The proposal mimicked the static RSA setup used with
TLS 1.2 by using static DH key shares. The proposal was unable to achieve
consensus at the IETF, and was not accepted as a work item. Further the
TLS WG did not achieve consensus to work on any draft that enabled any
kind of visibility into TLS connections. The European Telecommunications
Standards Institute however has published a draft standard [CYBER-27-3]
that defines a protocol they call enterprise TLS (eTLS), which uses static
DH.
6.4.1 Mechanism
The proposal, presented to the IETF as draft-green, required servers to
repeatedly use the same key share for every TLS 1.3 handshake. Usually
a server would use a fresh, ephemeral key, gy, for each handshake. When
using draft-green the server would instead select the same key share each
time. By sharing the private portion of the DH key, y, with all middleboxes
allowed to access traffic, said middleboxes can compute the key by observing
the handshake.
6.4.2 Discussion
draft-green was proposed to the IETF before the IETF 99 meeting, where
it was presented by Fenter, Green, and Housley. As can be seen from the min-
utes of the meeting, the proposal was controversial [Tur17]. Fenter presented
a number of use cases, (1) packet analysis, (2) fraud monitoring, (3) IDSs
and IPSs, (4) malware detection, (5) incident response, (6) regulatory re-
quirements, (7) layer 7 distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) protection, and
(8) performance management. Diagnostics was also mentioned as a key use
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case. Identifying problems without being able to trace them is harder, and
thus might extend issues that could otherwise be resolved quickly.
Green then presented a security analysis. According to Green, with the
exception of forward secrecy, draft-green is cryptographically secure. The
pros of draft-green were given as (1) it involves no significant protocol
changes, (2) it uses well understood cryptography, and (3) it is detectable.
In opposition, Farrell presented TINFOIL [Far18]. TINFOIL is a list of
objections to interception technologies being made compatible with TLS
1.3. We discuss the general objections to interception technologies in Sec-
tion 6.15.2, we limit discussion here to those objections specific to draft-
green.
One criticism specific to static DH approaches is that they are not im-
plementation robust. This means that a poor implementation can lead to
attacks. If something is implementation robust, then a poor implementation
should fail, rather than be successfully attacked. For example Jager et al.
[JSS15b] show that an invalid curve attack can be used on certain imple-
mentations of TLS 1.2 to derive the private portion of the server’s DH key
share. When a client connects to the server in TLS 1.2 using elliptic curve
cryptography with DH it usually sends the server a point on the negotiated
curve. By carefully choosing a point not on the elliptic curve, but on a re-
lated one that is chosen for having certain weak properties, the attacker can
make the server compute an easily invertible value, with some non-negligible
probability. This is called an invalid curve attack, and a well implemented
server will check that the incoming point is on the claimed curve, but at
Jager et al. show, a number of implementations do not check this. If the
attack is successful, the attacker can compute the private portion of server’s
DH key share. If the server uses static DH values, i.e. it reuses the same DH
values for more than one connection, then the attacker can use that value
to impersonate the server by MITMing connections.
Although this attack is on TLS 1.2, TLS 1.3 also uses a DHE and may
well share libraries with TLS 1.2. This attack serves to highlight that using
static DH can introduce vulnerabilities.
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Another criticism of this approach is that a client cannot tell on its first
connection whether this mechanism is being employed, and thus at least
some clients are unaware that their connections are not private, when they
have a reasonable expectation that they will be.
One criticism of draft-green in comparison with mcTLS is that a mid-
dlebox that possesses the connection keys can undetectably modify the con-
nection in either direction. This means that whilst draft-green achieves
its goal of weakening the confidentiality goals of TLS 1.3, it has the side
effect of breaking the authentication and integrity guarantees. It shares this
criticism with draft-RHRD, which we introduce next.
6.5 draft-RHRD
draft-RHRD[7] was created to address criticisms of draft-green. It was
presented as a draft to the TLS WG at the IETF 101 meeting. The re-
opening of the visibility issue after the IETF did not achieve consensus to
work on visibility drafts was again contentious [Tur18].
6.5.1 Mechanism
draft-RHRD takes a similar approach to the static RSA mode of TLS 1.2.
Before TLS connections begin the server is provisioned with the public por-
tion of a DH key share, gm. The private portion of this key share, m, is given
to all middleboxes.
The client adds an extension to the ClientHello called Visibility.
When sent by the client the extension is empty. By including this extension
the client acquiesces to the connection being observed.
The Visibility extension is also included in the server’s reply. When
sent by the server the extension includes a value that is opaque to the
client. The server sends the extension in the unencrypted portion of the
ServerHello.
The opaque value is formed of three parts, and completes a DHE with
all the middleboxes. The pieces are as follows.
[7]This is sometimes pronounced “rehired”, for its visual similarity to that word.
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1. The public key with which the server was provisioned, gm.
2. An ephemeral key share[8] generated by the server, gn.
3. The master secret[9] of the connection, ms, wrapped with the key the
server has established with the middleboxes gmn, i.e. {ms}gmn .
Any middlebox knowing m can unwrap the master secret, and decrypt
the connection.
6.5.2 Discussion
This suggestion is an improvement over draft-green because the client
must explicitly opt-in. However, in practice, this opt-in may not be optional.
Because the extension is included in the client and server’s unencrypted ex-
tensions an outside observer can detect whether the extension is in use,
and block connections that do not use it. Further the observer can monitor
whether the public key the server sends is one it knows, and block con-
nections for which it does not know the key. It can do this even without
computing the wrapping key.
Another criticism of draft-RHRD, which applies equally to draft-green,
is that neither the client nor the server knows the identities of observers.
Further the mechanism relies on a form of key escrow, or key revelation. This
is considered bad practice [BCP200]. Although the mechanism is ostensibly
similar to that employed in static RSA, it differs in a number of key aspects.
Static RSA is secure under a threat model where an attacker cannot acquire
the server’s long-term keys, and is a key exchange mechanism. In draft-
RHRD the key is established by TLS 1.3, and then revealed to a third party.
Another criticism of draft-RHRD is that introducing extensions that weaken
the security of TLS is outside the charter of the TLS working group.
[8]Note this key share is different from the key share the server intends for the client,
which we denote gy.
[9]More accurately the early secret and the handshake secret, from which the master
secret is derived, are sent. This ensures that the middleboxes can decrypt the entire hand-
shake.
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6.6 A new approach
The three proposals we have discussed so far, mcTLS, draft-green, and
draft-RHRD, all modify the way TLS works to transform a two-party end-
to-end protocol into a multi-party protocol. This approach means that all
the formal analyses that have been performed of TLS 1.3 are not valid if one
of these suggestions is in use. Our suggestion takes a different approach.
We take a multi-party protocol and layer TLS 1.3 on top of it, to con-
struct a composite protocol. This makes clear the exact relationship between
TLS 1.3 and the lower layer protocol. In the previous two chapters we dis-
cuss EAs and LEAs, which layer protocols on top of TLS 1.3. With this
suggestion we layer TLS 1.3 on top of another protocol. By applying the
same channel bindings logic we believe that we can construct a composite
protocol that it is possible reason about formally.
The multi-party protocol we choose is MLS [Bar+18], a protocol being
developed at the IETF to construct a common base for group messaging
applications. MLS is under active development, and thus any analysis de-
pends on the exact end state of MLS. However, we base our construction on
research into asynchronous ratcheting trees (ARTs) [Coh+17], which form
the suggested base for the key-exchange phase of MLS, and has had some
formal analysis. Where details of MLS have yet to be defined we use the
details suggested in ART.
The intuition for how this would work is that the client and server would
establish a group with any requisite middleboxes, and use the key from this
group to derive an out-of-band pre-shared key for a TLS 1.3 handshake. By
using a multiparty protocol for the establishment of the OOB PSK means
that rather than trying to construct a multi-party protocol from a two-party
protocol, we instead use a multi-party protocol to establish the multi-party
key, then use a two-party protocol for the two party portion of the protocol.
We also provide a mechanism for ensuring that middleboxes cannot break
the integrity or authenticity of the connection. Further by using a standard
mode of TLS 1.3 we do not invalidate analyses of the specification.
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Constructing our layering from two protocols that have some formal
analysis and constructing a contributive channel binding, in line with the
Bhargavan hypothesis, gives us some confidence that our construction is
reasonable, although we leave a formal analysis for future work.
6.7 MLS
MLS defines a multi-party key agreement protocol, that is designed to define
the security guarantees for group messaging systems a` la WhatsApp. The
purpose is to establish a shared key between a group of people suitable for
encrypting messages between them. MLS has various group management
features such as adding and removing people from the group. We make use
of these features to ensure that before each connection between a client and
server they explicitly agree again on the middleboxes involved. MLS uses two
tree constructions that we introduce here. ARTs are used to establish secret
keys, Merkle trees are used to efficiently commit to a group of participants.
6.7.1 Asynchronous ratcheting trees
Asynchronous ratcheting trees (ARTs) are described in work by Cohn-Gordon
et al. [Coh+17], and we follow their notation. An ART is a left-balanced bi-
nary tree whose root is the shared secret key, and whose leaves are DH
secret keys.[10] Each non-leaf node contains links to its two children and
some ancillary data. In particular, if its two children contain x and y then
the node contains gxy. The root key, therefore, is constructed of a tower of
exponentials.[11] We call the key at the root of the ART the root key.
Each node in the ART contains a DH secret key, which is then used as
a private key.[12] We can construct a second tree, T , in which each node
corresponds to a node in the ART, and contains the public key of private
key stored in the corresponding node, i.e. if a node in the ART contains x
the corresponding node in T contains gx, we call T the tree of public keys.
[10]Note that we use the term secret keys to refer to the result of a DHE, gxy, as opposed
to the private portion of a DH key share, i.e. x or y.
[11]Recall that all these exponentiations are modulo some prime p, and thus the key
remains in the keyspace.
[12]Excluding the root node.
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Because we assume the DH problem is hard[13], we can publish T and an
attacker gains no advantage in deriving any of the private keys.
If an actor, Alice, wishes to establish a shared key with a group, Bob,
Charlie, . . . ; she acquires ephemeral DH key shares from all prospective
participants, including herself[14], EK0, . . . , EKn. She then creates a new
DH key, called the setup key, suk. Using the setup key and the key shares she
computes a shared key, λi := (EKi)
suk, with each participant. We refer to
the node constructed from an actor’s DH key share as the actor’s node. Using
these keys as the leaves of the tree she can now compute the root secret.
Because the root secret contains contributions from all the participants each
can be sure it has sufficient entropy.
Alice now sends a four part message to all the participants. The message
contains the following.
1. The list of ephemeral keys used, EK0, . . . , EKn;
2. The public portion of the setup key, gsuk;
3. A tree, T , containing the public key of each node in the ART; and
4. A signature of items 1 - 3.
Let EKi represent Bob’s ephemeral key share, and let eki represent the
private portion of EKi. On receipt of Alice’s message Bob can compute
λi := (g
suk)eki . Knowing just λi and T Bob can compute the root secret as
follows.
To compute the root secret Bob must extract the co-path of λi from
T .[15] The co-path of a node is defined as the node’s sibling, the sibling of its
parent, and so on, until the root. The sibling of λi in T is g
λj .[16] Using these
two values Bob can compute gλiλj , the secret value of his parent node in the
ART. Using the copath of his parent node in T , Bob can now compute the
secret of his grandparent and so on, until he computes the secret of the root.
[13]See Section 2.3.2.
[14]For simplicity, we here describe the unauthenticated version of this computation. For
the authenticated version see [Coh+17, p. 20]
[15]Note that Alice can compute the secret directly during construction of the ART.
[16]Where j = i± 1
209
6.7. MLS
Bob can only compute the secrets of his direct ancestors, not the secrets of
his siblings. Using this mechanism all members of the group share a key,
but only those whose key shares were included in the ART can compute the
root secret.
Cohn-Gordon et al. use a technique proposed by Marlinspike [Mar13] to
achieve asynchronous key establishment. Users of the protocol sign a number
of key shares with their public certificate, and send them to an untrusted
server. When an actor, Alice, wishes to communicate with another actor,
Bob, she can go to the untrusted server and request pre-keys for Bob. This
allows Alice to complete a DHE with Bob even if he is oﬄine. By posting
her setup message to the server, when Bob comes back online he can retrieve
the setup message and compute the keys, even if Alice is oﬄine. We call the
server untrusted because even a malicious server cannot achieve any malign
outcome beyond a simple DoS. This design is such that even if the server is
legally compelled to attack its users, it is technically incapable of doing so.
The use of an untrusted server is of particular interest in our case, be-
cause not all middleboxes will be available all the time. Unlike mcTLS, where
if one middlebox goes down so does the entire network, with asynchronous
key establishment a middlebox that is added to a session whilst it is oﬄine,
will be able to decrypt that session when it again comes online.
6.7.2 Merkle trees
The second part of the MLS key establishment protocol involves Merkle
trees. A Merkle tree is a tree of elements, whose key property is that the size
of a proof that an element is in the tree grows logarithmically in the number
of leaves in the tree. In MLS Merkle trees are used to efficiently commit to
a set of identity keys. These identity keys correspond to the identities of the
participants. Whilst ARTs establishes keys between a group of participants
Merkle trees provide a robust way of committing to the identities of those
members.
Merkle trees were proposed by Merkle [Mer88]. Originally Merkle trees
were constructed with DES operations, but they are now constructed with
hash algorithms. A leaf node in a Merkle tree is constructed h(1 || e), where
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h is a hash function, || is the concatenation operation, and e is the element
in the tree. A parent is constructed from its left and right children, h(2 ||
left child || right child).
To prove an element, e, is in the tree it is sufficient to provide e and
all nodes on its co-path. The verifier can then compute the path from e to
the root. If the computed root node matches the expected root node then
the verification succeeds. Because it is infeasible to find two different values
that hash to the same value it is sufficient for the verifier to store just the
root node. Thus if two parties agree on the root of the Merkle tree then they
both agree on all its elements.
In MLS the Merkle tree contains identities for all the participants, and
the leaf nodes of the Merkle tree correspond to the leaf nodes of the ART.
6.8 Layering MLS over TLS
We now begin to compose the MLS and TLS 1.3 protocols, see Figure 6.1
for a sketch of the complete protocol. We use the multi-party key exchange
defined by Cohn-Gordon et al. [Coh+17] to agree a key between all the
participants. Before a TLS session the client performs an MLS run adding
all the participants in the protocol, including the server and any observers.
At the end of an MLS run all participants agree on the root of the ART
and the Merkle tree, amongst other things. We refer to the leaf key shared
between the client and server as λcs. Because we define the client to be the
group initiator we can be certain this exists.
6.9 Channel binding
We now construct a channel binding that will uniquely identify an MLS run.
We will construct what we term a pairwise channel binding.
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Definition 6.9.1. Pairwise Channel Binding. A pairwise channel bind-
ing is a value produced at the end of a multi-party protocol run, such
that no two protocol runs with different parameters produce the same
value, and no two distinct pairs of participants in the protocol produce
the same value.
In our case, we construct a channel binding that uniquely identifies an
MLS run and designates two participants, the client and the server. This
definition allows us to capture the multi-party to two-party transition, dis-
tinguishing the client and server from the middleboxes.
Our work in Chapter 4, in particular the definitions of ICA and contribu-
tive channel bindingss (CCBs), see Definitions 4.4.4 and 4.4.7, tells us that a
channel binding that authenticates future / later runs needs to include con-
tributions based on the shared secrets established during the run. To this
end we include contributions from the root secret. To establish a pairwise
channel binding, and thus to authentically identify two participants as the
client and the server we also include a contribution from λcs. λcs can only
be computed by the someone who knows the setup key suk or ekS
[17], i.e.
the client or the server.[18],[19] The MLS draft [Bar+18, pp. 16-17] defines
the minimal elements that each participant needs to maintain of the MLS
session state. We use this as a basis for our channel binding, because we
know that the server will be certain to know these values. A participant
must store:
1. Its index in the identity and ratchet trees;
2. The private key of its key share, used to construct the leaf keys;
3. The private key associated with its identity key in the identity tree;
4. The current epoch number;
[17]Recall that ekS is the private portion of the key EKS
[18]This use may invalidate the computational proof of ART, but because it is only used
to key an HMAC, it might not.
[19]We assume the ART is bound to the identity tree by the end of the run, but if not
the channel binding must also be signed.
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5. The group ID (GID);
6. The co-path of its leaf in the identity tree;
7. The co-path of its leaf in the ART;
8. The message encryption secret;
9. The current add key pair; and
10. The current init secret.
Because we do not use the messaging functionality of MLS the message
encryption secret is not relevant to our use case. The epoch number, add key
pair and the init secret relate to group management functions, which we do
not discuss, save to note that we assume that once the group management
features have been developed and have stabilised they will be analysed and
will achieve a reasonable level of security. Once MLS is complete, if the
group management functions are not useful for our purposes we can simply
construct a new group for each new set of participants.
The group ID (GID) is simply a value that uniquely identifies groups,
which remains constant when adding and removing members.
Based on this state, we propose the following construction for the channel
binding for the client, server pair.
HMAC(λcs, <epoch,
group id,
cipher suite,
identity co− pathS ,
ratchet co− pathS >)
6.9.1 Analysis under Bhargavan et al.’s framework
Examining this design under Bhargavan et al.’s framework shows this chan-
nel binding to be contributive by construction. As there is no prior layer we
only need to show that the channel binding is dependent on the params[20]
and the session secrets. The params in this case are as follows.
[20]See Section 4.4.3
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params = (ci, cr, sid, cb, cbin) where
ci := SUK,
cr := idS ,
sid := GID,
cb := as above,
and cbin := ⊥
Where idS is the server’s identity in the identity tree. The channel binding
is dependent on λcs, which is dependent on SUK.
[21] The identity co-path
constitutes a proof that idS is in the identity tree, and thus the channel
binding is dependent on idS . The GID is included directly in the channel
binding, and there is no prior layer.
The session secrets established are the ratchet root key and λcs, both of
which are included in the channel binding.
6.9.2 Channel bindings in TLS 1.3
A shortcoming of the TLS 1.3 specification is that it does not include an
explicit API for adding channel bindings. This means there is no explicit
way for the client to signal that it is aware, at the TLS layer, that it is
being bound to lower layer. Channel bindings were originally proposed for
use with insecure legacy protocols that could not be changed. This would
seem to imply that this construction is acceptable, however this is not the
case in general. In the legacy case it is implicitly assumed that it is general
knowledge that the legacy protocol is insecure. Further it is assumed that the
secure outer protocol strictly increases the security. Because TLS 1.3 is con-
sidered highly secure, and layering it with MLS weakens the confidentiality
guarantee neither of these assumptions holds in our case.
The ideal solution would be for TLS 1.3 to have an input to the key
schedule explicitly for channel binding, which given that it has an output
for channel bindings would bring it in line with the channel bindings re-
quirements in RFC 5056 [RFC5056, p. 6].
[21]Recall that SUK is the public portion of suk.
214
6.9. Channel binding
Another approach would be to assume that any application creating an
MLS with TLS session is aware at the application layer. This solution is less
than ideal, because whilst the author of the application may or may not be
aware that this solution is in use, this is not necessarily signalled to the user.
We propose two technical measures[22] that ensure this data is available
to, and understood by, the TLS layer, and require that the TLS layer be
responsible for signalling this to the user. Specifically, to use MLS with TLS
with these measures would require modifications to the TLS libraries, and
thus we can require the implementers to provide the appropriate signalling.
In practice, for reasons we discuss later, we do not expect MLS with TLS to
be implemented in browsers, and thus the need for user signalling is limited.
The first of our proposed measures is to require the channel binding to
include a truncated copy of the ClientHello, specifically everything before
the PSK IDs, including the client nonce.
HMAC(λcs, <Truncate(ClientHello),
epoch,
group id,
cipher suite,
identity frontierS ,
ratchet frontierS >)
This is a shorter truncation than used in the TLS 1.3 specification to
truncate the ServerHello, which includes the PSK IDs, but not the PSK
binders. Because, as we describe in the next section, we include the channel
binding in the PSK ID, we must truncate earlier. This construction requires
the channel binding to be computed at the TLS layer with access to all the
fields identifying the MLS session, rather than allowing the caller to simply
pass the TLS library the PSK ID and its PSK. This would require support at
the TLS layer. Our construction works effectively without this modification,
and it may be preferable to not support MLS with TLS in libraries to make
it is less likely to spread outside the data centre, but this is a trade-off
between ensuring user visibility and controlling the spread of deployment.
[22]We introduce the first of these below, and the second in Section 6.12.
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6.10 PSK-identifier
The client constructs the PSK identifier as follows.[23]
< group id, client index, server index, channel binding >
The server can identify the session and participants from the first three
fields, and calculate the appropriate channel binding, to compare with the
last field. The key used in the session is constructed from the secret portion
of the root key. We propose the following construction.
HMAC(root key, ``mls with tls, oob psk'')
This allows us to use the key independently of any other usage of the
ART root key, following the best practice of labelling keys.
6.11 Cipher suites
We propose a new cipher suite mode that simply appends a MAC tag to
each TLS record before it is passed to a standard mode. If the MAC key is
independent of the keys used for the AEAD then it would appear that this
doesn’t affect the security of the AEAD, because the security of AEAD is
independent of the plaintext. In this scenario we use a key derived from λcs
to MAC the messages. We propose the following construction.
HMAC(λcs, ‘‘mls with tls, mac key’’)
We refer to this as the record MAC key. This provides integrity and
pairwise authentication of the messages to the client and server. The other
participants can read the channel, but cannot write correctly formed mes-
sages to the channel or verify the MAC tag. This construction addresses
a problem with draft-green and draft-RHRD, both of which sacrifice the
authenticity and integrity guarantees of TLS 1.3 along with confidentiality.
[23]Because MLS is still under active development we use a symbolic style, and do not
give specific types or ranges. When work on MLS is complete we will revisit this work and
specify these details.
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6.12 Participants extension
We further propose an extension to TLS, the participants extension. This
extension is empty when sent by the client. The server returns the identity
tree, the ART, the client and server nonce, along with a MAC tag keyed
with the record MAC key. This makes the identities of the participants
transparent to the TLS library. A TLS library that implements this extension
must include the relevant signalling to the user that MLS with TLS is in use,
and further exactly which identities are in the tree, and thus are monitoring
the connection. This is the second of our two mechanisms for ensuring user
visibility.
If the channel binding does not include the truncated ClientHello, i.e.
uses the first construction we suggest, and the client does not support this
extension at the TLS layer, the user may not know that they are in a visibility
scenario. In this case sending the extension unprompted would correctly
abort the connection.
Use of this extension makes the use of this mechanism visible on the wire.
Prior to draft-18 of the TLS 1.3 specification clients that received extensions
that they didn’t send in the ClientHello[24] were required to abort with
an “unsupported extension” alert [Res16, p. 35]. By the final specification
this had changed such that an actor receiving the response portion of an
extension they did not request was required to abort [RFC8446, p. 36]. We
could thus alternatively define this extension such that the server sends the
extension during the encrypted extensions as an indicator, without needing
prompting from the client. This makes use of MLS with TLS indistinguish-
able to an adversary.[25] However a client unaware of MLS with TLS would
simply ignore the extension in this latter design. When this indistinguish-
able design is in use we rely on the inclusion of the Truncate(ClientHello)
mechanism to ensure the client is aware of MLS with TLS.
[24]With the exception of the Cookie extension
[25]Whilst this is true from a symbolic perspective it may be possible to detect by
analysing the length of the server’s EncryptedExtensions.
217
6.13. Sketch of the complete composition
Client Distribution
Server
Middlebox Server
InitKeys(gM )
InitKeys(gS)
ReqInitKeys(M,S)
InitKeys(gM ), InitKeys(gS)
Init(grpid, R, g
M , SUK, T )∗
Init(grpid, R, g
S , SUK, T )∗
ClientHello(PSKid, λCS)
ServerHello(Participants)
Finished
[Application Data]
Establish
pre-keys
Establish MLS
Session
Establish OOB
TLS Session
Figure 6.1: Sketch of the MLS with TLS protocol. The starred Init messages
are currently undefined in the MLS specification, and thus we base the
parameters off the ART protocol [Coh+17].
As with our earlier mechanism, this extension can be entirely elided with
no effect on the efficacy of the protocol, and is only useful for ensuring user
awareness.
6.13 Sketch of the complete composition
In this section we provide a sketch of the complete protocol composition, in
the form of parametrised messages.
The actors in this sketch are the client, C, the server, S, the distribution
server, D, and a middlebox, M .
218
6.13. Sketch of the complete composition
M → D : InitKey(pk(skM ), gM )
S → D : InitKey(pk(skS), gS)
C → D : ReqInitKey(M,S)
D → C : InitKey(pk(skM ), gM ), InitKey(pk(skS), gS)
C → S : Init(grpid, Roster(C, S,M), gS , SUK, T )
C →M : Init(grpid, Roster(C, S,M), gS , SUK, T )
C → S : ClientHelloPSK(gid, C, S, HMAC(gCS′ , Roster(C, S,M)))
S → C : ServerHello(Participants(Roster(C, S,M)))
C → S : Finished
The proposed structure of the InitKey message when sent by an actor,
A, is as follows. [26]
〈g, gA, pk(skA), sig alg, signature〉
where signature is a signature of the message signed with A’s LTK.
signature := {g, gA, pk(skA), sig alg}skA
The ReqInitKey message does not yet have a specified form.
The Init message does not yet have a specified form, so we have based
the parameters on the form in Cohn-Gordon et al. [Coh+17]. The form in
Cohn-Gordon et al. is as follows.
〈index(A), [pk(skX) | X ∈ Actors], gA, SUK, copath(A)〉
Because the MLS protocol does not currently have a mechanism for
instantiating a group with more than one member, groups are created by
adding each member one by one. This has the longer form:
C → S : {grp id, epoch, roster, T, transcript, init secret}gS (Welcome)
C → D : 〈g, gS , pk(skS), sig alg, signature〉 (Add)
S → D : copath(gS′) (Update)
[26]This structure has slightly simplified for clarity. The first two fields, g and gA, are in
fact a list of groups and a corresponding list of public keys respectively.
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Where the messages sent to the distribution server, D, are forwarded to all
members of the group (including S).
The Welcome message has all the information S needs to join the group,
and is encrypted with S’s init key. The Add message, which has the same
structure as the InitKey message is sent to all group members, including
S, and is used to update the group state to include S. S then immediately
sends an Update message, updating its leaf key to a new key constructed
from a new DH public key, gS
′
.
6.14 Proposed usage
We don’t anticipate that MLS with TLS will receive support in TLS libraries,
particularly we anticipate that MLS with TLS will not be supported by
browsers. We consider this a vital lynchpin in ensuring MLS with TLS is
confined to data centres and enterprise networks.
Because MLS with TLS requires support on both endpoints, and we an-
ticipate limited support we propose MLS with TLS be used in conjunction
with split TLS. Split TLS refers to the practice of terminating a TLS con-
nection at a middlebox and creating a new connection with the destination.
For connections that both start and end inside the enterprise network
where the client does not support MLS with TLS we propose that the client’s
TLS 1.3 connection be terminated near the client, with the middlebox cre-
ating an MLS with TLS connection on to the server. The middlebox near
the client could be an end-point agent[27] on the machine, or a proxy near
the client on the network.
If neither the server or the client support MLS with TLS then the con-
nection can be split twice, once near the client, and once near the server.
For connections that leave the network, the middlebox must terminate at
the edge. Similarly, TLS 1.3 connections that enter the network from outside
can be terminated by a middlebox authorised to act as the server, and MLS
with TLS run on the internal network.
[27]An end-point agent is a piece of software running on the client or server that performs
some extra function. In this case splitting the TLS connection.
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This setup has the advantage that it requires the terminating middle-
boxes to be able to act as certificate authorities for the internal network.
Establishing a certificate authority company-wide is possible by requiring
the addition of a certificate to the root of trust for each device, however
obtaining a certificate authority certificate that is in the “standard” root of
trust is quickly detected, and can lead to the issuing authority being shut
down.
Famously, Symantec, formerly one of the oldest and largest certificate au-
thorities, was found to be mis-issuing such certificates and was removed from
the roots of trust shipped with Chrome[28] and Firefox[29], which together
capture the majority of the browser market. This meant that Symantec cer-
tificates became much less useful, and consequently much less valuable. This
forced Symantec to sell off their PKI business.[30] This means that whilst this
mechanism will be effective within corporate environments, any attempts to
deploy it across the internet will be detected.
This configuration has advantages over using split TLS alone. First, with
split TLS the connection is only decryptable at active middleboxes, this
means that either there are only a small number of points where a connection
can be read, or there is a high degree of latency as each middlebox decrypts
and re-encrypts the connection. With MLS with TLS forming the majority
of the connection, middleboxes can be added at virtually any point, with
no increase in latency beyond connection setup. Further, because MLS uses
pre-keys such that participants do not have to be simultaneously online, the
increase in setup time for each new participant is very small as the client only
needs to make one round trip to the keying server. This configuration has
similar advantages over mcTLS, although it does not offer the fine-grained
control over what content can be seen by the middlebox.
[28]https : / / security . googleblog . com / 2017 / 09 / chromes - plan - to - distrust -
symantec.html
[29]https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2018/03/12/distrust- symantec- tls-
certificates/
[30]https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/08/03/symantec_q1_2018/
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6.15 Security considerations
In this section we discuss the security goals of our layered protocol. The
TINFOIL document [Far18] is the best summary of all the objections raised
against the other drafts. We thus enumerate our security goals, and then
proceed systematically through the objections raised. In Section 6.15.3 we
discuss shortcomings of our proposal that have not been earlier addressed.
6.15.1 Security goals
We here enumerate the security goals of MLS with TLS. These goals are
very similar to the goals of TLS 1.3, and we do not examine them in great
detail.
1. Secret session keys: No-one outside the group of participants can read
the session.
2. Authentication: No messages will be accepted except those written by
the client or the server.
3. Channel binding: The MLS session will be agreed upon by all partici-
pants.
4. Transparency: Both the client and server agree on all participants.
5. Protection of endpoint identities: The TLS handshake does not reveal
the identities of the participants to a passive outside observer.
6. PFS: Compromise of a participant does not reveal the contents of
messages from a previous MLS epoch.
7. Post-compromise security (PCS): After an MLS Update an attacker
who cannot derive the updated root key cannot compute any derived
secrets.
6.15.2 General concerns
We here enumerate the arguments against all earlier proposals, and discuss
how they apply to the various proposals, including our own. We highlight
which criticisms apply to which proposals in Table 6.1
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Weakening confidentiality
It is argued that all proposals weaken the confidentiality of TLS 1.3, and thus
are prima facie a bad idea. This proposal increases the number of parties
who can read the TLS channel. This weakens the confidentiality guarantee
of TLS and replaces it with the guarantee from MLS. Alternatively, if one
considers all participants except the client as extensions of the server, i.e. the
server is defined as a collection of end-points, or at least as not the adversary,
then a textualist reading of the definition of the secrecy of TLS session keys
holds [CK01, Def 1. part 2], and it can be argued that the confidentiality
guarantee remains unchanged.
All the proposals weaken the confidentiality guarantees of TLS 1.3, as
this is in fact the goal, but only mcTLS and MLS with TLS make these new
guarantees explicit.
Weakening TLS
It is argued that all proposals of this type weaken TLS, which is vastly
important given its ubiquity and the sensitivity of the data it protects.
mcTLS, draft-green, and draft-RHRD all modify TLS in ways that weaken
its security guarantees. draft-green and draft-RHRD in particular break
guarantees other than confidentiality. mcTLS is based on TLS 1.2, which
makes direct comparison of security guarantees impossible, but using mcTLS
and remaining on TLS 1.2 is certainly weaker than moving to TLS 1.3.
If used without the extension and cipher suite our proposal does not
require any changes to the TLS protocol, and therefore can be considered a
valid use of TLS 1.3. We thus argue that this cannot weaken the guarantees
of TLS 1.3, although perhaps TLS 1.3 has weaker guarantees than intended.
The two proposed changes we make to TLS 1.3, using the extension and
the cipher suite, improve the security guarantees achieved between the client
and server, and being independent of the values protected by TLS (bar the
OOB-PSK) do not weaken TLS.
224
6.15. Security considerations
Pervasive monitoring
Pervasive monitoring is a threat-model we must consider [RFC7258]. draft-
green is the most amenable to pervasive monitoring, requiring only changes
on the server end. A government could compel a server to implement draft-
green and without any cooperation from the client monitor all connec-
tions to the server. draft-RHRD, given its detectability on the wire, is also
problematic in this regard. A government could simply drop all connections
without the Visibility extension, effectively forcing all connections to be
monitorable. This criticism can also be made of mcTLS, although as a mod-
ification of TLS 1.2 it could also be argued that this is an improvement on
the status quo. Further with mcTLS the monitoring devices must be visible
to both endpoints, mitigating this risk at least partially.
In our case monitoring requires co-operation from both the client and
the server, and, unless the extension is sent by the client, cannot be detected
without active participation in every session by the monitor. Even a monitor
that just blocks any connection that doesn’t use MLS with TLS, assuming
it could detect its usage, would have to participate in the MLS handshake
to know whether on not it was involved in the session. Further, even if it
had been involved initially, the monitor would have to continue to check on
each handshake to determine whether it had been removed from the group.
Pervasive monitoring through draft-green [Gre+17] would be cheaper and
simpler to administer and enforce, requiring only co-operation from servers,
and operates as a panopticon where clients cannot determine whether a
given session is being monitored, and if it is, by whom. Further, because this
proposal requires an end-point agent, assuming it is not implemented in core
TLS, it would be simpler for a government to simply install an end-point
agent that performs monitoring directly, for example the endpoint agents
employed in Xinjiang province by China [McC17]. We suggest, therefore,
that this proposal does not greatly increase the risk of mass surveillance.
Secret monitoring
A criticism that does apply to our proposal, in particular the use of split
TLS with MLS with TLS could allow for secret monitoring.
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Use of our proposal requires the client and server to be aware that it is
in use, and to explicitly agree to use it. However, if the extension is not used
and the channel binding does not include the truncated ClientHello, an
endpoint agent could keep the fact that this mechanism is in use secret from
the client. This is problematic, and thus we propose that both the second
channel binding and the indistinguishable extension are used. However, an
endpoint agent could still keep this secret by MITMing the connection on
the client, and running MLS with TLS over the wire. In this threat model
however, an end-point agent could simply push all the plain-text in the
clear or publish the master secret. Further this threat model assumes that
the end-point agent is a malicious root of trust, which breaks all PKI based
protocols.
Hidden observers
A criticism of both draft-green and draft-RHRD is that even if partici-
pants know they are being monitored, they do not know by whom. With
mcTLS and with our proposal the client and the server must agree on all
participants, including certificates for each. By using the extension the client
and server must be explicitly aware of all participants at the TLS layer. To
a non-participating observer or a passive participant, the list of participants
in the session is secret. A passive participant does not know if it, or any
other participant, has been excluded from the session.
Mass deployment
A criticism of draft-green and draft-RHRD is that they could see mass
deployment, even if they are only intended to be used inside the data centre.
Because this protocol requires MLS to be run in conjunction with a TLS
connection it can only be used where both endpoints support it. If this
functionality is not included in browsers or other major libraries of TLS 1.3
its use will require the use of an endpoint agent, limiting its distribution to
areas under a single administrative domain.
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TLS complexity
A criticism of mcTLS and draft-RHRD is that they increase the complexity
of TLS and thus increase the chances of an attack. This proposal can be
implemented without modification of TLS, although it uses the OOB PSK
mechanism in a way that explicitly changes the confidentiality guarantees
of TLS. By pinning the confidentiality guarantees of the proposal on MLS,
and specifically ARTs, which have some formal analysis, we can ensure that
the minimum level of confidentiality is at least that of MLS. The same
reasoning can apply to PCS and PFS. Therefore whilst this criticism applies
to our proposal too, we argue that our proposal isolates TLS 1.3 from the
complexity as much as possible, and further, that the complexity can be
studied and that our proposal lends itself to formal analysis.
Two-party vs multi-party
A criticism of draft-green, draft-RHRD, and mcTLS is that they modify
TLS to turn a two-party protocol into a multi-party protocol. This trans-
formation is not well understood, and potentially invalidates all analyses of
TLS by changing the basic assumptions.
Our proposal avoids this problem by layering TLS 1.3 on top of a multi-
party protocol. TLS is a two-party protocol, so using a multi-party protocol
to establish the necessary keys is more appropriate. By then producing a
pairwise channel binding we only use TLS in a two-party manner. The trans-
formation therefore is from a multi-party protocol to a two-party protocol,
which is special case of a multi-party protocol.
Transparent and private
A design challenge was to design a protocol that is both transparent to the
client and server, but also private from the network. draft-green is invisible
to the network, but not transparent to the client. draft-RHRD and mcTLS
are both transparent to the client, but also detectable on the network.
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If the server sends the Participants extension unprompted then the use
of this mechanism is invisible to network intermediaries, except via side-
channels, but is explicitly agreed to by the client.[31] Further, a network
intermediary who mandates that it be included in every session cannot pas-
sively detect compliance, but must actively participate in the session, stay-
ing up-to-date with the MLS epoch and decrypting the handshake to ensure
that its DH share has been included in the ART. The participant cannot
discern, without participation until the end of the ServerHello, whether in
the latest MLS epoch it was excluded from the participants group.
Authentication and integrity
draft-green and draft-RHRD both allow middleboxes to derive the mas-
ter secret of the TLS channel. Because this key is used for confidentiality,
integrity, and authentication of the data, a middlebox that knows the key
is able to subvert integrity and authentication, as well as decrypt the data.
This means that both proposals weaken the TLS connection more than nec-
essary.
mcTLS allows for fine grained control of reads and writes, and once the
vulnerability found by Bhargavan et al. [Bha+18] was patched, provides ac-
countable proxying, i.e. middleboxes can modify the channel in an integrity
preserving way. By this we mean that any changes are detected by the end-
points, and attributed to the middlebox.
Our proposal preserves integrity and authentication by using a new ci-
pher suite mode and a seperate key to provide authenticity and integrity.
We thus improve on draft-green and draft-RHRD, but do not provide as
much functionality as mcTLS.
Formal analysis
draft-RHRD has not been subject to any formal analysis, which is a serious
criticism. Further the design invalidates the formal analyses of TLS 1.3 that
have already been done. TLS is a sufficiently important protocol that formal
[31]Assuming the client is aware of MLS with TLS, i.e. the second channel binding pro-
posal is used.
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analysis is required. A proposal that modifies TLS’s security guarantees
without any formal analysis is problematic, but one that invalidates previous
work is worse.
mcTLS has seen substantial formal analysis, although it is based on
TLS 1.2 which limits its applicability. draft-green arguably doesn’t change
the way TLS 1.3 operates, or rather is already a valid mechanism. However
it changes the base assumptions of TLS 1.3 in a way that invalidates some
analyses, including our own from Chapter 3.
Our proposal has complex guarantees and complex mechanisms. It needs
rigorous formal analysis before deployment. Because it only applies to a
single mode of TLS 1.3, and builds off the work of MLS which has already
seen some formal analysis, this work may well be tractable. Using MLS in
this way might invalidate the computational analysis of ART, but an initial
survey would suggest that extending the computational proof to this case
would be trivial. Because this proposal doesn’t require any changes to TLS
the prior analyses should still hold, with the caveat that all participants
bar the client are considered to be part of the server. The channel binding
between the two layers is contributive, and thus assuming the Bhargavan
hypothesis the composition is secure. Composing the analysis of MLS with
that of TLS 1.3 and considering the effect of the new cipher mode and
extension will require substantial amounts of effort, which we leave for future
work.
Standardising “broken” crypto
A criticism of draft-green and draft-RHRD is that they standardise “bro-
ken” cryptography. Standardising weaker forms of cryptography has been
the cause of vulnerabilities in TLS, even many years after the weaker forms
were considered deprecated. The LOGJAM [Adr+15] and FREAK [Beu+15]
attacks both compromise TLS connections by tricking them into using so
called “export grade” security. “Export grade” security limited the number
of bits American software could use in its keys if it was being exported out-
side the USA. Although this policy was terminated in the late 1990’s cipher
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suites with very short keys were still widely supported when these attacks
were found in 2015.
This was used as an argument against adoption of the two standards,
although in the case of draft-green there is nothing explicitly preventing
the server using static DH keys in the specification, and thus standardisation
is not strictly necessary. Further, in case of draft-green, the comparison
with “export grade” security is not strong. Every session has a strong key,
and if only a single session is run, it is indistinguishable from vanilla TLS
1.3. Sessions are only weaker in aggregate.
draft-RHRD suffers this criticism more. Because draft-RHRD introduces
a new extension it needs to be standardised in order to interoperate between
TLS 1.3 implementations. Further, a single session with the Visibility ex-
tension is weaker than one without, and standardisation would be standar-
dising weaker cryptography.
mcTLS does not suffer this criticism as it was proposed whilst TLS 1.3
was still in the early stages of development, and improves the security of
TLS 1.2. Further mcTLS is not an IETF standard.
We argue that this criticism does not apply to our proposal either. Our
proposal combines two other standards in a new way, and defines new se-
curity guarantees. With the exception of the confidentiality guarantee of
TLS it does not violate any of the guarantees of TLS 1.3, and for the confi-
dentiality guarantee offers the guarantee used in MLS. Different guarantees
are not inherently broken, in the same way that MLS is not considered
“broken” because multiple participants can read a group message. Further,
we assert that we do not break cryptography in any meaningful way. In
“export grade” cryptography keys have an intentionally limited number of
bits, and in draft-RHRD keys are intentionally exported, in comparison MLS
with TLS, to the best of our knowledge, does not use any constructions or
practices that are out of line with current best practice.
Revising threat models
A strong argument against including any of the proposals in a TLS 1.3 li-
brary is that any application that called the library would have to revise its
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threat model to consider the visibility case. Given the thousands of applica-
tions that make use of TLS as a base layer, and that may simply upgrade
to TLS 1.3 when their libraries get updated this is entirely infeasible.
We therefore suggest that our proposal not be included in such libraries,
but that it be activated by a separate call to a different library. Any appli-
cation taking this extra step has clearly done so with full knowledge of this
suggestion, and with the intent to use it. Further, our proposed deployment,
pairing MLS with TLS with split TLS mitigates this issue, because split
TLS is currently a threat model with TLS 1.3, and therefore must already
be considered by developers.
Multi-party forward secrecy policy
A criticism raised of draft-green and draft-RHRD is that there is no mecha-
nism by which the client or server can determine the forward secrecy policies
of other participants, and this applies equally to our proposal. For example
a logging device may just log all traffic and not update their epoch. This
would allow the logging device to decrypt historical logs, at the cost of for-
ward secrecy for the entire connection. Establishing these sort of policies is
an area of active development for MLS [Gil18].
Participant identity protection
TLS 1.3 guarantees endpoint identity protection, and it is not clear how that
guarantee would extend to middleboxes. In draft-green and draft-RHRD
the middleboxes are passive and thus cannot be identified by an outside
attacker, but in mcTLS an active attacker could collect certificates from
all participants. This suggests that whilst the client’s certificate must be
protected from active attackers, the certificates of middleboxes only need to
be protected from passive attackers.
If our protocol is implemented as written, even an active adversary can-
not enumerate the participants added to a connection without being one of
the participants added to the connection by the client. In practice however,
to aid participant discovery, the client will probably add a single “discov-
ery box”, that will then add all appropriate participants. This construction
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means that clients do not need to maintain an up-to-date list of middle-
boxes, just to be able to find a discovery box. In this case the participants
will have the same degree of identity protection as the server, i.e. protection
from passive adversaries.
Wiretapping
There was much debate whether the various proposals constituted wire-
tapping under the definition in RFC 2804 [RFC2804]. The RFC defines
wiretapping as follows.
“Wiretapping is what occurs when information passed across the Inter-
net from one party to one or more other parties is delivered to a third
party:
1. Without the sending party knowing about the third party
2. Without any of the recipient parties knowing about the delivery
to the third party
3. When the normal expectation of the sender is that the transmitted
information will only be seen by the recipient parties or parties
obliged to keep the information in confidence
4. When the third party acts deliberately to target the transmission
of the first party, either because he is of interest, or because the
second party’s reception is of interest.”
RFC 2804 [RFC2804, pp. 3-4]
For a protocol to be said to enable wiretapping all four conditions must
be violated.
The second clause has an unusual construction. Why worry specifically
about knowledge of delivery of the message, rather than knowledge of the
third party? This question is addressed in the work of Foucault [Fou95] when
discussing Panopticism. Panopticism is a reference to the work of Jeremy
Bentham on the Panopticon.
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The Panopticon is a prison design by Jeremy Bentham [Ben91]. It de-
scribes a ring of cells surrounding a central watchtower. The watchtower is
designed such that a warden within can see into any cell, but no prisoner can
see into the watchtower. This means that whilst the warden cannot watch
every cell at once, no prisoner knows whether or not he is being watched.
Famously critiqued by Foucault in his book Discipline and Punish [Fou95],
Foucault writes
“He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, as-
sumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them play
spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation
in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of
his own subjection”
Discipline and Punish [Fou95, pp. 202-203]
In short, because the prisoners know they could be being watched, they
self-regulate their behaviour as if they are being watched. In the same way,
the recipient of a message who knows that it could be being read, must
regulate its behaviour as if it is being read. This increases the power of the
observer over the observed.
This raises significantly different problems from those raised by monitor-
ing someone who is unaware they are being observed. Someone who does not
know they are being observed suffers a violation of their privacy, someone
who knows they are being observed suffers a violation of their autonomy.
draft-green was criticised for enabling wiretapping. It clearly violates
conditions 3 and 4. On at least the first connection it is undetectable to
the sender, and with minor modifications is always undetectable[32], which
violates condition 1.
[32]For example, by sharing the seed of a pseudo-random number generator with observers
the server could generate a virtually infinite stream of keys that the observers know, but
which it is nearly impossible to detect.
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A server configured to use a static DH key has no ability to determine
whether the monitor is listening. Even though it knows that a monitor could
listen, it does not know whether the plaintext is delivered to the third party,
violating condition 2.
draft-RHRD suffers from very similar criticism. The violation of condi-
tion 3 is not as clear, but if we consider the case where an adversary blocks
all connections without the Visibility extension, the situation becomes
that of the Panopticon. The violation of condition 1 comes from the lack of
sender knowledge of who the observers are.
mcTLS does not constitute wiretapping, as the client and the server
both are always aware that all middleboxes are actively participating in the
channel. This means that conditions 1 and 2 are not violated.
We argue that our proposal does not constitute wiretapping. Not only
is the client aware that the third party exists, it has a certificate from each
middlebox, thus condition 1 is not violated. We argue that condition 2 is not
violated, or at least it cannot be easily reduced to the case of the Panopticon.
Consider the case where a middlebox, if it detects it does not have access to
a connection, blocks said connection. This is the reduction we use for draft-
RHRD. The server could detect whether the middlebox is observing a given
connection by removing it from the group. If the middlebox is not actively
processing MLS group updates then it will be unaware that it has been
ejected from the group and allow the connection to proceed. Thus the server
can test for message delivery, leaving condition 2 unviolated.[33] Condition
3 is also unviolated, because the client actively nominates the middleboxes
that may view the connection, thus it cannot have an expectation that said
middleboxes will not read it.
TLS charter violation
The TLS WG objected to draft-green and draft-RHRD being accepted as
work for the WG on the grounds that it is outside the WG’s charter. The
TLS WG charter calls for improving the security of TLS 1.3, in particular
with respect to privacy [Gro18]. draft-green is already permissible within
[33]This argument applies equally to the client.
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TLS 1.3, and constitutes wiretapping, giving the WG a strong reason to
object to accepting it as work. draft-RHRD breaks forward secrecy, uses key
revelation and enables wiretapping, giving the WG grounds to object to it
under BCP 200 [BCP200] and RFC 2804 [RFC2804] respectively. mcTLS
was not raised with the TLS WG so this objection is not applicable.
Our proposal can be implemented under TLS 1.3 without any changes,
and thus does not violate the charter in that form. Adding the cipher suite
and extension, which would require work from the WG, strictly improve the
security of a valid deployment of TLS, and thus, we argue, do not constitute
a violation of the charter.
Key revelation
draft-RHRD uses key revelation, which is not best practice [BCP200]. Our
mechanism uses a key agreement protocol, and there is no mechanism for key
revelation. Further a participant added to the MLS session after the TLS
handshake has begun is unable to read that session. Only after a second
handshake with agreement from both the client and server can the new
participant read the channel.
Points of attack
A criticism of all the proposals is that, by complicating TLS 1.3, they in-
crease the area which can be attacked. Whilst our proposal increases the
number of points of attack, particularly on the confidentiality of a TLS ses-
sion, we believe with formal analysis these risks can be militated against.
Formal analysis reduces the attack surface by forcing attacks to be on im-
plementations rather than on the protocol design.
6.15.3 Specific concerns
In this section we discuss concerns specific to our proposal.
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Composition complexity
Protocol composition is hard, and channel bindings in particular have of-
ten been attacked, including those designed for use in TLS 1.3 [Cre+16]
[BBK17]. Before deployment this proposal would require rigorous formal
analysis.
Session linkability
In our design the group ID field remains the same for repeated handshakes,
even after MLS updates. This weakens the privacy guarantees achievable in
TLS 1.3. It is unclear how this identity could be masked. If this is a problem
in a particular environment then a new MLS group could be negotiated for
each connection, at the cost of efficiency.
ART computational proof
The re-use of the leaf-keys from MLS potentially invalidates the compu-
tational proof of ART, but is required for the construction of a pairwise
channel binding (i.e. one that distinguishes between pairs of participants in
an MLS session). Therefore our proposal would need analysis as a composite
protocol.
Malicious servers
A client that relies on an end-point agent to perform the MLS run, and uses
the first channel binding construction, cannot at the TLS layer confirm that
the identity tree sent by the server is the one used in the MLS run. If the
second construction is used the client can verify the tree, if it trusts the
end-point agent. Even using the second construction the client can still be
tricked into using the wrong identity tree, but this relies on the end-point
agent and the server maliciously collaborating. Without direct support for
MLS with TLS in TLS libraries this seems hard to resolve.
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6.16 Conclusions
In this chapter we propose a novel method for achieving limited visibility
into the payload of TLS 1.3 connections using the OOB PSK mode. We
propose two variants, one which requires no changes to TLS 1.3, and one
that requires only changes that strictly improve security. By splitting our
proposal into these two variants we can easily demonstrate that (1) MLS
with TLS does not weaken TLS 1.3, although we do highlight that the
OOB PSK mode has weaker guarantees than might have been expected and
(2) that our proposed changes to TLS 1.3 meet at least some of the criteria
for extensions to TLS, namely that they do not weaken security.
Our design is carefully constructed to aid formal analysis, which we leave
for future work. Our design uses best practices, to minimise the risk of flaws.
We construct our design of two pieces, asynchronous ratcheting trees (ARTs)
and TLS 1.3 OOB PSK mode, both of which have been the subject of rigor-
ous formal study [Coh+17] [Cre+16] [Cre+17a]. The Bhargavan hypothesis,
that composite protocols layered with CCBs are secure, has been successful
in finding and fixing flaws in composite protocols [BDP15]. This gives evi-
dence that protocols constructed in this way are likely to be secure, and by
constructing our composition in this way we minimise the risk of flaws.
In Section 6.15 we carefully compare our proposal to earlier proposals,
and consider objections that may be raised. We show that MLS with TLS
avoids many of the flaws that made prior proposals problematic, and where
we cannot completely avoid the flaws, we discuss how we can militate against
them.
We argue that MLS with TLS is a reasonable composition, and wor-
thy of further study. Specifically we propose that a formal analysis of MLS
with TLS be performed, which would ameliorate the remaining technical
concerns. This analysis needs to await the completion, or at least the sta-
bilisation of the MLS draft, but once this milestone has been reached, we
expect the analysis to be feasible.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
In this thesis we study TLS and its use in composite protocols. A central
theme has been the use of formal analysis both to evaluate security protocols,
and also as an aid in designing them. A secondary theme has been the anal-
ysis of composite protocols. Protocols have become more and more complex
in design as we try and achieve more and more complex effects. Rather than
construct ever more complex protocols from the same base primitives, these
complex protocols can be constructed by using other protocols as building
blocks. We study how these protocols can be securely composed, and what
effects they can achieve. A tertiary theme is the interaction between the
IETF and the formal analysis community. By performing analysis on pro-
tocol designs before they are standardised flaws in the design can be fixed
before they become a problem in the real world. This interaction has pro-
vided a fruitful area of practical research problems and allowed the formal
analysis community to contribute their expertise to the production of real
world protocols.
As protocols have become more complex analysing them has become
more difficult. This has driven the development of ever more powerful anal-
ysis tools, and in Chapter 3 we show that it is now possible to analyse a
protocol as complex as TLS 1.3 in a single piece. We analyse TLS 1.3 us-
ing the protocol analysis tool Tamarin [Sch+12], proving that it meets its
claimed security guarantees. However we also find that there is an ambiguity
on the client side, such that it can never know it is authenticated.
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When presented to the TLS WG, this ambiguity was not considered
severe enough to warrant changing the handshake itself. In a similar manner,
a known replay attack on the 0-RTT mode of TLS 1.3 was not fixed in the
protocol. Both problems are noted in the TLS 1.3 specification [RFC8446, p.
146, pp. 150-151], which requires that they be protected against at a different
layer. This is because the costs of mitigating it were high, and the security
benefit low. To mitigate either issue at the TLS layer would require an
additional message be sent, adding latency to the connection. This highlights
the trade-offs inherent in protocol design, in this case trading better security
at the TLS layer for faster speeds, which will increase adoption.
Throughout this work we develop the understanding of composite pro-
tocols, and in particular the properties that relate one layer of the protocol
to another. In Chapter 4 we analyse EAs, and their relationship to TLS.
The literature on compound authentication, a property that defines the re-
lationship between different layers of a composite protocol, was previously
related to a fairly restricted set of protocols. We extend this work with two
new properties, inward compound authentication (ICA) and outward com-
pound authentication (OCA). These two properties allowed us to formalise
and prove the security guarantees of EAs, whereas earlier techniques were
only able to reason about a restricted set of results.
EAs define a two layer composite protocol, comprising of a TLS session
and a single EA. In Chapter 5 we use the definition of OCA to extend EAs
to LEAs, producing a n-layer composite protocol, using TLS as a base layer,
and then layering EAs one atop the other. We describe different layering
patterns, leading us to define authentication forests, allowing us to describe
very complex authentication properties. Pushing the boundaries of Tamarin,
we prove a partial set of results about our composite protocol. We leave com-
pletion of the proof for future work, along with an analysis of the extended
set of use cases and design changes suggested at the IETF 102 meeting. By
proposing work to the TLS WG we invert the pattern of protocols being
proposed by the engineering community. Our proposal had a fairly niche set
of use cases, but presentation to the TLS WG led to the suggestion of a
number of other areas of application, most notably for extending authenti-
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cation across a resumption. This again shows that the interaction between
formal analysis community and the IETF is useful to both.
Chapter 6 inverts another of the patterns in the thesis. EAs and LEAs
both build layers on top of a base TLS layer. We construct a composite
protocol that uses a protocol called MLS as base layer, and TLS 1.3 as
an upper layer. This construction lets us achieve complex properties, in
particular it allows an authenticated and authorised group of third-parties to
decrypt, but not modify, the contents of the TLS connection. This work was
inspired by a contentious discussion in the TLS WG over whether to support
this use case. Numerous technical objections were raised to modifying TLS
1.3 to support this use case. Our construction is designed such that TLS 1.3
may be used unmodified to achieve this effect, whilst avoiding or militating
against all technical objections to previous proposals. This demonstrates the
power and flexibility of composite protocols, allowing for the construction of
a highly complex protocol, with complex properties which is also amenable
to formal analysis, which we leave to future work.
Our work pushes the boundaries of formal analysis, extending the set of
protocols we can reason about and advancing modelling techniques to allow
current tools to analyse more complex protocols. We also provide more ev-
idence for the Bhargavan hypothesis, showing that EAs, which use CCBs,
achieve various compound authentication properties. Finally, our work shows
that it is possible to construct complex composite protocols with nuanced
properties that achieve effects that multiple earlier attempts based on mod-
ifying a single layer protocol had failed to achieve.
7.1 Future work
Throughout this thesis we propose a number of pieces of future work. We
suggest that the EA model be integrated into the TLS model, removing the
abstraction in the EA model, and providing a much more robust result. To
achieve this result would require work on both the TLS and EA models to
make them more memory efficient.
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Another future line of work is to complete the proof of the LEA model.
Currently the proof only holds for the immediately preceding EA, this means
that whilst we can reason about a 3-layer TLS-EA-LEA composite protocol,
we cannot generalise this result to an n-layer composite protocol. Integrating
this LEA model with the TLS model would greatly improve the fidelity of the
result. Further it would let us examine the use of LEAs across resumptions;
a proposed use case of LEAs.
A third line of work we propose is a formal analysis of MLS with TLS.
This work requires the MLS protocol to be closer to completion but would
provide useful results, finding any potential vulnerabilities in the design and
allowing progress to be made both in the MLS with TLS protocol and in
the design of composite protocols in general.
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Appendix A
TLS Model State Diagrams
C0start
C1
C2a
C2b
C2c
C2d
C3
C4
S0start
S1
S2a
S2b
S2c
S2d
S3
S4
ClientPSK ServerPSK
client gen keys
recv encrypted extensions
recv certificate request OR
skip recv certificate request
client auth OR
client auth certcert req ctxt 6= ‘0’
cert req ctxt = ‘0’
hello retry request
server gen keys
encrypted extensions
certificate request OR
skip certificate request
cert req ctxt 6= ‘0’
recv client auth OR
recv client auth cert
cert req ctxt = ‘0’
ClientHello
+Extensions
ServerHello
+Extensions
EncryptedExtensions
CertificateRequest
Certificate
CertificateVerify
Finished
Certificate
CertificateVerify
Finished
Finished
recv new session ticket new session ticket
NewSessionTicket
client hello OR
client hello psk
recv client hello OR
recv client hello psk
server hello OR
server hello psk OR
server hello psk dhe
ke mode =
〈 ‘psk dhe ke’, ‘psk ke’ 〉
recv server hello OR
recv server hello psk OR
recv server hello psk dhe
ke mode =
〈 ‘psk dhe ke’, ‘psk ke’ 〉
recv server auth OR
recv server auth pskauth mode = ‘psk auth’
auth mode ∈
{‘psk sign auth’, ‘0’} server auth OR
server auth psk
auth mode = ‘psk auth’
Finished
EarlyDataStream EarlyDataStream
Figure A.1: Part 1 of the full state diagram for Tamarin model, showing all
rules covered in the initial handshake (excluding rules dealing with record
layer).
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Figure A.2: Part 2 of the full state diagram for Tamarin model, showing all
post-handshake rules covered.
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1. Introduction
Exported Authenticators (EAs)[EA] provide a method for authenticating
one party of a Transport Layer Security (TLS) communication to the
other after the session has been established. EAs are defined for
TLS 1.3[TLS13] and TLS 1.2 with extended master secret, RFC 7627
[RFC7627]. Multiple EAs sent on the same channel do not prove joint
authentication. They prove that the sender is individually
authoritative over each certificate, but not jointly authoritative
over all certificates. By including this extension a sender can
prove joint authentication. This extension can be included in
CertificateRequest messages and Certificate messages.
Joint authentication could be used, for example, to securely update
pinned certificates. When a client connects to a server for which it
has a pinned certificate, the server could send the new certificate
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to be pinned, and then bind the previously pinned certificate to it.
This proves to the client that the server is jointly authoritative
over both certificates. To defeat this mechanism an attacker is
required to both compromise the key of the old certificate and
improperly obtain a certificate from the PKI.
Another potential use is to provide proof that a certificate has been
accepted. Because EAs do not have a response mechanism, the sender
of an EA does not know the receiver's view of its authentication
status. By using this extension to reference EAs sent by its peer, a
party can prove to its peer that it has accepted a particular
certificate.
By constructing a chain of referenced EAs complex joint
authentication properties can be achieved.
Hoyland Expires December 27, 2018 [Page 2]
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1.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
262
2. Extension Format
The "extension_data" field of this extension SHALL contain:
struct {
opaque prev_certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>;
opaque binding[Hash.length];
} LayeredEA;
where "prev_certificate_request_context" is the certificate request
context of the EA you are referencing, and "binding" is the Finished
message of that same EA. The hash used is that used in the exported
authenticator, which is the hash function used by the TLS connection.
A party who wishes its peer to prove it is jointly authoritative over
multiple certificates can request a sequence of certificates, each
bound to its predecessor. Receipt of a series of EAs binding these
certificates into a chain proves the sender is jointly authoritative
over all those certificates.
A party who receives a CertificateRequest with this extension MUST
verify that it previously received or sent an EA with the appropriate
certificate request context and Finished message. If so then the
party MAY respond with a Certificate fulfilling the request, or it
MAY choose to not fulfil the request.
A party who receives a request from its peer for which it does not
recognise the referenced certificate or does not want to link to the
referenced certificate for some other reason, but still wishes to
respond with an EA MAY send an EA omitting the extension, or it MAY
choose to not fulfil the request. If the peer receives an EA with
the extension omitted it proves the sender is authoritative over the
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certificate in the EA, but makes no claims about the previous EA
referenced in the request.
For spontaneous certificates The server MUST include a unique (within
the context of the connection) certificate_request_context for any EA
it may wish to bind to. To be able to verify bindings both parties
must keep a list of accepted EAs they are willing to bind to,
including certificate_request_contexts and Finished messages. A
client that receives a spontaneous EA with a
Hoyland Expires December 27, 2018 [Page 3]
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certificate_request_context that it has already seen and for which it
is willing to receive a binding MUST ignore it.
3. Acknowledgements
4. IANA Considerations
This document requests IANA to update the TLS ExtensionsType
registry, defined in [TLS13], to include the
layered_exported_authenticator extension.
5. Security Considerations
For the authentication guarantees to apply, requests, and thus
responses, must unambiguously identify previous EAs. Because EAs do
not place a restriction on both parties to a connection using the
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same certificate_request_context, the certificate_request_context is
not sufficient to unambiguously identify previous EAs. Because EAs
are unidirectional, and the Finished message is dependent on the
labels used to enforce this, the Finished message is sufficient to
identify previous EAS unambiguously. In the case of spontaneous EAs
a malicious server or an attacker who had compromised the TLS channel
could send two identical spontaneous EAs. To militate against this a
client receiving such an EA MUST check that it has not already
accepted an EA with the same certificate_request_context that it is
willing to bind to. If it previously accepted such a certificate but
did not add it to the list of certificates which it was willing to
bind to, adding it to the list is still secure. The
certificate_request_context is included in the request to ease
identification of the previous EA, but is not sufficient alone.
Both parties can be sure the Finished messages that are used to
reference previous EAs are unique. For requested EAs the inclusion
of the certificate_request_context, which is generated by the
requestor, guarantees this is the case. For spontaneous certificates
the client may only accept EAs after checking it does not have any
EAs it is willing to bind to with the same
certificate_request_context.
The Finished messages amount to channel bindings as defined in
RFC5056 [RFC5056], and thus publication of them should not weaken the
security of either the referenced EA or the TLS channel.
This extension only authenticates prior EAs. Thus, an attacker who
is able to compromise a TLS connection could append authentications
to the connection. Any attempt to bind to these certificates by an
honest agent would not be accepted by the peer.
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Appendix C
Partial Deconstructions
For ease of reference we reproduce the code provided with the Tamarin
Prover to highlight the problems with partial deconstructions. The code was
authored by Simon Meier[1]. We discuss the issue of partial deconstructions
in Chapter 5.
C.1 The Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol
1 theory NSLPK3
2 begin
3
4 builtins: asymmetric-encryption
5
6 /*
7 Protocol: The classic three message version of the
8 Needham-Schroeder-Lowe Public Key Protocol
9 Modeler: Simon Meier
10 Date: June 2012
11 Source: Modeled after the description by Paulson in
12 Isabelle/HOL/Auth/NS_Public.thy.
13
14 Status: working
15
16 Note that we are using explicit global constants for
discerning the↪→
17 different encryption instead of the implicit sources.
[1]The code is sourced from the Tamarin prover repository and can be accessed at https:
//github.com/tamarin-prover/tamarin-prover/blob/master/examples/classic/
NSLPK3.spthy
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18 */
19
20
21 // Public key infrastructure
22 rule Register_pk:
23 [ Fr(~ltkA) ]
24 -->
25 [ !Ltk($A, ~ltkA), !Pk($A, pk(~ltkA)), Out(pk(~ltkA)) ]
26
27 rule Reveal_ltk:
28 [ !Ltk(A, ltkA) ] --[ RevLtk(A) ]-> [ Out(ltkA) ]
29
30
31 /* We formalize the following protocol
32
33 protocol NSLPK3 {
34 1. I -> R: {'1',ni,I}pk(R)
35 2. I <- R: {'2',ni,nr,R}pk(I)
36 3. I -> R: {'3',nr}pk(R)
37 }
38 */
39
40 rule I_1:
41 let m1 = aenc{'1', ~ni, $I}pkR
42 in
43 [ Fr(~ni)
44 , !Pk($R, pkR)
45 ]
46 --[ OUT_I_1(m1)
47 ]->
48 [ Out( m1 )
49 , St_I_1($I, $R, ~ni)
50 ]
51
52 rule R_1:
53 let m1 = aenc{'1', ni, I}pk(ltkR)
54 m2 = aenc{'2', ni, ~nr, $R}pkI
55 in
56 [ !Ltk($R, ltkR)
57 , In( m1 )
58 , !Pk(I, pkI)
59 , Fr(~nr)
60 ]
61 --[ IN_R_1_ni( ni, m1 )
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62 , OUT_R_1( m2 )
63 , Running(I, $R, <'init',ni,~nr>)
64 ]->
65 [ Out( m2 )
66 , St_R_1($R, I, ni, ~nr)
67 ]
68
69 rule I_2:
70 let m2 = aenc{'2', ni, nr, R}pk(ltkI)
71 m3 = aenc{'3', nr}pkR
72 in
73 [ St_I_1(I, R, ni)
74 , !Ltk(I, ltkI)
75 , In( m2 )
76 , !Pk(R, pkR)
77 ]
78 --[ IN_I_2_nr( nr, m2)
79 , Commit (I, R, <'init',ni,nr>) // need to log identities
explicitely to↪→
80 , Running(R, I, <'resp',ni,nr>) // specify that they must
not be↪→
81 // compromised in the
property.↪→
82 ]->
83 [ Out( m3 )
84 , Secret(I,R,nr)
85 , Secret(I,R,ni)
86 ]
87
88 rule R_2:
89 [ St_R_1(R, I, ni, nr)
90 , !Ltk(R, ltkR)
91 , In( aenc{'3', nr}pk(ltkR) )
92 ]
93 --[ Commit (R, I, <'resp',ni,nr>)
94 ]->
95 [ Secret(R,I,nr)
96 , Secret(R,I,ni)
97 ]
98
99 /* TODO: Also model session-key reveals and adapt security
properties. */↪→
100 rule Secrecy_claim:
101 [ Secret(A, B, m) ] --[ Secret(A, B, m) ]-> []
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102
103
104
105 /* Note that we are using an untyped protocol model.
106 The contents of the 'ni' variable in rule R_1 may therefore in
general be any↪→
107 message. This leads to unsolved chain constraints when
checking what message↪→
108 can be extracted from the message sent by rule R_1. In order
to get rid of↪→
109 these constraints, we require the following sources invariant
that relates the↪→
110 point of instantiation to the point of sending by either the
adversary or the↪→
111 initiator.
112
113 In order to understand the use of this sources invariant you
might try the↪→
114 follwing experiment. Comment out this sources invariant and
then check the↪→
115 precomputed case distinctions in the GUI. Try to complete the
proof of the↪→
116 'nonce_secrecy' lemma.
117 */
118 lemma types [sources]:
119 " (All ni m1 #i.
120 IN_R_1_ni( ni, m1) @ i
121 ==>
122 ( (Ex #j. KU(ni) @ j & j < i)
123 | (Ex #j. OUT_I_1( m1 ) @ j)
124 )
125 )
126 & (All nr m2 #i.
127 IN_I_2_nr( nr, m2) @ i
128 ==>
129 ( (Ex #j. KU(nr) @ j & j < i)
130 | (Ex #j. OUT_R_1( m2 ) @ j)
131 )
132 )
133 "
134
135 // Nonce secrecy from the perspective of both the initiator
and the responder.↪→
136 lemma nonce_secrecy:
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137 " /* It cannot be that */
138 not(
139 Ex A B s #i.
140 /* somebody claims to have setup a shared secret, */
141 Secret(A, B, s) @ i
142 /* but the adversary knows it */
143 & (Ex #j. K(s) @ j)
144 /* without having performed a long-term key reveal.
*/↪→
145 & not (Ex #r. RevLtk(A) @ r)
146 & not (Ex #r. RevLtk(B) @ r)
147 )"
148
149 // Injective agreement from the perspective of both the
initiator and the responder.↪→
150 lemma injective_agree:
151 " /* Whenever somebody commits to running a session, then*/
152 All actor peer params #i.
153 Commit(actor, peer, params) @ i
154 ==>
155 /* there is somebody running a session with the same
parameters */↪→
156 (Ex #j. Running(actor, peer, params) @ j & j < i
157 /* and there is no other commit on the same
parameters */↪→
158 & not(Ex actor2 peer2 #i2.
159 Commit(actor2, peer2, params) @ i2 &
not(#i = #i2)↪→
160 )
161 )
162 /* or the adversary perform a long-term key reveal on
actor or peer */↪→
163 | (Ex #r. RevLtk(actor) @ r)
164 | (Ex #r. RevLtk(peer) @ r)
165 "
166
167 // Consistency check: ensure that secrets can be shared
between honest agents.↪→
168 lemma session_key_setup_possible:
169 exists-trace
170 " /* It is possible that */
171 Ex A B s #i.
172 /* somebody claims to have setup a shared secret, */
173 Secret(A, B, s) @ i
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174 /* without the adversary having performed a long-term
key reveal. */↪→
175 & not (Ex #r. RevLtk(A) @ r)
176 & not (Ex #r. RevLtk(B) @ r)
177 "
178
179 end
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